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Abstract 
 
The IEEE 802.11 networks are vulnerable to numerous wireless-specific attacks. 
Attackers can implement MAC address spoofing techniques to launch these attacks, 
while masquerading themselves behind a false MAC address. The implementation of 
Intrusion Detection Systems has become fundamental in the development of security 
infrastructures for wireless networks. This thesis proposes the designing a novel 
security system that makes use of metrics from multiple layers of observation to 
produce a collective decision on whether an attack is taking place. 
The Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence is the data fusion technique used to 
combine the evidences from the different layers. A novel, unsupervised and self-
adaptive Basic Probability Assignment (BPA) approach able to automatically adapt its 
beliefs assignment to the current characteristics of the wireless network is proposed. 
This BPA approach is composed of three different and independent statistical 
techniques, which are capable to identify the presence of attacks in real time. Despite 
the lightweight processing requirements, the proposed security system produces 
outstanding detection results, generating high intrusion detection accuracy and very 
low number of false alarms. A thorough description of the generated results, for all the 
considered datasets is presented in this thesis. The effectiveness of the proposed 
system is evaluated using different types of injection attacks. Regarding one of these 
attacks, to the best of the author knowledge, the security system presented in this 
thesis is the first one able to efficiently identify the Airpwn attack.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) have experienced a tremendous growth in 
popularity over the last decade. WLANs, based on the IEEE 802.11 standard, have 
become very affordable and have been increasingly deployed in businesses of any 
kind, educational institutions, governmental buildings, public places, and private 
properties. They offer to users significant mobility advantage, usage flexibility, fast 
and cheap network deployment, and easier scalability than conventional wired 
networks. More recently, 4G technology has gained relevance in the mobile and 
broadband connectivity market. Two 4G wireless technologies, Long Term Evolution 
(LTE) and Worldwide Interoperability of Microwave Access (WiMAX), based on the 
IEEE 802.16 standard, are forecasted to dominate the broadband connectivity market. 
The number of mobile broadband subscribers is expected to reach 9.3 billion by 
2018 [1]. Despite the growth in popularity of the 4G technologies, IEEE 802.11 
networks, known as WiFi, still attracts great interest among companies that provide 
Internet access, and final users. Infonetics explains that mobile operators want to see a 
closer integration of WiFi with mobile networks in coming years. The mobile 
operators perceive WiFi as a key solution for more intelligent mobile offload [2]. This 
market research firm forecasts that mobile WiFi access points will experience in 2016 
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a growth rate of the 86%, as mobile operators want a closer integration between WiFi 
and the mobile networks [3]. Private users of wireless-ready electronic devices still 
perceive WiFi as the main source of data connectivity for their smartphones and 
tablets. According to the report in [4], 58% of smartphone users and 93% of tablet 
owners use WiFi for Internet access, rather than using mobile broadband connectivity. 
1.2 Insecurity of Wireless Networks 
Unfortunately, the fast change in technology, the general trend towards mobility and 
Internet accessibility anytime-anywhere are playing a very important role in the 
insecurity of wireless devices. The vulnerabilities present in the wireless standard 
protocols have exposed wireless network users to an increasing number of 
sophisticated, easy to launch and untraceable attacks [51]. A discussion about the 
security of wireless network is presented in [53]. 
The IEEE 802.11 standard proposed different security protocols, establishing 
traffic encryption and integrity protection to the network infrastructure [5], as well as 
avoiding unauthorised access to the wireless networks. However, wireless networks 
cannot rely on these security protocols to protect the content of the communications. 
All these security protocols are vulnerable to decryption analysis processes [7] [8] 
[10]. In addition to be vulnerable to attacks and intrusion attempts that generally affect 
the devices connected to the wired networks such as viruses, malware, spam, web-
based attacks, Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed DoS (DDoS), identity theft, etc., 
the wireless network users suffer also from new types of attacks that specifically 
affects the wireless networks. These attacks are known as Wireless-Specific attacks. 
The wireless-specific attacks target the wireless vulnerabilities in the two lower layers 
of the network protocol stack, the Physical (PHY) and the Medium Access Control 
(MAC) layers. In contrast to the cyber-attacks that come from the core of the network 
and reach the wireless devices through the Access Point (AP) for WiFi networks 
(eNodeBS for LTE and Base Station for WiMAX), wireless-specific attacks are those 
that are launched with a third party device and reach the wireless devices through the 
wireless link of the network. 
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The difficulty of launching cyber-attacks that specifically compromise the 
wireless communications is decreasing fast. The required knowledge, software and 
devices to launch these attacks are very easily available [9]. Both the software tools 
and the essential instructions can be easily found on the Internet. Similarly, the 
appropriate wireless Network Interface Controller (NIC) can be bought and the precise 
chipset driver can be also found on the Internet. 
Bringing together the fact that the wireless networks are significantly more 
unsecure and easier to compromise by cyber-attacks than wired networks, the 
forecasted increase in the number of users that will make use of wireless networks to 
access to the Internet, and the fact that the number of cyber-crimes has experienced 
tremendous growth in recent years, creates the perfect scenario possible for hackers to 
carry out their malicious actions. The authors of [12] present a complete taxonomy of 
the most common threats that WLANs may encounter. Currently, the number of 
attacks that specifically target mobile devices remains small. However, information 
security experts have alerted that it is only a matter of time before these figures change 
[6]. It is expected that the next generation of wireless networks, particularly those 
serving a wide range of users (e.g. open/public wireless networks) will have to operate 
during prolonged periods of time under threat of attack or facing long periods of active 
attacks. Therefore, it is clear that special effort must be made to provide more reliable 
protection mechanisms to such networks and the devices that access to them. 
1.2.1 Mechanisms to Enhance Wireless Networks Security 
The design of secure and reliable wireless networks presents a major challenge to 
security system designers. Security mechanisms that have been commonly used to 
protect the networks, and especially wireless networks, have not been completely 
efficient. Whichever the implemented security mechanisms, it has been a matter of 
time before these mechanisms have been circumvented or overpassed by attackers. All 
the security mechanism should be designed with the following security objectives in 
mind. These security objectives have been nicely documented in [10] [12]. 
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 Confidentiality 
The network security systems should ensure that only authorised users have access 
to transmitted information, and safeguard the privacy of the transmitted 
information from unauthorised users and attackers. Encryption, authentication and 
access control mechanisms are the most commonly utilised approaches to provide 
confidentiality to the wireless communications [13]. Authentication and access 
control mechanisms prevent unauthorised access to the wireless network resources. 
Encryption mechanisms prevent attacker or unauthorised users from reading 
transmitted information. 
 Integrity 
The wireless devices within the WLANs should be aware of any intentional or 
unintentional modification in the transmitted information. The network security 
systems also should guarantee that unauthorised users and attackers do not modify 
the transmitted information, and indicate whether the information has been 
replayed. Cryptographic hashes are commonly utilised to provide integrity for 
wireless communications. 
 Availability 
The wireless network should guarantee that legitimate devices could always be 
accessed and be able to use the network resources, upon demand. Network security 
systems should ensure that unintended users or attackers could not block the access 
to the wireless network resources. Because the availability of a network could be 
compromised by attacks of diverse nature, different security mechanisms might be 
required to safeguard the availability of the network. 
Traditional network security mechanisms, such as cryptography protocols, firewalls or 
antivirus, are not efficient enough to protect the wireless network infrastructure. These 
static mechanisms are unable to dynamically adapt their detection capabilities to either 
the changing characteristics of the protected communication systems or the constantly 
changing complexity of the cyber-attacks. Although different amendments of the 
wireless technology standards have been released and modified to provide stronger 
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cryptographic mechanisms and more robust security policies, there are still numerous 
attacks able to compromise the privacy of the wireless communications. Antivirus 
systems are intended to protect Personal Computers (PCs) from viruses, malware or 
Trojan horses, mainly at the application layer. These systems are effective identifying 
and removing from the systems infections that have already occurred, but 
inappropriate to protect wireless networks and wireless devices at the lower layers of 
the protocol stack. The firewalls, commonly allocated between the local network and 
the Internet Service Provider (ISP) backbone, cannot protect wireless networks from 
wireless-specific attacks because the lack of physical boundaries allows the attacker to 
directly interact with the wireless devices without passing through the firewall. 
Therefore, an improved or alternative solution for securing the wireless networks is 
required. 
1.2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 
Performing an analysis of the vulnerabilities of the wireless networks it is easy to 
conclude that there exist three main characteristics that make the implementation of 
the wireless-specific attacks feasible. These are the ability to intercept and analyse the 
wireless communications content, the capability to inject malicious information into 
the wireless communication, and the capacity to impersonate the identity of legitimate 
wireless members of the network. An attacker can easily implement techniques of 
MAC address spoofing. These characteristics allow the attackers to implement an 
immense number of attacks that compromise the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the wireless communications and wireless networks infrastructure. The 
efforts to provide reliable security to the wireless networks should focus on 
discovering the real identity of the device that transmits the frames, even if the 
attacker masquerades itself behind a false identity. 
The implementation of wireless network monitoring tools, such as Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs), able to identify the presence of attackers intercepting and 
injecting information, as well as impersonating the identity of legitimate wireless 
devices, has become fundamental in the development of security infrastructures for 
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wireless networks. IDSs are security systems designed to protect networks or 
computer systems by constantly monitoring and detecting malicious actions that 
compromise the resources of the monitored system [14]. In [86], the authors describe 
the main functions performed by IDSs as gathering activity information from the 
monitored system, analysing the gathered information and assessing the nature of this 
information, and raising an alarm if the outcome of the detection process indicates the 
presence of attack. These systems incorporate sophisticated information analysis 
techniques that allow processing diverse types of information. 
IDSs outperform the protection capabilities of cryptography protocols, firewalls or 
antivirus. As will be explained in Chapter 4, certain types of IDSs dynamically update 
their detection capabilities, enhancing the network protection capabilities against 
attacks [15], in contrast to the traditional static security mechanisms; in particular, the 
anomaly-based IDSs. Different mechanisms could be utilised by the IDSs to analyse 
the datasets. Some mechanisms would produce more efficient results than others, 
depending on the different factors, such as the behaviour of the monitored system, the 
type of attacks, or the gathered metrics. An approach that has gained wide interest 
among the research community is the use of Data Mining techniques in tasks of 
intrusion detection [36]. 
The utilisation of data mining techniques has been proved to improve the 
detection capabilities of IDSs, making the datasets analysis process more efficient. 
Data mining techniques are able to identify previously unknown and useful 
information in datasets applying different mathematical and statistical analysis. 
However, almost every single data mining technique used in tasks of intrusion 
detection suffers from important drawbacks that need to be overcome. For instance, 
some of these techniques require preprocessing the analysed datasets to produce 
acceptable results, or require performing a thorough training process before carrying 
out the data analysis. 
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1.2.3 Multi-Layer Detection and Data Fusion 
IDSs can make use of any observable and measurable metric of the monitored system 
to detect attacks. According to [16], common sources to extract these metrics are audit 
logs, network traffic, user commands or system calls. Focusing on wireless networks, 
the different features could be extracted from the frame headers, the frames payload or 
constructed traffic Netflow data. There is no restriction in the number of layers from 
which the metrics could be extracted. Either a single metric or multiple metrics could 
be extracted from one or multiple layers throughout the whole protocol stack. These 
gathered metrics compose the dataset analysed by an IDS to detect the presence of 
attacks or evidence of intrusion attempts. 
The utilisation of an appropriate number of metrics is a very important step for 
IDSs towards an efficient intrusion detection process. Although there are cases in 
which IDSs that utilise information from a single metric might give precise detection 
results, the presence of attacks is rarely accurately detectable by examining a single 
metric from one layer of the protocol stack. As many researchers have previously 
demonstrated [37] [38] [39], the combined use of multiple metrics from the same or 
different protocol layers may result in higher detection accuracy rate with lower 
numbers of false alarms. Hence, utilising a multi-layer approach may help towards 
improving the process of detecting and mitigating wireless network attacks. 
Using the information from multiple metrics from multiple layers could be 
managed in different ways. One of the mechanisms is the utilisation of data fusion 
methods to make a combined use of the information from the different metrics. Data 
fusion can be defined as the process of collecting information from multiple and 
heterogeneous sources, and combining them towards obtaining a more accurate final 
result [39]. Among different data fusion methods that could have been utilised, the 
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) Theory of Evidence has been chosen in this work. One of the 
reasons for this selection is the ability of managing uncertainty, which allows tackling 
a large range of problems. 
The D-S theory has been previously used in the intrusion detection field to 
enhance the detection accuracy of IDSs [39] [40] [41]. Despite been proven as a 
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powerful and efficient technique, a very important step to allow D-S theory to be used 
in practice remains to be investigated. This is to find an automatic and self-adaptive 
process of Basic Probability Assignment (BPA), based on the measured characteristics 
of the network. The major challenge for applying D-S theory in IDS is to 
automatically determine the beliefs assigned to each of the considered hypothesis, 
based on the information extracted from the network measurements [42]. None of the 
previous works that use D-S has found an efficient solution to this challenge. 
Among all the works on IDS that investigate the use of the D-S theory, there exist 
multiple ways of assigning belief to each of the considered hypotheses. However, few 
of them could be used off-the-shelf without either prior thorough training or fine 
tuning period. Furthermore, most of the alternative techniques have to be trained with 
completely clean datasets. Expert opinion to manually assign the belief probabilities is 
often the utilised approach, which is inadequate for automatic and self-adaptive IDSs. 
The utilisation of fixed functions or linear functions to assign the belief is another 
approach often utilised, which cannot automatically adapt to changes. Other group of 
approaches to assign belief to each of the hypotheses is based on the uses of data 
mining techniques, which require the gathering of large amounts of data traffic and the 
completion of a training period before being able to perform BPA tasks. These 
systems may be unable to automatically adapt to changes in real time. 
1.3 Motivation and Objectives 
Despite the development of many mechanisms to provide security for the wireless 
networks, these networks remain insecure. Wireless communications still suffer from 
security vulnerabilities [10]. Designing a security system that could provide better 
levels of protection for the wireless networks is one of the principal objectives of this 
thesis. Any effort to provide an extra level of protection to a network has become an 
issue of critical importance. In an optimum situation, security system should be 
autonomous and unsupervised, able to work with the intervention from a system 
administrator. Designing a system with these characteristics has become one of the 
objectives of this research work. 
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Security systems that work in off-line or nearly real time are one step behind the 
attackers. In order to provide significant security protection against attacks, the 
proposed security mechanism should work in real time, analysing network frames as 
soon as they arrive to the protected system. The security system should be capable of 
detecting the presence of attacks without the need for thorough training process and 
the computational cost of the system should be lightweight to be applied in real time. 
Therefore, the proposed system should be computationally low cost. In addition, it is 
desirable for a security system to be scalable and applicable to other wireless 
technologies. 
As explained previously, the utilisation of multi-layer approaches may help 
towards improving the process of detecting and mitigating wireless network attacks. 
Hence, in order to maximise the accuracy of the security system, this system should 
implement multi-layer and data fusion techniques to increase the intrusion detection 
capabilities. The D-S theory has been chosen in this work, for the ability of managing 
uncertainty that this technique provides. In order to utilise the D-S theory as part of an 
autonomous and unsupervised security system, able to perform the detection in real 
time, an automatic and self-adaptive BPA must be found. Currently, there exist 
multiple ways of assigning belief to each of the considered hypotheses. However, few 
of them could be used off-the-shelf without either prior thorough training or fine 
tuning period. Therefore, the implementation of novel BPA techniques able to 
automatically adapt their beliefs assignment to the current characteristics of the 
wireless network, without intervention from an IDS administrator became another of 
the most important objectives of this thesis. 
1.4 Design Challenges 
The experiments for the development of this thesis have been implemented using 
wireless network traffic datasets gathered in a live operational wireless network. WiFi 
has been the wireless network technology selected for the development of this work. 
This decision has been taken for different reasons. Firstly, the IEEE 802.11 standard 
still attract great interest among companies and final users. As explained previously, 
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despite the growth in popularity of the 4G technologies, it is expected that wireless 
networks based on this standard will experience an 86% growth rate by 2016 [2]. 
Second, the wireless equipment based on the IEEE 802.11 standard was more easily 
accessible than WiMAX equipment. A limited number of WiMAX cards using open 
source drivers were available, making the implementation of wireless-specific attacks 
in a live operational WiMAX network unfeasible. Also, the compatibility of TShark 
[17] gathering network traffic is more advanced and better integrated with the IEEE 
802.11 standard than the 4G technology standards. 
Attempts were made to evaluate the proposed methodology on a WiMAX 
network. Although a base station emulator was used for this purpose, the capabilities 
of this emulator were highly restricted, and did not allow the implementation of the 
wireless-specific attacks that have been examined in this thesis. The level of restriction 
of this WiMAX network emulator made it difficult to acquire real WiMAX network 
traffic, and the experiments that have been implemented in this work were therefore 
very limited. However, the potential of the approach for use on a WiMAX network has 
been investigated to some degree. 
It should be noted that the LTE and WiMAX network traffic datasets required 
could not have been created directly utilising the different network simulation 
software available. This option was discarded because of two main reasons. On the 
one hand, the network simulation software tools are unable to take into account all the 
parameters and environmental conditions that wireless communication may experience 
in a physical network testbed. The simulated network traffic datasets would lack 
relevant information to implement the experiments and to conduct the attack 
detections. On the other hand, the available network simulation software tools do not 
allow direct implementation of the wireless-specific attacks that are examined in this 
thesis. Therefore, the main experiments for the development of this thesis have been 
implemented in a physically deployed WiFi network testbed. 
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1.5 Thesis Contributions and Outcomes 
 Novel BPA methodology 
The most important contribution of this thesis is a novel BPA methodology able 
to automatically adapt its probabilities assignment to the current characteristics of 
the wireless network, without intervention from an IDS administrator. The novel 
automatic, unsupervised and self-adaptive BPA methodology developed for this 
thesis is composed of three different and independent statistical techniques, able of 
generating predictions regarding the presence of attacks, based on historical 
parameters. 
 Multi-layer security system 
Another major contribution of this thesis is the development of a novel automatic 
and self-adaptive security system, based on multi-layer data fusion architecture, 
which provides real time protection to the wireless networks against wireless-
specific attacks. The security mechanism developed for this thesis makes use of 
metrics from multiple layers of observation to protect IEEE 802.11 networks from 
wireless-specific attacks. The developed anomaly-based IDS provides high level of 
protection to the wireless networks against this type of attacks. In addition, the 
system has been proved scalable and applicable to other wireless technologies. 
 Real time protection 
The presented security system only requires a lightweight process for generating a 
baseline profile of normal utilisation. The lightweight processing requirements of 
the three proposed techniques allow implementing the BPA process for the 
detection in real time, concluding the real nature of each single analysed frame is 
just a few μseconds. This timeframe allows the presented system to perform any 
countermeasure action before a new incoming frame reaches the protected system. 
 High intrusion detection accuracy 
Despite the lightweight processing requirements, the proposed security system 
produces outstanding detection results, generating high intrusion detection 
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accuracy and very low number of false alarms. It also ratifies the improvement in 
the intrusion detection process provided by the combined use of information from 
multiple protocols stack layers. The complete description of the IDS framework 
and the detailed description of the three developed BPA methodologies are 
presented in this thesis. 
 Detection of different injection attacks 
The effectiveness of the presented security system has been evaluated using 
different types of injection attacks. Regarding one of these attacks, to the best of 
the author knowledge, the security system presented in this thesis is the first one 
able to efficiently identify the Airpwn attack [18]. Still there has not been reported 
evidence that cyber-attackers are using the Airpwn attack actively. Nonetheless, in 
this thesis it is speculated that cyber-attackers might see in this tool an effective 
and easy to implement mechanism to gain substantial economic benefit. 
 Publicly available datasets 
A series of network traffic datasets have been gathered from a live operational 
IEEE 802.11 network, physically deployed in the laboratory of the High Speed 
Network Group, at Loughborough University. The network traffic was gathered 
and stored in the form of pcap files [19], using TShark. These datasets have been 
made accessible and publicly available in [20]. Considering the lack of publicly 
available network traffic datasets with which different IDSs can be evaluated, the 
gathered datasets is another contribution of this thesis. 
 Source code 
The presented security system has been written in the C language, during the 
completion of this thesis, which provides great flexibility to be easily adapted or 
integrated to other security implementations. 
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1.6 Thesis Outline 
The outline of the thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the most important published works in the 
field of wireless security and intrusion detection. Existing detection methodologies to 
identify attacks in WLANs that make use of MAC spoofing are central to the content 
of this chapter. Different data mining techniques are described. Additionally, systems 
that use of multi-layer approach and data fusion methodologies are also discussed. 
This chapter also describes the different methods to determine the BPA values in D-S 
theory present in the IDS literature. 
Chapter 3 presents a description of the security protocols recommended by the 
IEEE 802.11 standard, along with a brief description of the current security systems. 
This chapter also presents an extensive overview of the most common wireless-
specific attacks. These are the attacks that more commonly compromise to wireless 
networks, in order to find a common implementation pattern that could help to identify 
a common detection or countermeasure mechanism against these attacks. The chapter 
finishes with a description of the particular wireless-specific attacks that have been 
practically evaluated in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of IDSs. This chapter presents a detailed 
taxonomy of the most relevant characteristics considered when an IDS is designed, as 
well as the pros and cons of each of the characteristics. Next, this chapter describes the 
characteristic included in the final architecture design of the IDS presented in this 
thesis, and discusses the principal reasons for selecting each of the characteristics that 
have been included in the final architecture of the system. The purpose of this chapter 
is to find the most convenient architecture for the presented detection system. 
Chapter 5 introduces a thorough description of the detection techniques and 
internal architecture design of the IDS presented in this thesis. It describes the way the 
information if administrated within the IDS, and explains the sliding window 
technique developed to implement the IDS training process. It also introduces the 
concepts of multi-layer intrusion detection and data fusion techniques. The chapter 
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concludes with the description of a novel BPA methodology able to automatically 
adapt its probabilities assignment to the current characteristics of the wireless network, 
without intervention from an IDS administrator. 
Chapter 6 provides a thorough analysis of the wireless network traffic datasets 
analysed in this thesis. This chapter starts with a decision of whether utilise well-
known network datasets, synthetically generated dataset, or network traffic datasets 
gathered from a live operational network. It also describes the testbed from which the 
different datasets have been gathered. Then, all the metrics used to carry out the 
intrusion detection are individually described. For each of the datasets, a thorough 
statistical analysis of each of the metrics is presented. The chapter concludes with a 
brief description of the concept of feature selection and curse of dimensionality. 
Chapter 7 evaluates the effectiveness of the unsupervised anomaly based IDS 
framework presented in this thesis. This chapter presents a series of experiments and a 
thorough description of the generated results, for all the considered datasets and all the 
possible metric combinations. The experiments compare the detection results 
generated using the multi-layer approach (i.e. when all the considered metrics are 
used) against the same methodology utilising different sets of metrics. Also, the 
experiments evaluate the system configuration that best result generates, as well as the 
most appropriate sliding window length. The presented results empirically prove the 
efficiency of the proposed IDS and the different BPA techniques. In addition, the 
results empirically prove the intrusion detection can be implemented in real time. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides the conclusions of this thesis and discusses the 
possible future research work. 
 15
 
 
 
Chapter 2  
Related Work 
 
The research literature based on network security and IDSs is extensive. This chapter 
starts with an overview of the most important works published in the field of wireless 
security. It also provides an overview of the most important published works in the 
field of intrusion detection. Next, a brief description of some of the most widely used 
intrusion detection techniques is presented. Different techniques could be utilised by 
the IDSs to analyse network traffic and to identify attacks. Given that the efficiency of 
the IDSs depends on these techniques, it is important to consider the available 
intrusion detection techniques that could have been used in this thesis. For each 
technique, some advantages and disadvantages have been listed. This chapter pays 
special attention to the techniques mainly used by anomaly IDSs. Additionally, 
systems that use a multi-layer approach and data fusion methodologies are also 
discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes with the description of the different methods 
to determine the BPA values in D-S theory present in the IDS literature, and their 
inadequacy in being determined automatically and in real time, based on the measured 
characteristics of the analysed network traffic. 
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2.1 Wireless Security Background 
The insecurity of IEEE 802.11 networks has been addressed in multiple research 
works. The authors of [12] present a complete taxonomy of the most common threats 
that WLANs may encounter. A number of wireless-specific attacks are described, 
along with a series of countermeasures. In [49], the authors address the insecurity of 
WiFi networks, describing some of the security protocols included in the IEEE 802.11 
standard and some of the vulnerabilities. Similarly, the authors of [50] also describe 
some of the vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.11 standard. 
One of the most relevant works about the WiFi network vulnerabilities is 
presented in [51]. The authors describe a series IEEE 802.11 network vulnerabilities 
that could be exploited by an attacker. Then, the feasibility of implementing some 
wireless-specific attacks and the effect that these attacks produce on the wireless 
networks are studied with practical experiments. Finally, a number of countermeasures 
are also suggested. Other research work that describes an overview of the 
vulnerabilities in WiFi networks is presented in [52]. 
A discussion about the security of wireless network is presented in [53]. In this 
work, the authors discuss concepts about the security mechanisms of both, 3G and 
WiFi networks, and describe some of the standards vulnerabilities. Another research 
on the insecurity of wireless networks is presented in [5]. Similar to [53], this work 
discusses concepts about the security mechanisms of 3G and WiFi networks. A wide 
description of different security mechanisms described in the IEEE 802.11 standard is 
presented. 
2.2 Research on Intrusion Detection Systems 
IDSs have been a very active research topic for more than a decade. There are 
numerous publications that propose novel IDS approaches, for instance, to increase the 
detection efficiency of IDSs or to design more effective architecture of these systems. 
In [55], an extensive description of multiple concepts about IDSs is presented. The 
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authors provide a complete guidance about the design, implementation and 
deployments of IDSs. 
In [56], the authors describe multiple general concepts in the field of IDSs. This 
work describes some of the most common categories of IDS, provides some detection 
techniques, and presents the concept of data fusion in IDSs. Similarly, an extensive 
description of multiple concepts of IDSs is presented in [57] and explains some of the 
issues that remain open in the field of IDSs. Multiple concepts about IDSs are also 
presented in [58]. IDS categories, advantages and disadvantages of some of these 
categories and detection techniques are described in this work. 
One of the most complete researches on IDSs is presented in [10]. This 
dissertation initially introduces the IEEE 802.11 standard, describes some of the 
vulnerabilities and feasible attacks, and gives a complete taxonomy of IDSs. Then, the 
author proposes a novel detection approach to detect intrusion in WLANs, using 
information from the PHY and MAC layers. In the PHY layer, the difference between 
consecutive Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) values is calculated and 
compared against a defined threshold. In the MAC layer, [10] measures the Round 
Trip Time (RTT) that takes to complete the Request-to-Send (RTS) - Clear-to-Send 
(CTS) handshake between the AP and the wireless client. This approach would be 
ineffective if the wireless devices do not implement the RTS-CTS process. 
Additionally, the detection threshold is calculated using averages of historical 
information. In contrast to the work presented in this thesis, both approaches operate 
independently. An alarm is raised after both approach consider there is an attack. 
2.2.1 Detecting Attacks 
A complete description of DoS attacks has been presented in [59]. The authors make a 
short description of IEEE 802.11 networks before describing a number of DoS attacks 
at the PHY and MAC layers. This work also presents a series of countermeasures that 
could be implemented against this type of attack. In [60], the authors present a brief 
description of different DoS that can be implemented in wireless networks. DoS 
attacks in WiFi networks, launched at the PHY and MAC layers, have been studied in 
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many other research works. In [61] [62], the authors practically demonstrated the 
effect of the DoS attacks at both layers, stopping the legitimate wireless 
communication. Other researches have used simulation environments to study the DoS 
attacks in WiFi networks. For instance, [63] [64] [65] present works that use OPNET 
network modeller [66] to simulate DoS attacks. These works also propose 
countermeasure mechanisms against this type of attacks, and describe possible 
drawbacks for the proposed mechanisms. 
In [67], another type of DoS attacks is presented. The authors have practically 
evaluated the effect of authentication request and association request flooding on the 
network performance. The solution against this attack proposed by the authors, MAC 
address filtering, may work against the legitimate network users. 
One of the research works that employs the monotonic increment of the sequence 
number value to identify spoofing attacks is presented in [68]. Initially this work 
presents an extensive study about the change pattern of the sequence number in non-
malicious situations. This is compared against the change pattern of the sequence 
number when spoofing attack takes place. Then, the authors propose and practically 
evaluate a methodology that uses sequence number value to identify attacks. Although 
the results show this is an effective approach, the authors explain that the proposed 
methodology is unable to detect spoofed frames if the attacker replicates the sequence 
number value of the last legitimate frame transmitted. 
The methodology proposed in [72] also conducts the analysis of the sequence 
number to identify the presence of MAC spoofing attacks. Initially, the proposed 
detection system computes the theoretical maximum number of frames that can be 
transmitted per second. Through the use of the sequence number and the frame arrival 
time, the proposed methodology calculates whether the theoretical maximum number 
of frames is surpassed. In that case an alarm is reported. As highlighted by the authors, 
the effectiveness of this methodology relies on an arbitrary threshold defined by the 
system administrator, which is a major drawback. In addition, this methodology is 
unable to manage retransmitted frames, which, according to the authors, always 
produce false alarms. The authors of [72] also describe the utilisation of MacSpoof, a 
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sequence number analysis tool. MacSpoof identifies gaps between the sequence 
numbers of two consecutive frames. If a certain number of gaps occur within a 
specified time period, an alarm is reported. This is another example of an inefficient 
detection mechanism that identifies the presence of attacks counting the number of 
times that the protected system has been attacked during a defined period of time. 
In [69], the authors tackle the detection of spoofing attacks in a wireless ad hoc 
network. This work describes a method to detect MAC spoofing attacks, using the 
sequence numbers at the MAC layer and the interarrival time between frames. 
Described by the authors, in a situation in which the spoofing device transmitted 
before the legitimate wireless device, the detection system that uses the sequence 
numbers would consider that the legitimate device is implementing a spoofing attack. 
Additionally, the presented methodology makes uses of a sliding window scheme. For 
the implementation of the experiments, the authors explain that the length of the 
window ‘should be large enough’. However, the appropriate window length is never 
specified. In addition, the implementation of the severity region proposed in this work 
requires the administrator to specify the threshold levels. 
Another approach that proposes using the sequence number to detect MAC 
spoofing attacks is presented in [70]. The authors present an adaptive threshold 
methodology to identify abrupt changes in the sequence number sequences. This 
approach is enhanced using timestamps of the monitored frames. Once more, the 
proposed system makes use of a threshold, which is empirically specified by the 
authors. Besides, the timestamp analysis is applied only on Beacon or Probe 
management frames. 
The authors of [71] also present a methodology to detect MAC spoofing attacks 
using the sequence number and ???? . This work requires generating a profile of 
normal behaviour in advance only with non-malicious information. The authors 
assume that the attacker is not present during the profiling period, and it is also 
assumed that the legitimate device is positioned in a fixed geographical location. 
Similar pieces of information are used in [72] to detect identity spoofing attacks. 
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In [73], the authors also tackle the detection of spoofing attacks in wireless 
networks using the single metric ????  to detect MAC spoofing attacks. Their 
approach requires the wireless devices to monitor the ???? value of communication in 
both directions of the communication between two legitimate devices in order to 
detect spoofing attacks. Also, the detection methodology requires the legitimate 
devices to keep and exchange records of the measured ????. Both parties compare 
their own records with the received information to detect the presence of identity 
spoofing attacks. This approach implementation exposes the exchanged information to 
be compromised by an attacker. Additionally, presented experiments involve ICMP 
protocol communication between the wireless devices. Whilst this type of information 
may be useful for the evaluation of the proposed methodology, this may not be 
representative of a real wireless network communication. 
The authors of [74] also show that individual ???? fingerprints can be used to 
identify the presence of MAC spoofing attacks. The presence of separate ???? 
fingerprints generated by a single MAC address indicates the presence of MAC 
spoofing attack. The authors of [75] also make use of the ???? , along with the 
geographical location of the wireless device, to detect the presence of identity 
spoofing attacks. After measuring the mean value of the ????  at multiple specific 
locations, the proposed methodology makes use of K-means clustering technique to 
identify the attack. The authors need to define the particular threshold value of the 
distance between centroids in the clusters to discriminate between non-malicious and 
spoofed information. The main drawback of this methodology is the assumption that 
the geographical location of the devices is accurately known. Additionally, the 
detection threshold needs to be empirically specified. 
The authors of [76] make a critic against the mechanisms that use the sequence 
number and ????  to identify spoofing attacks. As an attempt to overcome the 
drawbacks of these methodologies, the authors propose an alternative methodology 
that associates the sequence number with some Quality-of-Service (QoS) parameters, 
with different wireless devices manufacturers, along with location parameters. 
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2.3 Detection Technique for Intrusion Detection Systems 
The efficiency of the detection systems depends on the detection engine and the 
intrusion detection technique that it employs. Over the years, researchers and private 
companies have proposed and developed numerous techniques, which allow IDSs to 
analyse datasets and categorise the network traffic instances either as normal or 
malicious [77]. Some of the techniques would produce more efficient results than 
others, depending on different factors, such as the behaviour of the monitored system, 
the type of attacks, or the gathered metrics. 
This section is not intended to describe in detail all the available detection 
techniques, but to give a brief insight into some of the most widely used intrusion 
detection techniques that could have been used in this thesis. For each of the 
techniques, the advantages that make them appropriate for intrusion detection, and the 
disadvantages that make these techniques inadequate for intrusion detection have been 
listed. The authors of [57] [58] indicate that the three most common techniques used 
by the anomaly-based IDSs are statistical methods, machine learning and data mining 
techniques. The most common techniques used by misuse-based IDSs are pattern 
recognition, implication rules and data mining techniques. Since the system proposed 
in this thesis is primarily an anomaly IDSs, this chapter pays special attention to the 
techniques used by this type of detection systems, and leaves aside the techniques 
mainly used by misuse IDSs. 
2.3.1 Statistical-based Detection Techniques 
Statistical-based IDSs are the most widely used systems [78]. Generally, these systems 
construct two models or profiles [58], along with an alarm threshold. The first of these 
profiles is the reference of normal network traffic behaviour, constructed during the 
training process or training phase. Statistical techniques are used to generate a 
stochastic model that represents the behaviour of previously gathered information 
[36]. The second profile is the statistical representation of the currently analysed 
information, during the detection process. The amount of data required to generate this 
  
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK 
22
profile should not be as predominant as for the profile of normal network traffic 
behaviour. In addition, the alarm threshold is a value that establishes the boundary 
between normal and malicious information [55]. 
Two of the main difficulties for statistical-based IDSs are the creation of accurate 
profiles and accurately comparing both profiles. Statistical-based IDSs compare both 
profiles and calculate the level of deviation. An intrusion is identified if the level of 
deviation between the two profiles exceeds the alarm threshold. The level of deviation 
is usually calculated based on a distance function [78] such as the Euclidean distance, 
Manhattan distance or Hamming distance. In frequently changing environments such 
as wireless networks, new statistical profiles for the current analysed information 
should be repeatedly generated. The reference of normality requires a good training 
process. Whilst it is not always necessary to implement the training highly frequently, 
the statistical profile of the currently analysed information requires to be constantly 
updated every time a new frame is gathered. Also, the procedure of defining the alarm 
threshold represents high difficulty [79]. The value of the alarm threshold has an 
important and direct impact on the performance of the detection system. If the alarm 
threshold was not large enough, the IDS would tend to generate False Positives (FPs). 
In contrast, if the alarm threshold was too large, the IDS would tend to produce a high 
number of False Negatives (FNs) [78] [80]. 
In [36], the authors highlight that statistical-based IDSs do not require prior 
knowledge about the normal behaviour of the protected system. Based on the 
assumption that the normal traffic is predominant in the network traffic, the model 
representing the behaviour of previously gathered information would represent, in 
turn, the behaviour of non-malicious network traffic. This property gives the 
statistical-based IDSs the ability to adaptively learn the normal behaviour of the 
protected network traffic [56]. 
However, this type of approach is not exempt of disadvantages. Statistical-based 
IDSs require gathering network traffic over a period of time [79]. If the time required 
for gathering the information is excessively large, detection could not be implemented 
in real time. Another disadvantage highlighted by the authors of [36] is that the 
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reference of normality that these systems generate is susceptible to gradual 
modification over a period of time by the attacker. This modification causes an IDS to 
believe that the properties of the malicious information represent normality. In 
addition, [81] suggest that traditional statistical methods perform well when analysing 
homogeneous data measurements but their efficiency decreases when non-
homogeneous data measurements are analysed. 
2.3.1.1 Counting Repeated Events 
Not all statistical-based IDSs implement the intrusion detection similarly. A 
differential aspect of the statistical-based IDSs is the method employed to generate the 
reference of normality. In the intrusion detection literature diverse numbers of 
statistical methods have been proposed. A particular type of technique implemented by 
numerous IDSs is counting repeated events during specific periods of time. 
For example, in [82], the authors present an intrusion detection framework based 
on statistical detection techniques to detect attacks at the MAC layer in WiFi networks 
and the presence of wireless devices not following the indication of the IEEE 802.11 
standard. According to [55], this is a methodology able to detect, for instance, DoS 
attacks such as virtual jamming. The methodology presented in this work is based on 
detecting intrusions by counting events during periods of time. It establishes a set of 
alarm thresholds to some metrics. Then, the detection system calculates how often a 
particular event occurs during the defined period of time. The frequency value is 
compared to the alert threshold. If the frequency value exceeds the predefined 
threshold value, the attack has been identified and an alarm is flagged. The IDS needs 
to identify the evaluated event repeatedly before considering the presence of attack. 
Using a very similar methodology to the one implemented in [82], the authors of [37] 
present a framework that detects intrusions by counting events during a period of time 
and identify the attacks if the values of some predefined thresholds are exceeded. The 
authors of [67] also consider utilising a similar statistical detection technique to detect 
authentication and association frame flooding attacks. This work establishes an alarm 
threshold of 5 authentication or association frames per second. If the monitored AP 
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receives more than 5 authentication or association frames with the same source MAC 
address within a second, the detection system considers the presence of a flooding 
attack. This particular work filters out any frame with source MAC address similar to 
the one detected as the source of the authentication and association flooding attack. 
Another example of an IDS that detect intrusions by counting events during periods of 
time is the one presented in [83]. This methodology sets a timer for each received 
deauthentication frame. When the detector has captured at least 2 consecutive 
deauthentication frames from a given MAC address within 6 seconds, it reports an 
alert. A different statistical detection technique also based on the same concept of 
counting events is mentioned in [36]. The IDS collects information during a given 
period of time, and counts the number of times some particular events have been 
repeated. If the number of occurrences of the events is too low, it is considered 
abnormal. 
This intrusion detection methodology is very intuitive methodology and relatively 
easy to implement, and would not require a high computational cost for the detection 
engine. Although it is widely used, this method entitles fundamental drawbacks. After 
all, this detection methodology identifies attacks by counting the number of times that 
the protected system has been compromised during specific periods of time. 
2.3.2 Data Mining 
Traditionally, the security system administrators were in charge of manually 
generating the signatures utilised by the misuse IDSs to identify intrusions [15]. 
Similarly, security experts were in charge of manually the training datasets to train the 
supervised IDSs. Currently, the advances in data gathering technologies means that 
databases contain hundreds of thousands of data traffic records to be processed. The 
vast amount of data generated by current networks makes it impossible to perform 
manual analysis to detect network intrusions. A feasible solution to automate the data 
analysis process could be to employ data mining techniques. 
Data mining is an approach that has gained wide interest among the research 
community in tasks of intrusion detection [36]. The concept of data mining describes a 
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group of data analysis techniques used to automatically extract descriptive knowledge, 
identify previously unknown and useful information, predicting data relationships, and 
discovering behaviour patterns and trends from large amount of audited data [84]. 
These techniques can include different mathematical algorithms, statistical analysis 
and machine learning methods [85]. However, the use of data mining techniques 
mostly focuses on processing large amounts of audit data traffic rather than 
performing real time detection. 
Many IDS administrators use data mining techniques to automatically generate 
intrusion detection models to be used by IDSs. This approach has become very useful 
to improve IDSs performance [86] because it can automate the analysis of large 
datasets and finding process of important information [58]. Many researchers have 
made use of data mining techniques to label training datasets and to train supervised 
IDSs [87]. In the last few years, the concept of data mining has been slightly diluted 
because, according to the authors of [36], now almost every processing mechanism 
able to analyse dataset is nowadays considered a data mining technique. 
The advantage of applying data mining with IDSs lies in the fact that these 
techniques can automatically generate accurate intrusion detection models and 
signatures, which can be used to effectively distinguish between normal and abnormal 
network behaviours [88]. In the case of anomaly IDS, the data mining techniques can 
automatically create the reference of normal behaviour from the analysed information 
and implement the posterior intrusion detection. Similarly, data mining can be applied 
to automatically generate new signatures that will allow identify attacks or intrusion 
attempts, in the case of misuse IDS. However, almost every single data mining 
technique used on intrusion detection tasks requires, firstly, to have datasets for prior 
analysis, and, secondly, preprocessing of the dataset to produce acceptable results. The 
period of time required to gather the datasets is a drawback for real time systems. 
Also, most data mining techniques require training datasets [36], or require performing 
thorough training. Additionally, these techniques are generally computational 
intensive [58], and time consuming. 
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There exist many data mining techniques for intrusion detection. Based on the 
implemented task, these techniques can be divided into association rule analysis, 
sequence pattern analysis, classification analysis and cluster analysis [15] [88] [89]. 
2.3.2.1 Association Rule Techniques 
The association data mining techniques were the earliest techniques used in task of 
intrusion detection [15]. This type of data mining techniques finds relations between 
data instances in the datasets [88] [90] and generates correlation logical rules in the 
form of if ~ then [89] from a training dataset by employing rule extraction algorithms. 
Each rule should be mutually exclusive to avoid classification conflicts. The outcome 
rules of the association analysis data mining techniques can be used as signatures by 
the misuse IDSs. One of the main advantages of this approach is its simplicity. Instead 
of manually generating the if ~ then rules, the association data mining techniques 
could automatically generate these rules. 
One of the first research works that applied association data mining techniques in 
the task of intrusion detection was [90]. The detection methodology presented in this 
work requires labelled training datasets to generate the if ~ then rules. After a 
supervised training process, the authors generate association rules that allowed 
identifying intrusions. However, this type of technique is too simplistic to be able to 
detect the attacks currently implemented. One of the reasons is that, the sophistication 
of current attacks may cause that two different types of attacks manifest similarly to 
each other. Therefore, one association rule may incorrectly classify two different 
attacks into the same category. 
2.3.2.2 Sequence Pattern Techniques 
The different stages that wireless devices pass through during their normal protocol 
operations may be represented using state transitions. A feasible approach is using a 
Markov chain. The IEEE 802.11 standard defines these stages of normal operations. 
The Markov chain is a state transition approach that uses probabilities to model the 
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chances of changing from one state to another. During a training process, this 
technique creates the different states and calculates the probabilities associated to each 
of the state transitions [36]. IDSs based on this technique, also known as sequence 
pattern IDSs, could use inconsistencies in the state transitions to recognise that the 
protected system is not behaving, as it should. 
The sequence pattern techniques present a number of drawbacks when applied for 
intrusion detection in wireless networks. Initially, it may be understood that the IEEE 
802.11 standard accurately defines the operations of the WiFi devices. However, 
different WiFi device vendors develop their own implementation of the IEEE 802.11 
standard. Therefore, IDSs using sequence pattern techniques would require the exact 
configuration of each individual monitored device. 
2.3.2.3 Classification Techniques 
The classification data mining techniques categorise instances of the dataset into 
different categories previously defined. These techniques produce a set of 
classification rules, generated after a supervised training process, that unmistakeably 
separate each category from the rest. Since the data mining techniques in this category 
are supervised, the training process requires the use of previously labelled datasets. 
2.3.2.3.1 Classification – Decision Tree 
The decision tree is one of the most efficient classification techniques, according to 
[110]. The decision tree is a hierarchical structure used to classify data instances from 
a dataset with similar features into one of the defined categories [91]. Similar to other 
classification data mining techniques, the decision trees are constructed through a 
supervised training process, using previously labelled datasets [91]. Once the decision 
tree has been built, this structure can be used to classify new pieces of information into 
the predefined categories [92]. After applying the decision tree, each data instance is 
allocated into the particular category, which attributes are more similar to the 
attributes of the analysed data. 
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2.3.2.3.2 Classification – Artificial Neural Networks 
The Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is another classification data mining technique. 
The ANNs are computational models composed of a set of internal interconnected 
processing elements or nodes, also known as neurons [9] [93]. Each of these internal 
interconnections is assigned a particular weight value, which are dynamically adjusted 
according to a supervised training process [9]. Some ANNs may also modify their 
internal structure based on the supervised training process. The effectiveness of the 
ANNs depends on the quality of the supervised training process [40]. The different 
outcomes of the ANN define the different categories into which the analysed 
information is allocated. These outcomes are based on the characteristics of the nodes, 
as well as the weights associated with the internal interconnections [94]. Instead of 
allocating the data instances into one particular category, the neural networks provide 
the resulting weight value for each of the defined outcomes [93]. 
2.3.2.3.3 Classification – k-Nearest Neighbour 
Another classification data mining technique is the k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN). This 
technique is used by [86] in tasks of intrusion detection. The classification process of 
k-NN is based on finding the closest match of an unclassified data instance to a group 
of k instances in a training dataset [95]. The instances in the group of k instances have 
similar label. Given a data instance, k-NN measures the difference between the 
features that describe this data instance and the features of the k different instances in 
the training dataset. The difference between features is usually measured using the 
Euclidean distance [85] [95]. The data instance is classified as the instances in the 
group that generates the closer match. 
2.3.2.3.4 Classification – Support Vector Machine 
The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is an unsupervised classification data mining 
technique that generates a linear hyperplane over a dataset [13]. The SVM divides the 
instances of the evaluated dataset into two different categories, being the generated 
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linear hyperplane the separation limit between both categories. During a training 
process, the SVM generates the best hyperplane that maximises the separation 
between the two classes in the training dataset. 
2.3.2.3.5 Classification Techniques Drawbacks 
The classification data mining techniques are more appropriate to be used by misuse 
IDSs, rather than anomaly IDSs [57], because of the functions that these techniques 
implement. In fact, the data mining techniques that belong to this classification 
category act mostly as network forensics analysis rather than intrusion detection in real 
time [96]. The classification analysis techniques present a number of drawbacks. First 
of all, these are techniques that require supervised training. Unless the system is 
provided with previously labelled datasets or datasets completely composed of normal 
traffic, it will not be able to create the appropriate classification rules to categorise the 
information. Unfortunately, in real wireless networks the data traffic is not labelled, 
and even in controlled environments it is highly complicate that all the data is of non-
malicious nature [87]. This makes the use of these data mining techniques impractical. 
Also, if a new feature of the data instances needs to be analysed, a new training 
process needs to be executed to generate an updated set of classification rules, because 
it cannot be categorised as any of the previously known categories. 
In the case of a decision tree, the main complexity resides in the training process 
and defining an appropriate stop point in the construction of the tree [93], to avoid 
overtraining. This means that an excessive number of classification rules have been 
generated. The major drawback of the ANN is the high computational cost [9] and 
time consumption associated with the training process. These systems require large 
amounts of data to be properly trained [98]. For instance, the authors of [99] indicate 
that the ANNs require collecting training data for several days, before training the 
system, and perform the detection. The authors of [97] also highlight that the ANNs 
require a large period of time to train, due to its complex internal structure. In the case 
of k-NN, whilst being effective in the tasks of intrusion detection, this technique has a 
high computational cost to conduct the classification [85]. Also, the classification 
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performance of k-NN is very sensitive to the value of the parameter k [85], which 
needs to be predefined. In the case of SVM, the major drawback is the long training 
time required that limits its use in real time approaches. Also, because SVM is an 
unsupervised technique, the system administrator needs to define each of the classes 
after generating the hyperplane. 
2.3.2.4 Clustering Techniques 
Clustering has been commonly used as a data analysis mechanism, mostly focused on 
data visualisation, image analysis and pattern recognition. The clustering data mining 
techniques can also be used in tasks of intrusion detection to categorise network traffic 
instances as normal or malicious [88]. Numerous researches have used clustering in 
IDSs [24] [29] [91] [100]. 
Clustering provides an effective mechanism to automatically construct a profile of 
normal network behaviour that can be used to categorise the network traffic as normal 
or malicious [89]. Unlike other data mining techniques (e.g. Decision Tree), clustering 
is an unsupervised [101] technique that can be used to classify unlabelled instances, 
without previous training process or having previously labelled the instances of the 
datasets. This technique creates groups of data instances from a given dataset based on 
the similarity of their attributes. Instances within the same cluster have high similarity, 
whereas the attributes of the instances within a cluster have significant degree of 
dissimilarity with the instances in other clusters. 
The main advantages of using clustering are its capability to identify previously 
unknown evidences of attacks, as well as variations of known attacks [15]. IDSs that 
make use of clustering are more efficient than other techniques when implementing 
intrusion detection in real time, and require minimal interaction with the IDS 
administrator [91] [100]. 
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2.3.2.4.1 K-means Clustering Drawbacks 
There exist different algorithms of clustering techniques. One of the simplest and most 
commonly used clustering algorithms is the K-means [91]. This algorithm divides the 
data instances from a given dataset into K different clusters. The specific value of K 
has to be specified prior to the implementation of the division process. 
Despite of its effectiveness, K-means presents also some limitations. One of these 
limitations is the significant influence that the selection of the initial cluster centroids 
has over the final results. The selection of different initial centroids may lead to 
different clustering results in similar datasets. Also, the specific number of clusters K 
into which K-means divides data instances has to be specified prior to the 
implementation of the division process. However, this number may not be initially 
available and needs to be empirically defined, which is a major drawback for this 
technique to work in real time. In addition, K-means requires the empirical definition 
of the parameter µ for correctly labelling the data instances as normal or malicious. 
This parameter is used to define the threshold between normal and malicious clusters. 
2.4 Multi-layer Data Fusion 
Previous approaches on cross-layer/multi-layer data fusion have used simplistic 
combination techniques, such as averaging or majority voting [102], which does not 
require training or complex calculation. Data fusion can be defined as the process of 
gathering information from multiple and heterogeneous sources about diverse events, 
activities or situations, and combining them towards obtaining a more accurate final 
result [14] [39]. In [103], a study of the benefits and limitations of the cross-layer 
designs in the field of intrusion detection is presented. This research compares two 
different IDS architectures. Another interesting study is presented in [38], which 
experimentally compares the detection performance of cross-layer IDSs with the 
performance of single layer IDSs. The authors of [104] propose a novel collaborative 
detection approach that combines the final outcome of multiple IDSs. Similar 
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approach is used in [80], in which the authors propose the use of neural networks to 
combine the outcome of three different IDSs. 
In the field of intrusion detection, the combined utilisation of multiple metrics, 
extracted from a diverse number of sources is a very important step towards an 
efficient intrusion detection process. Previous researches [105] [106] use data fusion 
techniques in order to enhance the performance of their systems. The information from 
different layers could be sent to a shared database, and an IDS could infer the presence 
of intrusions using this common set of information. This is the structure that a 
centralised IDS would implement. In another cross-layer architecture, IDSs can also 
implement the task of intrusion detection independently, utilising information from 
only one source of information. Then, the decision of each individual IDS could be 
sent to a data fusion system to merge the individual decisions and reach a combined 
final result. In [80], the authors present a method that combines the outcome of 
multiple IDSs using data fusion techniques. Each IDS conducts independent detection 
processes and the individual decisions are combined to produce a collective final 
decision. Similarly, in [106] the authors present an approach that combines the 
outcome of three heterogeneous IDSs. In this particular work, the three classification 
data mining techniques are decision tree, Naïve Bayes [13] and ANN. In fact, a double 
data fusion process is implemented. The three detection techniques are initially used to 
analyse three independent features. The fusion outcome for each individual of the 
piece of information is initially combined. Then the three outcomes are successively 
combined to reach a final detection result. 
2.4.1 Researchers Using Dempster-Shafer Theory 
The application of D-S theory for improving the performance of IDSs is a very active 
research topic. This data fusion method has been previously used in multiple 
publications. In [102], one of the most thorough descriptions of D-S is presented. The 
authors present a comparative study between D-S theory and Bayesian inference as 
data fusion algorithms. Another complete description of the D-S theory is presented in 
[75]. The mathematical foundation of D-S theory, along with a description of the 
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advantages and disadvantages of this data fusion approach is presented in this work. In 
[39], the authors present a prototype for DDoS detection over wired links, based on D-
S theory. The system, periodically, fuses the knowledge collected from different 
sensors within the network, in order to infer the current state of the monitored 
network. The authors in [41] present and evaluate an IDS for detecting DoS attacks in 
a wireless network. The authors use the D-S theory to fuse the information from 
distinct nodes running two different algorithms. In [39] [102], the authors present a 
comparative study of different data fusion methods and conclude that D-S theory is 
more promising than Bayesian inference. 
2.4.2 Current Basic Probability Assignment Methodologies 
The BPA process is crucial to the effectiveness of D-S theory [107]. The BPA value 
should be based on the measured characteristics of the monitored environment. With 
regards to the topic of this thesis, the major challenge for applying D-S theory on IDS 
is to automatically determine the BPA values should be based on the characteristics of 
the wireless network traffic measurements [42]. 
In the IDS literature there exist multiple ways of assigning probabilities to each of 
the hypotheses in D-S theory, ranging from data mining techniques to empirical 
approaches. For instance, [108] utilises expert opinion to manually assign the belief 
probabilities to each of the hypotheses. This BPA process is completely subjective and 
might not be adequate for automatic and self-adaptive IDSs. The authors in [41] 
present a methodology that seeks changes in the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). The 
value of this single metric is measured from distinct nodes running two different local 
algorithms, single threshold and cumulative sum. Based on the measured information, 
their system generates the BPAs through the use of a linear function. One of the 
drawbacks of this methodology is that both local algorithms require the utilisation of 
diverse tuning parameters. In [98], the authors also present an IDS that make use of 
the D-S theory. In order to assign the BPAs, this work defines a specific equation 
based on the utilisation of thresholds. Apart from using fixed functions, which is a 
limited mechanism to calculate the beliefs, the authors do not provide either an explicit 
  
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK 
34
definition of how the thresholds are calculated, or a clear explanation of how the BPAs 
are assigned. A similar approach is used in [39], which uses fixed functions to define 
the BPA value after a fine-tuning process. Another example, [75] proposes two 
different ways of assigning belief probabilities, for two different datasets. In the first 
case, their method calculates a threshold based on the length of the dataset, and then 
utilises that threshold and fixed functions to assign the belief probabilities. In the 
second case, a scaled approach with pre-defined beliefs is used. Since the beliefs are 
assigned using fixed functions and pre-defined thresholds, the mechanisms proposed 
in this work would be unable to automatically adjust to changes in the dataset profile 
without the intervention of the IDS administrator. In [40], the authors use multiple 
manually defined thresholds, empirically defined after analysing non-malicious data. 
The authors do not describe the way the thresholds are defined. One last example, the 
methodology employed by [42] uses data mining to proceed with the BPA tasks. 
From the presented results, all of these methods are effective in increasing the DR 
and reducing the number of false alarms of the IDSs. However, none of the referred 
works investigate methods to find an automatic and self-adaptive process of BPA, and 
few of them could be used off-the-shelf without a previous training or fine tuning 
period. On the one hand, systems that make use of data mining techniques for BPA 
require the gathering of large amounts of data traffic, processing it and to complete a 
training period before being able to perform intrusion detection tasks. These systems 
are unable to automatically adapt to changes in the network traffic behaviour in real 
time. On the other hand, systems that have been empirically assigned fixed probability 
values by the IDS administrator, or systems that employ fixed functions to assign the 
belief probabilities are unable to automatically adjust to changes in the network traffic 
behaviour, without the intervention from the IDS administrator. 
2.5 Wireless Network Monitoring 
The task of wireless network traffic monitoring has been addressed in [8] [44]. The 
authors of these works present extended researches about different issues in deploying 
wireless network monitoring systems, and the process of implementing the actual 
  
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK 
35
monitoring of the IEEE 802.11 networks. Diverse concepts, such as the advantages of 
wireless monitoring, placement of the monitoring devices or merge of information 
from multiple monitoring devices, are all addressed in these papers. The authors of 
[83] describe a detection system in WiFi networks. The approach followed in this 
research is to monitor all possible transmission channels using numerous monitoring 
devices. Then the information is merged to proceed with the detection analysis. 
In [44], the authors discuss the correct number of monitoring sensors. This is 
whether to deploy a large number of sensors or a reduced number of these devices, 
close to the different devices in the protected wireless network. This work argues that 
deploying a reduced number of sensors is harmful for the correct monitoring of the 
network traffic, because of the severe network traffic measurement loss that the 
wireless sensors might experience. The authors of [116] highlight that traffic loss is a 
critical occurrence that could yield to undetected attacks. According to the authors of 
[44], multiple sensors would reduce the amount of traffic loss. The authors of [83] 
aggress that multiple sensors should be deployed to reduce or avoid traffic loss. 
2.6 Summary 
As it has been presented in this chapter, there are multiple research works that address 
the insecurity of IEEE 802.11 networks. These works mainly focuses on describing 
vulnerabilities of the wireless communication protocols, proposing enhanced security 
protocols, and describing attacks. Similarly, there are several published research works 
in the field of intrusion detection that propose more effective IDS approaches, and 
novel detection techniques to increase the detection efficiency of IDSs. A brief 
description of some of the most widely used intrusion detection techniques has been 
presented in this chapter. Special attention has been given to approaches designed to 
identify spoofing attacks in WLANs, and to techniques mainly used by anomaly IDSs. 
These are statistical methods, machine learning and data mining techniques. A brief 
description of some of these intrusion detection techniques has been presented, along 
with a list of some advantages and disadvantages. 
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The classification data mining techniques are more appropriate to be used by 
misuse IDSs, rather than anomaly IDSs. The classification analysis techniques present 
a number of drawbacks. Most of the described data mining techniques are supervised, 
and require extensive training process, as well as labelled datasets, to be effective. 
Unless the system is provided with previously labelled datasets, it will not be able to 
create the appropriate classification rules to categorise the information. This makes the 
use of these data mining techniques impractical for IDSs designed to implement the 
intrusion detection autonomously and in real time. Clustering is an unsupervised 
technique that can be used to identify previously unknown attacks without previous 
training process. This makes clustering an adequate technique when implementing 
intrusion detection autonomously. However, this technique also presents some 
limitations, such as the significant influence that the selection of the initial cluster 
centroids has over the final results. Statistical-based detection techniques are also 
adequate when implementing intrusion detection autonomously. These techniques are 
unsupervised and do not require prior knowledge about protected system. Traditional 
statistical methods perform well when analysing homogeneous data. However, their 
efficiency decreases when non-homogeneous data is analysed. 
The chapter concludes discussing systems that use of multi-layer approach and 
data fusion methodologies as part of the detection system. Among different data fusion 
methods, special attention has been given to the D-S theory. A description of the 
different methods to determine the BPA values present in the IDS literature has been 
presented. Few of these methods could be used autonomously, off-the-shelf without 
either prior thorough training or fine tuning period, and able to automatically adapt to 
changes in real time. Therefore, this chapter highlights the need for the 
implementation of a novel BPA methodology able to automatically adapt its 
probabilities assignment to the current characteristics of the wireless network, without 
intervention from an IDS administrator. 
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Chapter 3  
Protecting Against Wireless-Specific Attacks 
3.1 Introduction 
There exist different types of wireless-specific attack that can compromise wireless 
networks. Despite the diversity of these attacks, their objective can be still the same 
for different attacks. Similarly, there exist several mechanisms to protect wireless 
networks against these attacks. Some of these mechanisms will be better than others in 
protecting certain components of the wireless network or protecting against certain 
types of attacks. In some cases, a particular security mechanism will be the only 
mechanism able to effectively protect the wireless networks against a certain type of 
attack, or a particular intrusion attempt. 
If the attacks that the wireless network is being protected from were known 
beforehand, a security mechanism that provided better protection against this 
particular attack could be implemented. In that case, the wireless network would suffer 
the least damage or even no damage at all. Unfortunately, this is nearly impossible for 
legitimate users and the security mechanisms of the network. Only the attacker knows 
the particular attack that will be launched. The devices in the wireless network and the 
security mechanisms are unable to know which attack will be launched until this had 
already been occurred. 
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Occasionally, some of the countermeasure security mechanisms that have been 
proposed to protect the network against certain type of attacks could produce 
undesirable results or even further damage to the protected network. For instance, the 
use of access control lists can prevent unwanted wireless devices from joining the 
wireless network, but the access control lists can also prevent legitimate wireless 
devices from joining the network if their identity has been compromised. Hence, a 
security mechanism to provide consistent security to the wireless networks, regardless 
of the attack that these are being protected from should be implemented. 
This chapter presents an overview of a number of wireless-specific attacks. These 
are the attacks that more commonly compromise wireless networks. The purpose of 
this chapter is to find, if possible, a common implementation pattern, which could help 
to identify a common detection or countermeasure mechanism against these attacks. 
Prior to describing the attacks, a brief and simple description of the security protocols 
recommended by the IEEE 802.11 standard is given. The purpose of this description is 
to make the reader aware of the efforts that the IEEE 802.11 standard has made to 
safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the wireless network. In 
addition, some of the traditional network security mechanisms are also described. 
3.2 Traditional Wireless Network Security Mechanisms 
3.2.1 The IEEE 802.11 Security Mechanisms 
A complete description of these security protocols is out of the scope of this thesis. For 
a more detailed description of these protocols, refer to the IEEE 802.11 standard 
definition [111], or other works such as [5] [10] [112]. 
The IEEE 802.11 standard proposed different security protocols, establishing a 
traffic encryption framework at the MAC layer and integrity protection to the network 
infrastructure [5], as well as avoiding unauthorised access to the wireless networks. 
These are the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), the WiFi Protected Access (WPA) 
and the WPA2 (WPA Version 2), also known as the IEEE 802.11i standard. These 
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security protocols provide a framework for communication encryption, devices or user 
authentication, and communication content integrity protection. 
WEP was the first of the three security protocols defined by the IEEE 802.11 
standard. This protocol provides confidentiality protection using the stream cipher 
protocol Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) to encrypt the frames. The devices at both ends of the 
wireless communication must share the same secret key to communicate. In order to 
stop undesirable devices from joining the wireless network, WEP implements two 
different authentication mechanisms, the Open System Authentication and the Shared 
Key Authentication. Additionally, WEP enhances the integrity protection of the 
wireless communications by including Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) checksum 
protection to the encrypted frames. 
WPA provides confidentiality protection to the wireless communications using 
the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), a new encryption protocol based on the 
stream cipher protocol RC4 [10]. Similar to RC4, the TKIP protocol requires a shared 
secret key to protect the transmitted information [5]. WPA supports two different 
authentication mechanisms, the Shared Key Authentication and the IEEE 802.1x 
Server Based Authentication. Additionally, WPA also enhances the integrity 
protection to the wireless communications including Message Integrity Codes (MICs), 
replacing the previously used CRC checksum [5]. 
WPA2, also known as the IEEE 802.11i standard, is the security protocol most 
recently recommended by the IEEE 802.11 standard to provide authentication, 
confidentiality and integrity protection to the wireless communications. The IEEE 
802.11i standard provides stronger cryptographic protection than WEP and WPA, 
using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm [113]. Additionally, the 
IEEE 802.11i protocol also specifies the use of TKIP as encryption protocol, similar to 
WPA. In order to stop undesirable users from joining the wireless network, WPA2 
uses the IEEE 802.1x server based authentication mechanism [10]. 
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3.2.1.1 The IEEE 802.11 Authentication Mechanisms 
Authentication can be considered as the first security barrier that the wireless devices 
have to surpass before joining the wireless network. Every wireless device willing to 
join a network uses the authentication process to identify itself to the network. The 
wireless network relies on this identification process to ensure that only the authorised 
devices can join the network. Authentication occurs every time a user tries to join a 
wireless network. Each wireless device can be authenticated with multiple APs at the 
same time [59]. There is not restriction on the number of APs that a single device can 
be authenticated with. 
The IEEE 802.11 standard defines three different authentication mechanisms. 
These are the open system authentication, the shared key authentication and the IEEE 
802.1x server based authentication [70]. The former is a two-step process that grants 
authentication to any wireless device that requests so. The shared key authentication is 
a four-step process that requires the use of common cryptographic material between 
the AP and the wireless device willing to join the network. If both parties in the 
communication share the same secret key, the wireless network grants the 
authentication. The AP uses the source MAC address in the request frames to 
determine the identity of the wireless device, in both open system authentication and 
shared key authentication. The downside of these mechanisms is that none of the two 
implement mutual authentication between both ends of the communication. The 
wireless devices are authenticated to the AP but these nodes have not the capability to 
authenticate the identity of the AP. In addition, both frames involved in authentication, 
authentication request and authentication response, are sent in the clear, without any 
encryption mechanism [114]. 
The IEEE 802.1x server based authentication mechanism is the third 
authentication mechanism recommended by the IEEE 802.11 standard. In contrast to 
the previous mechanisms, IEEE 802.1x provides mutual authentication to both parties 
of the wireless communication [10]. In this authentication mechanism, an 
authentication server (e.g. a RADIUS server [115]) is the responsible to manage the 
authentication process between the AP and the wireless users [70]. The authentication 
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server decides whether to grant authentication or not, based on the credentials of the 
wireless users requesting authentication. The actual authentication method is 
implemented using the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), which provides 
mutual authentication to both, the AP and the wireless users [70]. 
3.2.1.2 The Insecurity of IEEE 802.11 Security Protocols 
The described security protocols were supposed to make the WLANs more reliable 
and assure cryptographic protection to the transmitted information that traverses the 
wireless medium. The utilisation of these security protocols forces the attacker to 
crack the cryptographic material and decrypt the protected communication in order to 
access to the transmitted information. It is down to the efficiency of these security 
protocols and how well implemented these protocols are, to prevent an attacker from 
decrypting and accessing to the content of the frames. 
However, wireless networks cannot rely on these security protocols to protect the 
content of the communications. All the security protocols previously presented are 
vulnerable to decryption analysis processes. If the attacker is able to obtain the 
cryptographic material used to encrypt the wireless traffic, the attacker is free to 
monitor the entire communication in the wireless network [116]. WEP is probably the 
most unsecure security protocol that could be used to protect the WLAN 
communications. WEP suffers from well-documented security vulnerabilities [49] 
[55]. All these security vulnerabilities have been identified and demonstrated in many 
research publications [8]. There are numerous software tools able to crack the 
cryptographic material used in WEP or WPA. An attacker using the right tools can 
easily obtain the shared secret key in a matter of minutes [7]. Additionally, the author 
of [10] indicates that frames can be modified despite including integrity protection 
such as CRC checksum. 
The IEEE 802.11i standard was proposed to address the vulnerabilities 
experienced by WEP [112] and WPA, providing stronger cryptographic protection 
than its predecessors. Although WPA2 has not been cracked until now, researchers 
from Air Tight Networks found the so-called ‘Hole 196’ vulnerability in the security 
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protocol WPA2 that allows malicious devices with knowledge of the Group Temporal 
Key (GTK), to transmit spoofed group addressed data frames to other wireless devices 
in a WPA2-protected WiFi network [118]. This vulnerability exposes the legitimate 
users of a WPA2-protected WiFi network to a diverse number of attacks, such Man-in-
the-Middle (MitM) or DoS. Explained by the same researchers, this vulnerability is 
also presented in the WPA security protocol. 
Moreover, the security protocols do not encrypt the whole communication of the 
network. All the management and control frames are transmitted unauthenticated and 
unencrypted [114], leaving IEEE 802.11 networks vulnerable to numerous type of 
attacks [119]. The IEEE 802.11w standard is the first and only amendment of the 
IEEE 802.11 standard to include protection to the management frames [67] [70]. 
Additionally, the header of the frames is never encrypted. Besides, regardless of which 
security protocol is used, an attacker can easily compromise the availability and 
integrity of the wireless networks. For instance, none of these protocols can protect the 
wireless communications certain type of attacks, such DoS [5] [113], which directly 
compromise the availability of the networks. 
The utilisation of authentication mechanisms or encryption techniques certainly 
helps to secure the network, making the implementation of attacks or intrusion 
attempts more difficult to some extent. However, none of these security protocols have 
been able to effectively and completely protect the wireless networks. Despite the 
different amendments of the IEEE 802.11 standard that have been released to provide 
more secure and reliable security protocols, still there exist numerous security 
vulnerabilities in the protocols that makes the wireless communications insecure 
[119]. The level of security of the wireless communications can also be enhanced at 
higher layers using end-to-end encryption mechanisms, such as Internet Protocol 
Security (IPSec) or Virtual Private Network (VPN). However, according to [5], these 
mechanisms cannot protect the network from the wireless-specific attacks. 
Due to the capabilities of the attacker to surpass the security protocols, the 
feasibility to crack and obtain the cryptographic material, and the numerous 
vulnerabilities in the security protocols, it is evident that cryptographic protection 
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cannot stop the attacker from carrying out the attacks and intrusions in WLANs. 
Therefore, all the wireless-specific attacks that are going to be described in the 
following Section 3.3 are described assuming that the attacker has complete access to 
the transmitted information, and assuming that the attacker is able to modify the 
content of the network traffic without being noticed. 
3.2.2 Network Firewalls 
One other security mechanism that is commonly employed to provide protection to the 
networks is the firewall. A firewall is a mechanism that controls the traffic that is 
allowed to pass through it. Firewalls can be utilised as security systems to protect local 
networks from Internet-based attacks and control the access to the network [79]. These 
network security systems are commonly allocated between the local network and the 
ISP backbone, which allows the network nodes to communicate with other network 
nodes through the Internet. 
Firewalls filter network traffic based on a set of rules and known access control 
policies. Information extracted from the header of the network frames is analysed by 
the firewalls. One or more pieces of information, e.g. source/destination address or 
source/destination port, are used to determine whether or not to stop the frames [120]. 
Firewalls provide a level of security to the local networks, but these systems are 
not effective security mechanisms for WLANs, and are unable to provide perfect 
protection to these type of networks against attacks [120]. Although many attacks 
from the Internet can be stopped by a properly configured firewall, not all the attacks 
from outside the network can be stopped by firewalls due to the difficulty in 
generating correct and precise filtering rules. Firewalls are unable to protect the 
network against attacks that have bypassed the system [79]. Another major drawback 
is the fact that firewalls cannot protect the network from attacks originated inside the 
network, because these attacks do not pass through the firewall. Additionally, the use 
of VPNs and wireless networks introduce new challenges to firewalls. The VPNs 
utilise encryption protection in both the header and the payload of the transmitted 
frames, making impossible the analysis of the header of the network frames. Besides, 
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the lack of physical boundaries in the wireless networks communication allows the 
attacker to directly interact with the wireless network users without passing through 
the firewall. 
3.2.3 Antivirus Software 
According to [55], an antivirus is a software used on PCs to identify viruses, malware 
and spyware files, and to prevent the effect that these files may cause to the protected 
system. This security software uses signature databases to identify the malicious files. 
These are commonly designed to monitor critical components of the Operating 
Systems (OSs) and to disinfect the malicious files [55]. Antivirus alone is not enough 
to provide reliable protection against current Internet threats [11]. The main drawback 
of these systems is that an antivirus is unable to identify malicious files for which 
signature has not been defined. These systems rely on the frequent update of the 
signature databases to be efficient. 
3.3 Wireless-Specific Attacks 
Wireless networks are vulnerable to similar threats to the wired networks. Cyber-
attacks and intrusion attempts that come from the ISP backbone core of the network, 
and reach the devices connected to the networks, affect similarly both type of 
networks. These attacks can be implemented remotely from any geographical location. 
Apart from being vulnerable to viruses, malware, spam, Internet-based attacks, DoS, 
DDoS, or identity theft attacks, the wireless network users suffer also from wireless-
specific attacks. These are attacks that specifically affect the wireless networks. 
In contrast to the cyber-attacks that come from the wired part of the network and 
reach the wireless devices through the AP for WiFi networks (eNodeBS for LTE and 
Base Station for WiMAX), the wireless-specific attacks are attacks that reach the 
wireless devices through the wireless part of the network; the wireless link. The 
attacker acts as a third party transmitter device to launch this type of attacks. The 
wireless-specific attacks require the attacker to be located in a position in which the 
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victim will be within its transmission range. Similarly, the attacker should be located 
within the transmission range of the victim in most of the attacks. However, there are 
some attacks that can be implemented with the attacker being off the transmission 
range of the victim. 
The following sections describe the most common type of wireless-specific 
attacks that the wireless communications and wireless networks infrastructure. After 
performing an analysis of these attacks, it is easy to conclude that there exist three 
main characteristics that make the implementation of the wireless-specific attacks 
feasible. First, the ability to intercept and analyse the wireless communications 
content. Second, the capability to inject malicious information into the wireless 
communication. Third, the capability to conceal the identity of the attackers to avoid 
being identified when launching attacks. 
3.3.1 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is the process through which attackers and unauthorised users 
illegitimately intercept and analyse transmitted information within a wireless network. 
Any device within the transmission range of the wireless network, with the capability 
to monitor the wireless medium, could access the transmitted information. An attacker 
could intercept the transmitted frames, perform an analysis of the content of these 
frames, and extract information about different parameters of the wireless network. 
In order to implement the eavesdropping attack, the attacker requires a receiver 
device able to monitor the traffic in the wireless network or wireless NIC configured 
in monitoring or promiscuous mode. The attacker does not actively interact with the 
wireless network traffic at all. The fact that eavesdropping does not actively interact 
with the wireless network traffic makes this attack impossible to detect [116]. 
Although the eavesdropping attack only compromises the confidentiality of the 
transmitted information, this attack is an initial step towards more dangerous attacks. 
Usually, the interception of information about the wireless network and the 
communication content is a prerequisite for the attackers to perform more severe 
active attacks over the wireless network. 
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The only countermeasure against eavesdropping is making use of reliable 
cryptographic mechanisms. However, as explained previously in Section 3.2, all the 
cryptographic mechanisms proposed by the IEEE 802.11 standard are vulnerable to 
decryption analysis processes. Eavesdropping is also a feasible attack because the 
wireless communications are not entirely protected by cryptographic mechanisms. The 
payload of the data frames is usually encrypted but the header of the data frames is 
never encrypted, for delivery reasons, exposing all the information to be analysed by 
an attacker. From the data frame header, an attacker can obtain, for instance, the MAC 
addresses, frames type and subtype, or Network Allocation Vector (NAV) value. On 
top of that, the management frames and the control frames are entirely unencrypted 
[59]. Therefore, the attacker would be able to intercept lots of information, even if the 
legitimate user made every possible effort to protect the wireless communication. 
Eavesdropping does not only allow the attacker to obtain information directly 
from the content of the frames. The information can also be composed of different 
statistical parameters from the characteristics of the wireless network and the wireless 
communication, in the form of Netflow data. Much more difficult to protect than the 
content of the frames is to hide the information that an attacker could extract from the 
characteristics of the wireless network communication, such as the signal power, 
transmission timing patterns, number of wireless devices in the network, or periodicity 
of the transmission. Despite utilising cryptographic mechanisms to protect the wireless 
communication, the legitimate user cannot hide all these parameters from the attacker. 
3.3.2 Active Attacks 
The term active attack represents all the attacks that actively interact with wireless 
communications, illegitimately injecting traffic or electromagnetic signals into the 
wireless medium. The attacker needs also to be able to create fully formed IEEE 
802.11 frames or modify previously captured frames and inject them into the wireless 
network. Moreover, the attackers should be able not to follow the indications of the 
IEEE 802.11 standard, and to inject whenever is needed. 
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3.3.2.1 Denial-of-Service 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is one of the most common types of active attacks used 
against wireless networks. Also, it is the most harmful attack that the wireless 
networks may suffer [60]. This type of attack actively prevents legitimate devices in 
the network from successfully transmitting or receiving any frame. DoS attacks target 
the availability and the integrity of the legitimate communications in the wireless 
network, and can be launched at multiple network layers of the protocol stack. For this 
work, only the DoS attacks that belong to the category of wireless-specific attacks are 
considered. These are the DoS attacks that can be launched either at the PHY layer or 
the MAC layer of the protocol stack. None of the cryptographic mechanisms can 
protect the wireless networks from this type of attacks [5] [113]. 
3.3.2.1.1 Physical Jamming 
Physical jamming is a particular type of DoS attacks launched at the PHY layer that 
exploits the functionality of the physical carrier sensing functions of the IEEE 802.11 
standard, in the legitimate users. By injecting a suitable level of radio frequency noise 
into the wireless medium, an attacker is able to make the wireless network devices 
conclude that the wireless medium is being used. The legitimate devices defer any 
transmission if the physical carrier sensing functions detect signal activities in the 
medium. Therefore, the wireless network devices affected by the physical jamming are 
prevented from transmitting, and the IEEE 802.11 standard does not provide any 
mechanism that could stop it. 
In [61], the authors state that there is no conventional security mechanism able to 
entirely protect wireless networks from physical jamming. Every wireless device 
within the transmission range of the attacker is vulnerable to this attack. Moreover, 
physical jamming can be implemented even if the attacker is not a member of the 
wireless network [63]. On the other hand, this type of attack can be detected by 
examining the wireless medium with a signal analyser. The attacker only requires a 
transmitter device able to inject electromagnetic noise signals or a wireless NIC able 
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to inject illegitimate traffic into the wireless medium. The wireless NIC does not 
follow the specifications of the IEEE 802.11 standard and the MAC protocol. 
There exist four different types of physical jamming attacks. These are brute 
force, periodic, random, and precision jamming. 
3.3.2.1.1.1 Brute Force Jamming 
Brute force jamming is the most simple of the physical jamming modes. The attacker 
continuously injects radio frequency noise into the wireless communications and 
disrupts any communication. Legitimate users are prevented from transmitting, as well 
as receiving frames. 
The effectiveness of brute force jamming is strongly correlated with diverse 
parameters, such as the used frequency channel and the transmission power level of 
the injected noise. Also, the attackers are able to directly target specific users using 
directional antennas. The authors in [37] have empirically demonstrated that the 
distance between the attacker and the legitimate wireless nodes is a parameter directly 
correlated with the effectiveness of any mode of physical jamming attack. The shorter 
the distance between the attacker and the legitimate users, the higher the effectiveness 
of the attack. 
This attack can be easily detected using wireless medium monitoring tools, such 
as signal analysers. There have been proposed diverse methods as countermeasure 
actions against brute force jamming. For instance, increasing the signal strength of the 
legitimate wireless communications could reduce the effect of this type of jamming 
attack on the communication. The physical carrier sense mechanism would consider 
the transmitted signal of the attacker launching the brute force attack as background 
noise if the legitimate wireless device uses stronger signal strength than the attack 
signal. This would practically depend on the receiver sensibility. Another 
countermeasure method would be to raise the threshold that determines whether there 
exists any transmission in the wireless medium. Consequently, the legitimate users in 
the wireless network would be able to initiate a communication despite the presence of 
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activity in the wireless medium. The authors of [62] demonstrated that the wireless 
transmission modulation plays an important role in the effectiveness of a jamming 
attack over the wireless network. Therefore, utilising the most appropriate modulation 
to each attack scenario could be a possible countermeasure technique. Dynamically 
negotiated radio frequency hop sequences is also proposed as countermeasure 
technique by [62]. Nevertheless, the authors of this work also explain that radio 
frequency hop sequences is not appropriate because informing all stations to change to 
a specific frequency during a DoS attack would be unfeasible. One last proposed 
countermeasure technique is the use of spread spectrum techniques [123]. All these 
countermeasure actions could reduce the effect of the brute force jamming attacks. 
3.3.2.1.1.2 Periodic Jamming 
Another modality of physical jamming is periodic jamming. Instead of continuously 
injecting radio frequency noise, the attacker intermittently injects high levels of 
interference into the wireless medium during short and periodic intervals. The attacker 
alternates between constant injection and silence periods. 
This attack may prevent legitimate network users from transmitting and receiving 
frames. However, periodic jamming is less efficient than brute force jamming. Since 
the attacker alternates injection and silence periods, some wireless users would be able 
to continue the communication during the attack silence periods. The duration of both 
periods would affect the effectiveness of the periodic jamming. The authors of [122] 
have demonstrated that attackers using shorter silence periods cause greater impact 
over the communication than attackers using larger silence periods. 
Detecting the presence of periodic jamming is more difficult than detecting brute 
force jamming. The periodic behaviour of this attack reduces the exposition time of 
the attacker to be detected by monitoring tools. Nonetheless, if it was detected, the 
monitoring tools could deduce the periodicity of the injection periods and circumvent 
the attack transmitting during the silence periods of the attacker. 
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The authors of [64] demonstrated that transmitting small frames are more 
probable to be successfully delivered than large frames if a periodic jamming attack is 
taking place. Then, one feasible countermeasure mechanism against this attack would 
be reducing the size of the transmitted frames. In addition, the countermeasure 
mechanisms proposed previously for brute force jamming are also applicable against 
other physical jamming attack modalities. 
3.3.2.1.1.3 Random Jamming 
Random jamming is another modality of physical jamming in which the attacker 
arbitrarily injects high levels of interference into the wireless medium, for short 
intervals. The duration of the injection and silence periods in random jamming is 
arbitrary. Similar to the periodic attack, the larger the injection period, the greater is 
the damage that the attack produces over the communication. 
The random behaviour of this attack reduces the exposition time of the attacker to 
be detected by any monitoring tool. Detecting the presence of random jamming is 
more difficult than detecting brute force or periodic jamming. Even if a monitoring 
tool is able to detect the presence of the random jamming, the random pattern 
behaviour of this attack makes circumventing the effect of attack extremely difficult. 
The countermeasure mechanisms proposed for brute force jamming and periodic 
jamming could still be utilised. 
3.3.2.1.1.4 Precision Jamming 
In precision jamming, the attacker targets specific components of the legitimate 
wireless communication. These components could be either frames transmitted 
to/from specific users, certain types of transmitted frames, or specific interframe space 
times. The attacker remains silent while monitoring the wireless medium and injects as 
soon as it detects a legitimate transmission. 
Overall, precision jamming could be the most effective mode of physical 
jamming, in terms of exposition time to be detected by any monitoring tool, and 
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effectiveness compromising the availability and integrity of the wireless network. 
Again, this attack may prevent legitimate users from starting transmitting or prevent 
the destination users from receiving frames. Since the attacker injects radio frequency 
noise during short period of time at the precise moment, this attack is very difficult to 
detect. On the other hand, precision jamming requires a more complex functionality 
from the attacker, which requires knowing the MAC protocol and needs to predict the 
precise moment that it has to inject. The countermeasure mechanisms proposed for the 
previous modalities of physical jamming could be similarly utilised to reduce the 
effect of the precision jamming attacks. 
3.3.2.1.2 Virtual Jamming 
Virtual jamming is another type of DoS attack. This attack, launched at the MAC 
layer, exploits the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance 
(CSMA/CA) protocol and the virtual carrier sensing function of the IEEE 802.11 
standard, in the legitimate users. The virtual jamming attack is based on the fact that 
the wireless network users defer any transmission if the virtual carrier sensing function 
indicates that the medium is being occupied. 
Assuming the capability of an attacker to create and inject fully formed IEEE 
802.11 frames, an attacker can create frames with a very high NAV value. By 
injecting frames with NAV set to its maximum value (32767 µseconds [114]) an 
attacker is able to make all the wireless devices in the network postpone any 
transmission. An attacker can use all MAC control frames (e.g. RTS), MAC 
management frames (e.g. Probe Request) and data frames to launch this attack. An 
attacker that persists in injecting these frames with high NAV value can stop the 
communication of the entire wireless network. In [51], the authors estimate that 
injecting 30 crafted control frames a second with the maximum NAV value is enough 
to stop the whole wireless communication. 
The effectiveness of this attack varies depending on the targeted objective. The 
authors in [61] have demonstrated that if the attacker targets the AP, the average 
transmission rate in the entire wireless network is deteriorated. However, all the 
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wireless devices could continue communicating during the attack. On the other hand, 
if the attacker injects the control frame destined to one specific wireless device, all the 
components in the network are unable to communicate. Unfortunately, the authors of 
this work do not explain the reasons of these dissimilar results, when the targeted 
device changes. Additionally, the authors in [62] also explained that if the crafted 
control frames are destined to a non-existing device, all the components in the network 
are also unable to communicate. In that case, the authors concluded that the cause of 
this behaviour resides in the fact that the wireless devices do not properly implement 
the indications of the IEEE 802.11 standard. Moreover, the effectiveness of virtual 
jamming is also related to the type of control frame used. According to [61], RTS 
frames produce more effective attack results than CTS and ACK frames. By using 
RTS frames, the wireless users propagate the effects of the attack to further number of 
users, which are outside the transition range of the attacker. The same propagation 
effect cannot be achieved using either CTS or ACK frames. 
One possible countermeasure mechanism against virtual jamming attack could be 
filtering out the crafted control frames. This could be implemented by using access 
control lists. The access control lists are based on the MAC address of the devices 
connected to the network [50] [53]. If the MAC address of a device is included in the 
access control list, all the traffic transmited by this device can be ignored. By filtering 
out the frames from the attacker and ignoring the NAV value in these frames, the 
legitimate components of the network would be able to continue communicating. This 
countermeasure mechanism would be effective if the attackers did not modify their 
MAC address. But, since the MAC addresses can be easily spoofed, the use of access 
control lists can affect to those legitimate devices whose MAC address had been 
spoofed. Another countermeasure mechanism proposed by the authors of [65] is to 
modify the IEEE 802.11 standard. After receiving a RTS frame and replaying with a 
CTS frame, the AP monitors the wireless medium. If the device sending the RTS does 
not start transmitting after a given period, the AP transmits another control frames 
with NAV set to 0. The authors of the same work also describe possible drawbacks for 
the countermeasure mechanism that they propose. 
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3.3.2.1.3 Frame Flooding 
Attackers could implement another type of DoS attack by injecting large amount of 
frames in a relatively short period of time. This is known as the frame flooding attack. 
Frame flooding actively works against the availability and the integrity of the wireless 
network resources. 
The wireless nodes that compose the wireless networks are generaly devices with 
limited operational resources. Frame flooding intends to exhaust the computational 
resources of these devices, preventing legitimate users in the wireless network from 
communicating. There exist diverse modalities of flooding attacks, based on the type 
of frame transmitted by the attacker. The most common modalities of this attack are 
probe request flooding, authentication request flooding, and association request 
flooding, according to [67]. 
3.3.2.1.3.1 Probe Request Flooding 
Legitimate wireless devices utilise the probe request frames to discover the presence 
of wireless networks and to request specific information about the transition properties 
of the AP. According to the IEEE 802.11 standard, every AP that receives a probe 
request frame has to respond with a probe response frame. Given that the AP responds 
to the received probe request frames, the probe request flooding attack tries to exploit 
this active scanning mechanism. 
In probe request flooding, the attacker injects multiple probe request frames in a 
very short period of time. An attacker flooding the AP with a large number of probe 
requests will exhaust the resources of the AP. As long as the attacker keeps sending 
probe request frames, the AP will be unable to process all requests from legitimate 
devices being served. These devices will be deprived of an efficient service, and the 
communication quality in the entire wireless network will be deteriorated. 
One feasible solution to this attack is that the AP would not process repeated 
requests from the same MAC address. The authors of [67] explain the utilisation of 
MAC address filtering or access control filter as countermeasure mechanisms against 
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different types of frame flooding attacks. Similar to the case of virtual jamming, this 
countermeasure mechanism would be effective if the attacker did not modify its MAC 
address. However, the use of access control lists can affect to those legitimate devices 
whose MAC address had been spoofed. 
3.3.2.1.3.2 Authentication / Association Request Flooding 
Authentication request and association request flooding follows similar 
implementation to probe request flooding. Wireless clients willing to join the wireless 
network use the authentication process to identify themselves to the network. In 
response, the AP transmits an authentication response frame to the devices, approving 
or disapproving the authentication for each received authentication request frame. 
Similar to the authentication request, the AP responds to each received association 
request frame. 
Processing the authentication requests and association requests involves the 
utilisation of memory and computational resources of the AP. The AP uses a buffer to 
store information about the wireless users during the authentication process. When the 
buffer is full, the AP would not be able to accept any new authentication request [67]. 
An attacker injecting large amount of consecutive authentication/association request 
frames in a short period of time will exhaust the resources of the AP, and would not be 
able process any other incoming request. Additionally, the communication quality of 
the already associated users will be deteriorated, or even lost [113]. 
The authors in [67] have conducted practical experiments to demonstrate the 
effect of these attacks against a wireless network. From the results that this work 
presents, both attacks are able to drop the communication throughput in an entire 
wireless network down to zero. 
Again, MAC address filtering could be a solution to this attack. Another 
countermeasure could be the utilisation of a counter or a timer, along with an 
established threshold. For each new received authentication/association request frame, 
the AP initiates the counter or a timer. If the number of incoming authentication / 
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association request frame surpasses the established threshold, the AP stops processing 
any other incoming request. However, this countermeasure mechanism can also affect 
legitimate wireless devices that request authentication/association after the established 
threshold has been reached. 
3.3.2.2 Frame Replay 
Frame replay is another attack that compromises the availability and the integrity of 
the legitimate communications in the wireless network. An attacker could retransmit 
intercepted frames; this is known as a frame replay attack. The attacker can retransmit 
any type of frame without a considerable level of difficulty. The device, to which the 
intercepted frame was destined to in first instance, either the AP or one of the wireless 
users, receives the replayed frame and will assume that this is a legitimate frame. 
The real threat of this attack against the wireless network resides on the type of 
frames that the attacker replays. For instance, if the attacker replays a deauthentication 
frame or a disassociation frame, it could force legitimate devices to leave the wireless 
network. As long as the attacker keeps replaying these frames, the legitimate devices 
will be unable to reauthenticate with the AP. Mutual authentication between both 
parties of the wireless communication would make frame replay attacks more difficult 
to succeed [12]. However, this attack is feasible because both management and control 
frames are unauthenticated. Also, the correct utilisation of sequence numbers in the 
transmitted frames would also make frame replay attacks more difficult to succeed. 
3.3.2.3 Frame Modification 
The success of the frame replay attack relies on the information included in the 
intercepted frames. The attacker needs to replay particular type of frames, such as a 
deauthentication frame, in order to succeed in the attack attempt. In order to achieve 
the maximum potential of the frame replay attack, the attacker should be also able to 
modify the content of certain fields in the intercepted frames before being replayed. 
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Using frame modification, attackers compromise the integrity of the legitimate 
communications in the wireless network. 
An attacker could modify beacon frames or probe responses from the AP, and 
advertise some wireless communication properties that are not suitable to accomplish 
an efficient communication. The attacker could make the nodes in the wireless 
network leave the network if the communication properties advertised by the AP are 
not the optimum. Similarly, the attacker could modify the information in the beacon 
frames or probe response frames, indicating that the AP only supports the weakest 
security protocol, e.g. WEP. 
The frame modification attack can be implemented since the attackers can easily 
surpass the security protocols implemented by the IEEE 802.11 standard to provide 
confidentiality, integrity and availability to the wireless communication. These 
protocols cannot stop the attackers from modifying the content of the network frames. 
One possible countermeasure mechanism against the frame modification attack is to 
implement mutual authentication between the AP and the wireless users [12]. 
3.3.2.3.1 Identity Spoofing 
Every Ethernet card and wireless NIC is assigned a unique MAC address, at the time 
of manufacture, to be unequivocally identified. However, this value can be arbitrary 
changed using an appropriate software tool. There are plenty of options available on 
the Internet that allow easily changing of the MAC addresses of the NICs. The 
capability of an attacker to modify the source MAC addresses in the injected frames, 
and masquerade itself behind a fake MAC address is known as Identity Spoofing or 
MAC address Spoofing. The attackers can spoof any MAC address. It could use not 
only the MAC address of legitimate user of the wireless network, but also the MAC 
address of non-existing devices within the wireless network. 
MAC address spoofing is among the most serious threats that wireless networks 
may face [73]. An attacker that spoofs its MAC address is able to perpetrate a diverse 
number of attacks. For instance, an attacker may be able to surpass the access control 
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mechanisms of the security infrastructure by spoofing the MAC address of legitimate 
users [124]. There exist numerous attacks, ranging from DoS to session hijacking that 
can be implemented because an attacker may masquerade itself as a legal user [69]. 
Utilising MAC spoofing is not completely necessary to implement most of the 
wireless-specific attacks described in this chapter, but the effectiveness of these 
attacks will be increased if the attacker utilised MAC spoofing. Many other wireless-
specific attacks need to conceal the identity of the attacker to avoid being identified. 
The different examples of spoofing attacks presented in this section can be 
launched because both management and control frames are unauthenticated. The 
different frames used for these attacks can be easily spoofed. If the IEEE 802.11 
standard provided a robust and secure authentication mechanism for the management 
and control frames, MAC spoofing could not be used to launch any type of attack. 
3.3.2.3.1.1 Deauthentication Request 
Deauthentication request attack is one of the attacks that require identity spoofing to 
be successfully implemented. The IEEE 802.11 standard defines the deauthentication 
management frames for requesting the deauthentication of a specific wireless device 
from the network either, in case the authenticated device wanted to leave the network, 
or the AP wanted a specific device to leave the network. In deauthentication request 
attacks, an attacker forces legitimate devices to leave the wireless network. This attack 
can be implemented because the IEEE 802.11 standard does not provide any 
mechanism for validating the authenticity of the deauthentication frames [51]. 
An attacker can inject deauthentication frames, destined to the AP, using the 
source MAC address of a wireless device already authenticated or associated. The AP 
will process the spoofed deauthentication frames and accept the deauthentication 
request because the source MAC address corresponds to a legitimate device. After 
leaving the network, the victims might reinitiate the entire authentication and 
association process. As long as the attacker keeps sending spoofed deauthentication 
frames, the victims will be unable to reauthenticate with the AP. Similarly, the attacker 
can also spoof the source MAC address of the AP and inject this deauthentication 
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frames, destined to a particular wireless device. Upon receiving the spoofed 
deauthentication frames, the targeted wireless devices will automatically leave the 
network. In one final attack scenario, the attacker can also inject deauthentication 
frames destined to the broadcast address [10]. As a consequence, all the authenticated 
or associated wireless devices have to leave the wireless network. However, the 
authors of [9] found that some wireless devices do not follow the indications of the 
IEEE 802.11 standard and could ignore this type of deauthentication frame. 
3.3.2.3.1.2 Disassociation Request 
The IEEE 802.11 standard states that each wireless user could be authenticated to 
different APs at the same time. However, these users are only allowed to be associated 
with a single AP at a time [112]. In order to stop the association with the AP, the IEEE 
802.11 standard defines disassociation frames. 
In disassociation request attacks, an attacker utilises spoofed disassociation frames 
to force legitimate devices to disassociate from the currently associated AP. Similar to 
the deauthentication request attack, this attack can be easily implemented because the 
IEEE 802.11 standard does not provide any mechanism for authenticating the 
authenticity of the disassociation frames [51]. An attacker can inject disassociation 
request frames using the source MAC address of an already associated wireless 
device, destined to the AP. The victim of this attack will be forced to disassociate from 
the associated AP. Similarly, the attacker can also inject disassociation request frames 
destined to a particular wireless device or destined to the broadcast address, using the 
spoof MAC address of the AP. As long as the attacker keeps sending spoofed 
disassociation request frames, the victims will be unable to reassociate with the AP. 
Similar countermeasure mechanisms can be implemented to protect wireless 
networks against both attacks. MAC filtering out may eliminate the effect of these 
attacks [67], but this solution may also cause a DoS attack on the legitimate device 
whose MAC address has been spoofed. Another countermeasure mechanism proposed 
is to authenticate the management and control frames [51]. The authors of [59] [51] 
have also proposed to modify the IEEE 802.11 standard. For instance, the authors of 
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[51] propose queuing the deauthentication or disassociation requests for a short period 
of time (i.e. 5-10 seconds) before processing them. If a data frame arrives from the 
same source MAC address as the deauthentication/disassociation request, during the 
queuing time, the request frame is discarded. Although the results presented by [51] 
prove this countermeasure mechanism efficient, there exist some drawbacks associated 
to this mechanism. First, the queuing mechanism adds an undesirable delay to wireless 
devices that are roaming between APs. Also, this countermeasure would be ineffective 
if any data frame is received during the queuing time. 
3.3.2.3.1.3 Rogue Access Point / Network Hijacking 
Rogue AP, also known as network hijacking, is a type of attack through which the 
attacker is able to take over the communication between the legitimate AP and 
wireless devices. This attack can be implemented as an extension of the 
deauthentication and disassociation attacks. Initially, the attacker spoofs the identity of 
the legitimate AP and forces the victim to leave the wireless network. Then, the 
attacker makes the wireless device authenticate and associate with itself rather than the 
legitimate AP. In order to achieve this, the attacker start transmitting spoofed beacon 
frames, including the MAC address of the AP and the same Service Set Identity 
(SSID) value. Probe response frames containing the same information, the spoofed 
MAC address and SSID, can be used to make the wireless device associate with the 
attacker [125]. The attacker needs to inject the frames using stronger signal strength 
than the AP, since the wireless devices try to associate to the AP with the strongest 
signal strength [125]. Before completely accomplishing this attack, the attacker needs 
to make sure that the wireless device does not reassociate back with the legitimate AP. 
Once the attacker has taken over the wireless communication, it has complete 
control of the communication [91]. The attacker would be able to freely access the 
information transmitted from or destined to the victim wireless client. It would be able 
to deliberately filter out and modify transmitted information, and it would be able to 
inject completely fake information to the wireless client. 
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The attackers can implement this attack since the management frames are 
unencrypted and unauthenticated, and by taking advantage of the identity spoofing 
capability [10]. One feasible countermeasure mechanism against the network hijacking 
attack is the implementation of mutual authentication between the legitimate AP and 
the wireless users [12]. Another countermeasure mechanism proposed by [114] is to 
increase the transmission signal strength of the AP to provide better wireless 
communication properties than the attacker, making the wireless devices authenticate 
with the AP again. 
3.3.2.3.1.4 Energy Saving 
The energy saving attack also requires identity spoofing to be efficiently implemented. 
The IEEE 802.11 standard provides a functionality to allow the wireless devices to 
save their generally limited energy resources. The wireless devices can enter an energy 
saving mode during which they are unable to transmit or receive any frame [51]. The 
energy saving mode leads to great power savings in wireless devices. The AP 
periodically transmits beacon frames containing the Traffic Indication Map (TIM) 
[59]. The TIM is used by the AP to indicate which wireless users in the energy saving 
mode have data buffered for them [112]. The wireless users must leave the energy 
saving mode to receive the beacon frames, and examine the TIM. If there is any 
buffered data at this time, the users send a PS-Poll control frame to the AP to retrieve 
the buffered data [112]. The AP sends the buffered data to the users that requested it 
and, subsequently, removes the contents of its buffer [51]. 
An attacker could spoofs the source MAC address of the PS-Poll control frames to 
launch the energy saving attack. An attacker can cause the AP to remove the buffered 
data destined to the wireless devices in the network. Taking advantage of the identity 
spoofing capability, the attacker is able to inject a PS-Poll control frame destined to 
the AP and to retrieve the buffered data of a legitimate user, while this user is sleeping 
[51]. After transmitting the buffered data the AP removes the contents of its buffer. 
Therefore, the legitimate user will never receive that information. Similarly, the 
attacker is able to inject beacon frames, spoofing the MAC address of the AP, 
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including a modified TIM value. If the TIM value indicates that there is not buffered 
data to be retrieved, the user will return back to the sleeping mode [51]. Given that the 
legitimate user does not retrieve the buffered data, the AP may collapse the buffering 
resources of the AP. One final attack that could compromise the implementation of the 
energy saving mode aims to break the synchronisation between the AP and the 
wireless device. The wireless devices in energy saving mode relies on its 
synchronisation with the AP to wake up and been able to receive TIM values. Before 
entering into the energy saving mode, the wireless device synchronises with the AP 
when to wake up. Given that the synchronisation information is transmitted in the 
clear, using unauthenticated management frames, an attacker can inject spoofed 
management frames to make the wireless device to wake up at the inappropriate times, 
falling out of synchronisation with the AP [51]. 
3.3.2.4 Man-in-the-Middle 
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) is a type of attack that works against the integrity of 
communication. By implementing this attack, the attacker is able to access the 
communication between two of the nodes in the network, and is capable of modifying 
the content of the transmitted information. 
MitM attack can be implemented using different methodologies. One of these 
methodologies is implementing this type of attack at the application layer. An attacker 
could initially install a computer virus, malware, or Trojan horse in the victim 
machine. Although an attacker could use these pieces of information to carry out many 
other malicious actions, these can also be used to have access to the system, and 
acquire, modify or delete information. This methodology of MitM attack is not 
exclusive of wireless nodes. It also affects nodes connected to an Ethernet network. 
Another methodology of MitM attack is implemented very similarly to network 
hijacking attack. In fact, this methodology, which affects only to the nodes in a 
wireless network, could be interpreted as a double implementation of the network 
hijacking attack. As part of this methodology, the attacker has to spoof the identity of 
both end devices of the wireless communication. On the one hand, after making the 
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wireless devices leave the network, the attacker spoofs the identity of the AP and starts 
transmitting spoofed beacon frames. These frames include the MAC address of the AP 
and similar SSID value to make the wireless device to associate with the attacker. On 
the other hand, the attacker spoofs the identity of the wireless device and tries to 
associate with the AP. At this moment, both legitimate devices believe that they are 
directly connected with each other. However, both are connected to the attacker. The 
attacker will receive all the frames that each end device transmits to the other wireless 
device. The attacker has now the freedom to let the information reach its destination, 
modify the content of the transmitted frames or discard any frame [126]. Finally, the 
attacker must assure that there is no direct communication between both legitimate 
wireless devices to succeed in the implementation of the MitM attack. In order to 
achieve that, the attacker must assure that each wireless device is off the transmission 
range of the other device. Alternatively, the attacker must assure that both wireless 
devices start using different frequency channels [52]. 
Another methodology of MitM attack can be implemented by intercepting the 
wireless communication and injecting crafted information, using the spoofed MAC 
address of a legitimate device. Similar to the previously explained MitM attack, this 
methodology affects only to the nodes in a wireless network. The attacker 
intentionally replaces the content of the website that the wireless clients receive. This 
methodology is one of the attacks that have been evaluated in this thesis. Further 
description of this implementation can be found in the following section 3.4.3. 
3.4 Evaluated Wireless-Specific Attacks 
As will be presented in forthcoming chapters, the effectiveness of the IDS proposed in 
this thesis will be evaluated using five different wireless network datasets, generated 
with two particular wireless-specific attacks, as well as a dataset with non-malicious 
information. These are deauthentication request and a particular implementation of 
MitM. The attacks have been practically implemented in a live operational IEEE 
802.11 network, physically deployed in the laboratory of the High Speed Network 
Group, at Loughborough University. 
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3.4.1 Deauthentication Attack 
One of the evaluated attacks is the deauthentication attack. This attack has been 
previously described in detail. The attacker launches a succession of deauthentication 
frames with the purpose of disrupting the connection between the AP and the wireless 
client, encrypted using WPA2. Although the wireless communication between the AP 
and the wireless client was WPA2 encrypted, this attack has been able to disrupt the 
communication. The attacker spoofed the source MAC address in the management 
frames used in this attack, utilising the MAC address of the AP. Aircrack [121] is the 
suite of penetration testing tools that has been used to implement this attack. 
3.4.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
Another attack that has been implemented in this thesis is the MitM attack, launched at 
the PHY layer. In fact, two different versions of the same attack have been 
implemented using the software tool Airpwn [18], which can be found as part of the 
suite of penetration testing tools Aircrack. Both implementations require the attacker 
to be physically located between the AP and the wireless device, intercepting the 
wireless communication. 
First of all, Airpwn intercepts the transmitted frames and looks for HTTP requests 
from the legitimate wireless nodes. As soon as the attacker eavesdrops a website 
request from a legitimate node in the wireless network, it injects its own crafted frame. 
For instance, the crafted frames may contain illegitimate HTML code onto the 
wireless channel, using the spoofed MAC address of the AP. Airpwn takes advantage 
of the RTT that a web server takes to respond to legal website requests to inject its 
own crafted HTML code. Since the attacker is physically located closer to the victim 
than the AP, it takes the attacker much less time to respond to the HTTP requests than 
the website server. When the victim receives the data, it will assume the original 
request was answered and process the fabricated HTML code from the attacker. In the 
first version of the attack, referred as ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 , the attacker replaces the whole 
content of the authentic website to a custom one. In the second version of the MitM 
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attack, referred as ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02, Airpwn replaces only the images in the website. The 
attacker listens for images requests, as part of the HTTP requests, and injects its own 
fabricated images. 
By replacing the content of the website that the wireless nodes receive, Airpwn 
could cause harm of varying severity. For instance, an attacker could cause less 
dangerous effects such as replacing the adverts of a specific website with different 
ones, with the economic benefit that this change could provide. An attacker could also 
include disturbing images that could produce psychological distress to the wireless 
network users. In the other extreme, an attacker could also cause more dangerous 
activity such as redirecting the wireless device to a phishing website. Figures 3.1 and 
3.2 show the effect caused by Airpwn to the website that the wireless client receives. 
Figure 3.1 shows the legitimate content of the Chinese website ‘Dict’ 
(http://www.dict.cn), when Airpwn is not active. This is how the legitimate website 
looks like in normal conditions. Figure 3.2 shows the same website. This time, the 
Airpwn is active and the figure shows the effect that the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 produces in the 
wireless client web browser. In this example, it is easy to identify the crafted injected 
content. The banner “Hello Defcon! Your” in red replaces the legitimate images in the 
original website. However, the crafted injected content could be more elaborated and 
the wireless client might not distinguish the difference between legitimate and 
malicious images. To make things clearer, Airpwn does not attack the website content 
at the web server. The attacker never targets the web servers. The attack occurs in the 
last link of the wireless network, before reaching the wireless client. 
3.4.2.1 Malvertising Using Airpwn 
There exist several Airpwn implementations that attackers can benefit from. Special 
attention has been given to this type of attack in this thesis because of its capability to 
modify the content of the websites presented to the wireless client. The capability of 
Airpwn to replace the adverts of a specific website with different ones could provide 
substantial economic benefit. 
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Figure 3.1 Website ‘Dict.cn’ Normal Content. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Website ‘Dict.cn’ Injected Malicious ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Content. 
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Currently, advertising in websites has become a high profitable business. In the 
last few years, cyber-attackers have gained presence in this billion-dollar environment 
trying to gain substantial economic benefit using illicit mechanisms. The authors of 
[25] explain that hackers can use the adverts embedded in websites to carry out 
malicious and fraudulent activities. This paper refers to this type of attack as 
malvertising. The authors highlight the fact that malvertising has become a very 
profitable illegitimate business, and they present an extensive study on the 
malvertising infrastructure. This work also shows that illicit adverts can be used by 
attackers to inject viruses, malware or Trojan horses into the devices accessing to the 
websites. Similarly, in 2013, a security research team exposed the existence of two 
software tools that injected unauthorised adverts in websites [26] [27] [28]. Some of 
these unauthorised adverts would lead users to malicious websites, or would even 
allow viruses and malware to gain access to the user devices [26]. In this particular 
case, the user is actively involved in the success of this attack. The user needs to install 
specific software prior the unauthorised adverts could be injected in the websites. 
Otherwise the malicious content could not be imbedded in the information displayed 
in the web browsers. Since the images used in these illegitimate adverts are, in some 
cases, the corporative brand logo of well-known multinational companies, users have 
no suspicion of this malvertising content appearing in their web browsers. In fact, this 
attack has passed undercover for a long time. It is of the interest of many parties to 
stop this type of actions, since it damages the reputation of both the websites in which 
the unauthorised adverts are injected and the brands which corporative image is used 
unauthorised, along with the damage caused to the final users. 
Currently, there is no reported evidence that cyber-attackers are actively using the 
Airpwn attack in malvertising. However, this attack could achieve the same goal than 
the attack presented in the previous paragraph that injects unauthorised adverts in 
websites. In contrast to the previously presented attack, Arpwn does not require to 
install any specific software. Arpwn injects the crafted content into the wireless 
communication, spoofing the identity of a legitimate AP. This is just one of the 
multiple usages that could be given to this particular penetration testing tool. The lack 
evidences about Airpwn being actively used does not necessarily mean that cyber-
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attackers are not currently making use of it. Nonetheless, it has been practically 
demonstrated that Airpwn can be used in malvertising. 
In this thesis it is speculated that cyber-attackers might see in this tool an effective 
and easy way to implement malvertising, as a mechanism to gain substantial economic 
benefit. Fortunately, this work presents a novel methodology that allow identify this 
attack, and allow the possible application of countermeasure techniques to jeopardise 
the success of Airpwn. To the best of the author knowledge, this is the first 
methodology able to efficiently identify this particular attack. 
3.5 Discussion 
In this chapter, several types of attacks have been described. The main purpose of this 
description has been to highlight the fact that, although many of these attacks can also 
affect wired devices connected to an Ethernet network, there exist a number of attacks 
specifically focused on wireless devices and WLANs. Traditional security systems 
that were initially designed to provide security to wired networks cannot provide a 
complete level of security to current wireless networks. 
From the different wireless-specific attacks explained above, the most commonly 
proposed countermeasure mechanisms in this chapter are access control filters or 
MAC address filtering. It is easy to realise that the success of these mechanisms relies 
on the unequivocally identification of the attacker. The MAC address in the frames 
determines the identity of the wireless device. Unfortunately, this is not a reliable 
approach to assess the real identity of the wireless device. An attacker can easily 
implement techniques of MAC address spoofing, and masquerade itself behind a fake 
MAC address. 
The efforts to provide reliable security against these attacks should focus on the 
identification of the device that has transmitted the frame. A possible solution might 
be using, not only the MAC address, but also multiple other parameters or metrics 
from the wireless device or the wireless communication to infer the real identity of 
these devices. The most effective approach would be to analyse features or metrics 
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from every layer of the protocol stack, and try to unequivocally differentiate between 
legitimate wireless devices in the network and the attacker; starting from the PHY 
layer. This would still not be the definite solution. In order to succeed in its purpose, 
the attacker may try to imitate as many characteristics of a valid wireless client as 
possible throughout the entire protocol stack. If the attacker had the capability to 
replicate all the characteristics of a legitimate wireless client, the different security 
systems would not be able to provide protection, and the attacker would finally 
succeed. However, it is highly unlikely that the attacker could mimic every single 
feature of the legitimate devices. Therefore, the higher the number of parameters or 
metrics used to identify the real identity of the wireless devices, the higher the 
probability to identify any attempt of an attacker to masquerade itself behind the 
spoofed identity of a legitimate wireless device. 
As will be explained in the following chapters, wireless network monitoring tools, 
such as IDSs, are the most appropriate network security mechanisms to identify the 
difference between a legitimate wireless device and an attacker impersonating the 
legitimate wireless device. If these network security mechanisms were able to 
unequivocally identify whether the frame has been transmitted by an attacker or by a 
legitimate node, then the most appropriate countermeasure mechanism could be 
applied. In order to prove that IDSs are appropriate mechanisms to protect networks 
against wireless-specific attacks, the deauthentication request and MitM attacks have 
been practically implemented in a live operational IEEE 802.11 network and 
evaluated. There might be a concern about whether the number of experiments is large 
enough to prove the efficiency of this security mechanism. Whilst evaluating all the 
existing wireless-specific attacks would be the most appropriate decision to assure that 
the IDSs can identify all these attacks, research wise, evaluating all these attacks 
would be impractical. The attacks implemented in this thesis are an adequate sample to 
showcase the efficiency of the IDSs. 
Lastly, during the implementation of this thesis, a third type of attack was also 
implemented. This was the rogue AP in which the attacker tries to take over the 
wireless communication between the AP and wireless client. Similar to the previous 
two attacks, the attacker spoofed the source MAC address in the injected frames 
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utilising the MAC address of the AP. The rogue AP attack was fully capable of getting 
sensitive information from the victim. The attack was implemented using the attacking 
tool HostAP [128]. However, the results of these experiments have not been included 
in this thesis for different reasons. The testbed in which the experiments were 
implemented was similar to the one in the deauthentication attacks. Therefore, these 
new results would not add to the idea that changes in the proximity of the attacker 
from the victim may have on the final results of the proposed detection system. Also, 
the experimental results using deauthentication and Airpwn attacks prove that the 
proposed methodology is able to efficiently detect different types of wireless-specific 
attack without making any adjustments to its implementation configuration, regardless 
of the implemented attack. Including the rogue AP experiment results would not add 
to prove the methodology efficiency. The experiment results for this type of attack, 
using the methodology proposed in this thesis have however been previously 
presented in [43]. The results published in this paper also prove the efficiency of the 
proposed detection system detecting this type of attack. 
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Chapter 4 
Detection System Definition 
4.1 Introduction 
Due to the increasing number of attacks and intrusion attempts that target wireless 
networks, the implementation of wireless network monitoring tools, such as IDSs, has 
become fundamental in the development of security infrastructures for wireless 
networks. These systems outperform the protection capabilities of cryptography 
protocols, firewalls or antivirus software. IDSs incorporate sophisticated information 
analysis techniques that support the processing of any observable and measurable 
metric of the monitored system to detect attacks. 
Different mechanisms could be utilised by IDSs to analyse the datasets. Similarly, 
multiple design configurations could be applied to the IDS architecture. Designing an 
IDS requires the consideration of multiple characteristics that define the final 
architecture of the system. The correct selection of these characteristics would 
establish the difference between an efficient and a poor detection process. This chapter 
introduces in detail the concept of IDSs, and provides a detailed taxonomy that 
describes the most relevant characteristics that need to be considered when an IDS is 
designed, as well as the pros and cons of each of the characteristics. Next, this chapter 
describes the characteristic included in the final architecture design of the IDS 
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presented in this thesis, and discusses the principal reasons for selecting each of these 
characteristics. The purpose of this chapter is to find the most convenient architecture 
for the detection system presented in this thesis and to discuss the reasons for selecting 
each of the characteristics. 
4.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are security systems that constantly monitor 
information from the protected environment, e.g. a computer or a network system, to 
identify evidence of attacks or intrusion attempts. The principal role of these systems 
is to detect malicious actions that compromise the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the resources of the protected systems [14]. In [86], the authors describe 
the main functions performed by IDSs as gathering activity information from the 
monitored system, analysing the gathered information and assessing the nature of this 
information, and raising an alarm if the outcome of the detection process indicates the 
presence of attack. The authors of [57] simplify the concept of IDS to just a 
classification problem in which a given piece of information is identified as normal or 
malicious. In my opinion, this last definition is excessively simplistic. The functions 
that IDSs implement are particularly complex to be defined as just a classification 
problem. 
IDSs have become essential components of the security mechanisms. These 
systems should be an indispensable part of any security infrastructure, complementing 
and supplementing the weakness that the traditional security mechanisms may have. 
Although IDSs could operate independently, similar to other security systems, IDSs 
should not be considered an alternative for current security mechanisms that are 
currently widely deployed, such as firewalls or anti-virus. IDSs outperform the 
detection capabilities of traditional network security mechanisms. This is because 
IDSs incorporate more sophisticated information analysis techniques, able to analyse 
more diverse type of information. In addition, as is explained later in this chapter, 
certain types of IDSs are able to dynamically adapt their detection capabilities to the 
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current characteristics of the resources being protected, in contrast to the traditional 
static security mechanisms. 
It is important to understand that IDSs are not designed to prevent intrusions from 
occurring. Nonetheless, some IDSs allow the system administrator to specify a set of 
actions to be automatically implemented in case an attack is detected [55]. Based on 
the nature of the actions, IDSs that include response actions can be categorised as 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) and Intrusion Tolerant Systems (ITSs). IPSs 
actively respond to the identified attacks by applying countermeasure techniques, 
attempting to stop them from persisting and preventing the attacks from succeeding 
[55]. However, actively stopping the attacks from persisting is not always possible for 
the detection systems. That is the main difference with ITSs. Instead of attempting to 
stop the attacks, the ITSs provide resilience against these attacks. ITSs adapt the 
operational capabilities of the protected system and allow the system to correctly 
continue working, despite the presence of the attacks [131]. 
4.2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems Classification 
Designing an IDS requires considering multiple characteristics that define the final 
architecture of the system. The correct selection of these characteristics has direct 
effect on the final performance of the system, establishing the difference between an 
efficient and a poor detection process. 
Different researchers in the field of intrusion detection have described numerous 
of these characteristics. The most widely utilised in the literature are the source where 
the information is gathered from, the methodology from which IDSs learn the 
difference between legitimate and malicious information, and the methodology utilised 
to conduct the intrusion detection. An extensive IDSs characteristics classification has 
been presented in [124]. This section provides a detailed taxonomy that, according to 
the author of this thesis, describes the most relevant characteristics for an efficient 
intrusion detection process. These characteristics are summarised in Table IV.I. 
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4.2.1.1 Source of Information 
Central to the intrusion detection process is the information analysed to infer the 
presence of attack. IDSs can make use of any measurable metric from a variety of 
sources. Based on the source of information, IDSs can be broadly divided into two 
main categories, network-based and host-based intrusion detection [56]. Router-based 
intrusion detection is another category described in [132], which is not generally used. 
TABLE IV.I.  CONSIDERED IDS CHARACTERISTICS. 
CHARACTERISTIC DEFINITION CATEGORY 
Source of Information 
Defines from where the 
information used by IDSs is 
gathered. 
Network-based 
Host-based 
Router-based 
Learning Approach 
Defines how IDSs learn the 
difference between normal 
and malicious information. 
Supervised 
Unsupervised 
Detection Systems Cooperation 
Defines the level of 
cooperation between 
different IDSs. 
Autonomous 
Cooperative 
Cooperative Systems 
Deployment 
Defines the way cooperative 
IDSs share the information. 
Centralised 
Hieratical 
Distributed 
Detection Timing 
Defines how long takes to 
implement the intrusions 
detection. 
Off-Line 
On-Line 
Detection Methodology 
Defines the methodology 
utilised to implement the 
intrusions detection. 
Misuse 
Anomaly 
Hybrid 
 
The network-based IDSs gather information from the data traffic passing through 
the network. Both wired and wireless networks can be the source of this information. 
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This type of detection system can obtain information directly from the content of the 
frames (i.e. the frame header and the frame payload) or it can generate different 
statistical parameters from the characteristics of the network in form of traffic Netflow 
data (for instance, the duration of the connection). Multiple monitoring sensors could 
be deployed in one single IDS to provide multiple data streams for a multi-layer 
approach [133]. On the other hand, the host-based IDSs gather information exclusively 
from operations that occur in individual computers (e.g. PCs), such as operating 
system audit trails, system logs and calls, sequence of user commands, application 
logs, or resource usage [80] [86]. These systems allow the identification of unintended 
and misbehaving activity locally to the personal devices. 
The host-based IDSs require be installed in the monitored PC. Current OSs have 
become highly complex [78]. Hence, for the proper operation of the host-based IDS, 
these systems may require great effort to be tailored to each respective system. In 
contrast, the network-based IDSs are able to protect the wireless devices in the 
network and the different components of the network from attacks, regardless of the 
specific OS installed in these systems. This type of system can operate without any 
knowledge at all or with little knowledge about the monitored network, such as the 
used network standard. In addition, the network-based IDSs do not require being 
installed in the network component devices. These systems could be installed in an 
independent monitoring device, not requiring direct access to any component of the 
monitored network. These facts make the network-based IDSs much easy systems to 
be developed. 
The router-based IDSs collect information from within the network core of the 
ISP backbone, the link between routers. However, this category is not as commonly 
utilised by researchers as the other two categories. Whilst the resources required to 
develop and deploy host-based and network-based IDSs are easy available, the access 
to either the routers in the ISP backbone or the information passing though these 
devices is highly restricted. Therefore, the deployment or utilisation of this type of 
IDSs is a decision that only the ISPs can take. For instance, one of the research studies 
that have had access to the core of a major UK ISP network is [134]. 
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4.2.1.2 Learning Approach 
Another characteristic that can be utilised to categorise IDSs is the approach utilised 
by these systems to learn the difference between legitimate and malicious information. 
IDSs can be categorised as supervised and unsupervised IDSs, based on the learning 
approach. 
The supervised IDSs are provided with a set of learning samples or training 
datasets that helps the detection mechanisms in IDSs to determine whether the 
analysed information is malicious or normal. Predefined signatures of known attacks 
directly teach the detection systems what is normal information and what is not. 
Training datasets, commonly labelled, also allow the administrators of IDSs, not only 
to learn the difference between normal and malicious information, but also to define 
the specific types of attacks that IDSs have to learn. The labelled training datasets may 
contain instances of both, normal and malicious information. On the other hand, if the 
training dataset is not labelled, the supervised IDSs assume that the dataset only 
contains instances of normal information. Therefore, IDSs can compute the reference 
of normal behaviour and consider as malicious any analysed information that outlines 
the defined reference. 
One complex task that supervised IDSs face is to assess whether the training 
datasets correctly represent the difference between normal and malicious information. 
In the case of utilising labelled datasets, the most important consideration is whether 
the instances in the datasets are correctly labelled. In addition, it is highly unlikely that 
the available labelled datasets or the attack signatures could cover all the existing 
attacks [135]. Therefore, this learning information needs to be frequently updated. In 
the case of utilising unlabelled dataset, the most important consideration is assuring 
that the dataset is completely clean, without any malicious instance. Again, obtaining 
completely clean training datasets can be extremely difficult or impossible to achieve. 
Even in a controlled testbed, assuring that the content of the training dataset is 
completely free of malicious instances is extremely hard [87]. If a supervised IDS was 
trained using an unlabelled dataset containing malicious instances, erroneously 
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considering that the dataset is completely clean, the IDS would not be able to detect 
this particular attack [57].  
The unsupervised IDSs learn the difference between legitimate and malicious 
information autonomously, solely based on the intelligence capabilities of the 
detection techniques analysing the attributes of the monitored information [100], 
without external support. The datasets used by the unsupervised IDSs to create the 
reference of normal behaviour are unlabelled, and may contain normal and malicious 
information instances. This saves the effort of assessing whether the instances in the 
datasets are correctly labelled, or whether the datasets contains any malicious instance. 
Since these systems do not make use of learning samples or training datasets as do 
the supervised IDSs, the unsupervised IDSs rely entirely on the efficiency of their 
decision algorithms to determine the difference between legitimate and malicious 
information. Finding a decision technique that could precisely differentiate between 
both types of information is the biggest difficulty when designing unsupervised IDSs. 
In addition, the lack of learning information means that, if any attack was detected, the 
unsupervised IDSs would not be able to identify the specific types of attacks. On top 
of that, two conditions must be assured for the unsupervised IDSs to be efficient; 
conditions that IDSs cannot fully control. The first condition is that the number of 
legal instances in the dataset must be larger than the malicious instances. Second, the 
difference between normal and malicious instances in the dataset must be quantifiable. 
According to the authors in [87], these two conditions will make malicious instances 
in the dataset appear as rare outliners from the more predominant normal instances. 
4.2.1.3 System Architecture 
The architecture of an IDS is composed of a diverse number of modules. The most 
common are a set of monitoring sensors, which perform information gathering 
functions, a database that stores the information gathered by the monitoring sensors, 
and a central engine that performs a set of operations to detect the presence of attacks 
[55] [136]. Many additional modules can be included to conduct efficient intrusion 
detection. For instance, it is also common for an IDS to include a preprocessing 
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module [88], data cleansing module, an administration console to monitoring console 
to control the system [136], or data fusion module, among others.  
4.2.1.3.1 Detection Systems Cooperation  
The architecture of IDSs provides numerous characteristics to categorise these 
systems. One of the characteristics is the level of cooperation between different IDSs. 
This means whether an IDS implements the detection individually or whether it 
cooperates with other detection systems. Based on the level of collaboration between 
diverse detection systems, these can be categorised as autonomous or cooperative 
intrusion detection [124]. 
One IDS can be designed with different levels of cooperation with other IDSs. In 
one end, there are IDSs primarily designed to conduct the intrusion detection using 
information shared by other detection systems. IDSs collaborate with other detection 
systems to conduct combined intrusion detection in a cooperative architecture. Sharing 
information among different IDSs can help to detect some ambiguous intrusions [137], 
reduce the number of false alarms by correlating different IDS outputs [104], and can 
help IDSs to anticipate possible attacks, previously detected by other IDSs. One of the 
best examples of this type of IDS architecture is a Wireless Sensors Network (WSN) 
looking for nodes whose internal behaviour have been compromised (i.e. Byzantine 
attack). The nodes in the WSNs share information about other nodes for the IDS to 
identify jeopardised devices. The level of cooperation among IDSs can be gradually 
reduced to the other extreme in which a single IDS would conduct the intrusion 
detection individually, without any information shared by any other IDS. In the other 
end, each IDS considered autonomous is responsible for performing the detection 
functions independently, and the effectiveness of these systems relies entirely on its 
own detection capabilities. There is no communication or information sharing with 
other IDSs. 
Cooperative IDSs provide some advantages over the autonomous IDSs. For 
instance, these IDSs posses more information and, therefore, they have a clearer 
picture of the environment which they are monitoring, and the specific type of attacks 
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that may be carried out. The authors of [104] propose a cooperative architecture in 
which multiple IDSs collaborate to make the intrusion detection more accurate and 
efficient. Despite the provided advantages, this type of system also has some 
drawbacks. First of all, the communication between IDSs may be vulnerable to 
attacks. An attacker could compromise the transmitted information, injecting faulty or 
false information, as well as colliding the communication between diverse IDSs. Also, 
a common communication language among all the detection systems should be 
defined for these systems to interpret the information received from other IDSs. This 
second requirement would not generate a great level of concern among a reduced 
number of cooperative IDSs. The administrator of these systems could agree on 
creating common communication language. However, this is not easily scalable to 
scenarios with high number of IDSs. In addition, the communication between 
cooperative IDSs increases the quantity of transmitted information, increasing the 
level of congestion in the communication bandwidth. 
On the other hand, the efficiency of an autonomous system relies entirely on its 
detection capabilities. Given that this type of systems does not have access to extra 
information, the accuracy of the autonomous systems might be lower than the 
cooperative systems. Nonetheless, the autonomous IDSs eliminate the disadvantages 
that the cooperative IDSs present. The authors of [137] correctly argue that 
autonomous IDSs could only be installed in devices with enough resources. Hence, the 
computational requirement of the different detection engines used by IDSs should be 
as low as possible for the autonomous system to be efficient. 
4.2.1.3.2 Cooperative Systems Deployment 
For IDSs using a cooperative architecture, the deployment of the systems may be also 
categorised as centralised, hieratical or distributed intrusion detection [58]. 
In a centralised system, individual monitoring sensors gather information locally 
and transmit this information to a centralised database. The sensors do not necessarily 
need to be in the same physical location. Then, the central detection engine of the IDS 
processes and analyses the information gathered by the different monitoring sensors, 
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stored in the database [124]. The central IDS would identify attacks from the 
information collectively gathered. A centralised system can also be composed of 
different IDSs that carry out individual detection processes and send information about 
any detected attack intrusion to a central correlation system to corroborate the 
detection using information from other systems [58]. Common to all the cooperative 
IDSs, the information transmitted to the central database is vulnerable to a series of 
attacks. Also, the information gathered by different sensors may be duplicated in the 
database, increasing the computational cost of IDS dealing with duplicate instances. 
Additionally, the communication between the monitoring sensors and the central 
database may create a traffic bottleneck. On top of that, the central database becomes a 
unique failing point. The entire system would be unavailable if the central database is 
inaccessible as consequence of any failure. If the database fails, the entire IDS also 
fails. 
In order to reduce the level of problem that a single central database or a single 
central detection engine may pose, a cooperative IDS can be deployed as a hieratical 
system. In this type of system deployment a diverse number of databases and detection 
engines are used. The different sensors or IDSs share information according to a 
hierarchic status. This approach can be envisioned as small cases of centralised 
systems, with similar vulnerabilities and drawbacks. However, the hieratical system 
splits the risk and reduces the probability of each database to fail, as well as reduces 
the probability of traffic bottleneck. In contrast to the centralised system, if one of the 
databases fails or is unavailable, the entire IDS do not completely fails. The 
communication between the different components is still vulnerable to attacks. 
In a distributed system, each detection system shares information directly with the 
rest of the IDSs. Either the information gathered by the sensors or information about 
local detection process is shared in a completely distributed way, without the use of 
any central database [58]. Similar to the previous two approaches, the communication 
between the different components is vulnerable to attacks. Also, the process of dealing 
with duplicate instances and its computational cost becomes redundant. In a 
centralised system, the central database processes and deletes the duplicate instances. 
In a distributed system, each system deals with duplicate instances independently. 
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Therefore, all the distributed systems may need to process and delete similar pieces of 
information. In addition, the distributed system increases the quantity of transmitted 
information, increasing the level of congestion in the communication bandwidth. 
4.2.1.4 Detection Timing 
IDSs can also be categorised according to the detection timing used by the system. 
This is whether a system works on-line or whether it works off-line [99] [124] [138]. 
The off-line IDSs work analysing network information in a non-real time manner. In 
contrast, the on-line IDSs work in real time, continuously analysing information as it 
is gathered from the monitored system, and detecting attack while they occur. The 
sooner an intrusion is detected, the less the amount of damage in infringed to the 
protected system. 
The off-line IDSs could gather information from the protected system during 
hours, days, or even weeks, either periodically or continuously, before implementing 
the intrusion detection. Once the information has been gathered, this is processed and 
analysed by the detection system. However, off-line IDSs do not always need to wait 
until the complete dataset has been gathered. The off-line IDSs could also choose to 
use time intervals models to conduct the detection process, using a specific frequency. 
The off-line approach is very convenient for researchers in the field of IDS to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the detection systems over the same dataset, or compare 
different detection approaches. However, the off-line IDSs fall into the category of 
forensic analysis. It becomes a matter of finding out whether the protected system has 
been attacked. By the time evidences of attack are found, these attacks may have 
already reached the protected system. The IDS would detect the attack after it has 
taken place. Even IDSs that work in nearly real time are one step behind the attackers. 
Urgent attack detection is crucial to provide appropriate and prompt protection. 
The IDSs have to be able to detect the attacks as soon as they occur [116]. The 
detection timing for an IDS to be defined as real time, or on-line IDS, should not be 
defined using standard time units. In contrast, the detection timing should be defined 
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by the time that an attacker needs to compromise the protected systems. The time that 
on-line IDSs need to detect intrusion attempts should be smaller than the time an 
attacker needs to compromise the protected system [139]. This would give the option 
to the protected system to implement any countermeasure action if required. 
A reduced number of publications have presented an on-line IDS, according to 
[138]. This might be because the on-line IDSs generally posse high computational 
cost. The off-line tend to be less computational demanding than the on-line IDSs. 
However, the computational cost of the IDSs should be lightweight to be applied in 
real time [90]. But lightweight detection processes are less reliable than a thorough 
detection processes. Therefore, the requirement of urgent makes the on-line IDSs less 
reliable than the off-line IDSs [99]. 
4.2.1.5 Detection Methodology 
One last characteristic to categorise IDSs is the methodology utilised to implement the 
detection. Based on the detection methodology, IDSs can be categorised as Anomaly 
or Misuse intrusion detection [13] [57]. This is the most frequently used characteristic 
to categorise IDSs. 
4.2.1.5.1 Misuse Intrusion Detection 
Similar to the antivirus, misuse IDSs make use of predefined signatures to identify 
known attacks. Misuse IDSs compare the analysed information against the signatures 
of known attacks, looking for any matching. In case any match is found, the systems 
will raise an alarm indicating the finding. A database is used to store the signatures. 
These signatures can be in the form of regular expressions or state transition models 
that characterise the implementation of particular malicious actions [10]. The attack 
signatures could be defined manually by the administrator of the detection system or it 
could be automatically defined as the outcome of an anomaly IDS. According to the 
authors in [100], the supervised IDSs are commonly used for misuse IDSs. The attack 
signatures define what normal information is and what malicious information is. 
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Traditionally, misuse IDS has been the preferred intrusion detection option for 
network security [57] [140]. Most of the commercial detection systems currently 
developed are based on misuse IDSs [78] [87] [106] [135] [141]. This is because the 
low percentage of FPs generated by this type of systems (commonly 0%), and the high 
degree of accuracy detecting known attacks. Also, the misuse IDSs are able to identify 
the specific type of attack that compromise the protected system. This fact is highly 
beneficial for the level of security provided to the protected system because, if the 
specific type of attack is known, the countermeasure mechanism that best protection 
provided against this attack can be implemented. In that case, the protected system 
would suffer low or even no damage at all. Misuse IDSs are also characterised by the 
short required time to detect the attacks. This is because it is assumed that the attack 
signatures are already stored in the signatures database before performing the intrusion 
detection analysis. The matching process carried out by these systems is done almost 
instantly. In addition, the implementation of misuse IDSs is conceptually simpler than 
anomaly IDSs. Evaluating the efficiency of these systems is also easier than assessing 
the efficiency of the anomaly IDS. 
Unfortunately, these systems are victims of their own good performance. The high 
degree of accuracy detecting known attacks and the low percentage of FPs would 
bring the user of the IDS into a false sense of security against unknown attacks. The 
misuse IDSs are unable to detected previously unknown attacks and variations of 
known attacks [104]. These systems may suffer from high percentage of FN alarms. 
The occurrence of a FN means that an attack has passed unnoticed and reached 
protected system. Another disadvantage of these systems is that, for each new type of 
attack that is identified, a new signature describing the attack should be generated and 
included into the signatures database [57]. From the time an attack is created to the 
time the respective attack signature is created, the monitored system is vulnerable to 
this particular attack [87]. Furthermore, poorly defined signatures could make the IDS 
to identify normal behaviours as malicious. In addition, the authors of [58] emphasise 
that the larger number of signatures stored in the database, the higher the 
computational cost and the longer the time required for analysing the signatures. This 
is a very interesting remark, because clearly reflect the fact that for each new attack or 
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modification of known attacks, a new signature ought to be generated. In an 
environment such as computer networks in which new attacks are constantly created, 
evaluating all the signatures in the database would be computational. 
4.2.1.5.2 Anomaly Intrusion Detection 
Researchers in the field of intrusion detection are mainly focused on anomaly IDS 
[36]. Anomaly IDSs create statistical references of normal behaviour of the protected 
systems using historical data [55]. Any deviation from the normal behaviour of the 
monitored systems is interpreted as an attack or intrusion attempt [40]. Anomaly IDSs 
are based on the assumption that the normal and malicious behaviour are differentiable 
from each other, and the difference must be quantifiable. If both behaviours were 
completely similar, any effort to identify the attacks would be impractical. In addition, 
anomaly IDSs require that the number of legal instances in the analysed dataset must 
be larger than the malicious instances. These two conditions are similar to the 
conditions required for the unsupervised IDSs. 
The effectiveness of an anomaly IDS relies on the technique utilised to analyse 
the information and the accuracy of the technique used to perform the training process. 
The process of creating the statistical reference of normal behaviour is considered the 
training process or training phase [78]. Numerous techniques can be employed to 
generate this reference. Once the training process has finished, the anomaly IDSs 
calculate the level of deviation of the currently analysed information from the 
reference of normality. High level of deviation between both values is likely to 
correspond to evidence of intrusion [79]. The main difficulty is to define the boundary 
between normal and malicious information. According to [104], this is one of the most 
complicated, and the most crucial tasks for anomaly IDSs. As part of the training 
process, the anomaly detection systems also have to define an alarm threshold. This 
alarm threshold defines the boundary between normal and malicious actions. If the 
deviation overpasses the defined alarm threshold, the system concludes that an attack 
is taking place and raises an alarm. 
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In contrast to misuse IDSs, this type of IDS is able to identify previously 
unknown attacks and variations of known attacks. Unfortunately, anomaly IDSs are 
known for their poor detection efficiency [36]. The anomaly IDSs tend to produce 
high number of false alarms [78] [106] [142] [143]; mainly FPs. These alarms are 
caused because normal activity is misclassified as anomalous. This is because 
information that deviates from the reference of normality does not always correspond 
to the occurrence of attacks [104]. There would be sometimes in which legitimate 
behaviour might deviate from the reference of normality, causing the anomaly IDS 
recognise this deviation as evidence of attack [144]. Another drawback presented of 
the anomaly IDSs is the inability to identify the specific type of attack that 
compromises the protected system. Also, anomaly IDSs commonly require long 
training periods to efficiently detect malicious actions [55] [78]. In addition, the 
difficulty of training this type of systems increases in dynamic environment [143]. 
4.2.1.5.3 Hybrid Intrusion Detection 
The IDSs are commonly either misuse or anomaly detection systems only [15]. 
Nonetheless, a methodology that may enhance the detection capabilities of the IDSs is 
to combine the use of misuse or anomaly detection systems [15] [78] [124]. This is 
known as Hybrid intrusion detection [15]. 
The hybrid intrusion detection combines the advantages of both systems [124]. 
This type of systems seeks to improve the overall intrusion detection performance of 
the misuse IDS, while reducing the number of false alarms suffered by the anomaly 
IDSs [36]. The anomaly detection capabilities allow the hybrid system to detect 
previously unknown attacks, as well as to generate new signatures that can be used by 
the misuse system, whereas the misuse detection capabilities provide the celerity to 
detect the attacks and the high detection accuracy of known attacks. An example of 
hybrid detection system is presented in [145]. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4:  DETECTION SYSTEM DEFINITION 
85
4.3 Discussing the Intrusion Detection System Designing 
There is no one final IDS design that could be efficient in every possible scenario. The 
final architecture of the detection system is subjected to any initial need required from 
the monitored system. Each decision in the design involves modify the selected 
characteristics. As can be inferred from the previous IDS taxonomy, each of these 
characteristics offers a series of benefits over the rest, such as detecting certain attacks 
that the others may ignore or substantially increasing the detection capabilities of the 
system [55]. But the offered benefit is not always the same. This is tied to the 
configuration of the protected system, and the configuration varies according to the 
context in which the IDS has been defined. A clear example of this variation is the 
particular scenario in which the IDS is going to be deployed. An IDS designed to be 
deployed in a business office, most likely would have a different architecture than an 
IDS designed to be deployed in a battlefield. The targeted scenario adds some 
constrains to the final architecture of the IDS, defines some requirements that alter the 
benefit that each characteristic offers, and in turn, alters the final selection of these 
characteristics. Hence, the effect that these characteristics may have on the final 
performance of the detection system should be predicted when designing the IDSs. 
The following section present a discussion about the specific characteristics that 
have been included in the IDS presented in this thesis, defines the architecture of the 
detection system, and offers the reasoning behind these selections. The chosen final 
architecture is the one that more efficiently adapts to the requirements defined for this 
work and best detection result produces, according to the author of this thesis. 
4.3.1 Defining the Source of Information 
The first decision about the design of the detection system presented in this thesis is to 
develop a network-based IDS. The main objective of this thesis is design a system to 
provide more reliable protection to wireless networks. Therefore, designing a network-
based IDS has been a simple and straightforward decision. The system will monitor 
the traffic in the network to identify presence of attacks. This type of IDS would allow 
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to be installed either in each of the wireless devices or in an independent third party 
monitor device. The source of information directly influences the type of information 
collected to identify the attacks. The proposed IDS has been designed to extract 
parameters only from different headers of the IEEE 802.11 frames. By doing so, the 
system is able to gather the required information, even if the traffic is encrypted, and 
does not commit any confidentiality infringement monitoring the payload content. 
4.3.2 Defining the Detection Timing 
Whereas this was not one of the initial requirements, the implementation of a detection 
system that could work in real time, or nearly real time, became one of the primary 
aims of the system proposed in this thesis. Instead of generating statistical parameters 
such as NetFlow data and SNMP statistics, or capturing network traffic datasets 
through sampling process, it was chosen for the detection system presented in this 
thesis to analyse the network traffic on a per-frame basis. This decision was taken 
because, in order to detect the wireless-specific attacks, the minimum unit of 
information that could compromise the protected system should be analysed. 
There may be situations in which the computational resources of the wireless 
network could not deal with the cost of working on a per-frame basis in real time. 
Working on a per-frame basis also poses the problem whether the detection system is 
not able to manage each frame before the next frame reaches the system. Nonetheless, 
the computational cost depends, not on whether the detection system work on-line or 
off-line, but on the used detection technique. In general, the on-line IDSs are highly 
computational demanding and less reliable than the off-line IDSs [99]. If the 
implemented detection technique were able to infer the presence of attack using low 
computational cost, working on per-frames in real time could be a feasible approach. 
4.3.3 Defining the Monitoring Sensors Deployment 
One approach that could reduce the computational demand is to reduce the amount of 
analysed data traffic. The monitoring sensors should gather only network traffic local 
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to the protected devices, and information that is transmitted in the radio frequency 
channel used by the protected device. It would not be necessary for an IDS to monitor 
network traffic in locations outside the transmission radio range of the protected 
nodes. IDSs should not consume computational resources protecting the wireless 
devices against attacks that cannot reach to the protected system. Similarly, it would 
not be necessary trying to provide protection against wireless-specific attacks launched 
in non-adjacent radio frequency channels that cannot interfere with the legitimate 
communication. The monitoring sensors should be located close or in the protected 
wireless device, monitoring the same radio channel. 
4.3.4 Defining the Detection Systems Cooperation 
For the presented detection system, it has been decided to design an autonomous IDS. 
The most important reason for designing an autonomous IDS is that information 
received from other IDSs may not be trustable. Similar to other wireless 
communication, an attacker may have compromised the communication. A similar 
situation would arise if different monitoring sensors distributed through the network 
had to transmit share information wirelessly. The communication between the 
different sensors could be compromised. In the IDS presented in this thesis, a single 
monitoring device collects all the network traffic. Therefore, it reduces the 
computational cost of merging and reorder information, cleaning duplicate frames or 
using any synchronisation method, as would occur if several sensors were used. 
4.3.5 Defining the Learning Approach 
One of the most important design requirements was that the presented IDS should be 
as independent from the system administrator as possible. Minimum or no human 
intervention should be required. Between the two possible options, using unsupervised 
IDSs is the only one that matches the requirements established for the design of the 
IDS presented in this thesis. This decision also benefits from the capability of the 
unsupervised IDSs to detect attacks using unlabelled datasets. 
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4.3.6 Defining the Detection Methodology 
One of the last characteristics to consider is the methodology utilised to detect 
intrusions. The capability of being able to identify previously unknown attacks and 
variations of known attacks provides to the anomaly IDSs great advantage over the 
misuse IDSs to protect current network systems. Therefore, the implementation of an 
anomaly IDS has been chosen over a misuse IDS in this thesis. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has introduced in detail the concept of IDSs. The IDSs are security 
systems that constantly monitor information from the protected environment to 
identify evidence of attacks or intrusion attempts. These systems incorporate 
information analysis techniques able to analyse diverse pieces of information. In 
particular, anomaly IDSs are able to dynamically adapt their detection capabilities to 
the current characteristics of the resources being protected. 
Designing an IDS requires the consideration of multiple characteristics that define 
the final architecture of the system. A number of characteristics that could be applied 
to the final architecture design of the IDS have been described. According to the 
opinion of the author of this thesis, these characteristics are the most relevant for an 
efficient intrusion detection process. The correct selection of these characteristics has 
direct effect on the final performance of the system, establishing the difference 
between an efficient and a poor detection process. Unfortunately, there is not a generic 
IDS architecture design that could be efficient in any situation, providing consistent 
security against any existing attack, or protecting any type of system. It has been 
obvious that when an IDS needs to be deployed, the final architecture of these systems 
must be designed very cautiously, always considering the system or device to which it 
is going to provide protection. 
Although the particular attacks that IDSs protect from cannot be known 
beforehand, it is important to anticipate the attacks more likely compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the resources of the protected systems. On 
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the other hand, it has been clear that the IDSs must be tailored to the particular 
protected system in order to be efficient and accurate. With regards to the IDS 
presented in this thesis, the architecture design is an unsupervised network-based 
anomaly IDS that operates autonomously and on-line. The characteristic included in 
the final architecture design of the IDS presented in this thesis, and discusses the 
principal reasons for selecting each of these characteristics have been also presented in 
this chapter. 
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Chapter 5  
Proposed Intrusion Detection Technique 
5.1 Introduction 
Any IDS requires some type of intelligence, in the form of detection technique to 
determine whether the analysed information is malicious or normal. The chosen 
technique should be able to construct an accurate reference of normal behaviour [89]. 
More important than constructing an accurate reference of normal behaviour is the 
requirement for these techniques to properly define the separation boundary between 
normal and malicious information. Chapter 2 provided a brief description of some of 
the most widely used intrusion detection techniques. The majority of these techniques 
work in a supervised manner. This fact makes them inefficient for a system that is 
intended to work in an unsupervised manner, without intervention from an IDS 
administrator. 
This chapter describes the detection techniques and internal architectural design of 
the IDS presented in this thesis. This is a novel unsupervised detection system 
framework, able to automatically adapt its detection capabilities to the current 
characteristics of the wireless network, without intervention from an IDS 
administrator. This chapter also explains the sliding window technique developed to 
implement the IDS training process. Additionally, the concepts of multi-layer intrusion 
detection and data fusion techniques are also introduced. Among other data fusion 
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techniques, special attention has been given to the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of 
evidence. A thorough description of the D-S mathematical framework is presented, 
along with a series of practical examples. The chapter concludes with the most 
important contribution of this thesis. This is the description of a novel BPA 
methodology able to automatically adapt its probabilities assignment to the current 
characteristics of the wireless network. 
5.2 Training Process 
For an unsupervised anomaly IDS, the statistical definition of the reference of 
normality is created using historical information from the wireless network traffic. 
Implementing a robust training process is of crucial for the effectiveness of the 
anomaly IDSs [78]. This is carried out during the training process. 
The training process starts with the monitoring sensors gathering information 
form the protected system. Then, the anomaly IDSs analyses this information to create 
a statistical reference of normality. Once the training process has finished and the 
reference of normal behaviour has been generated, the anomaly IDSs calculate the 
level of deviation of the currently analysed information from the reference. A high 
level of deviation between both values is likely to correspond to evidence of intrusion. 
If the training process is not implemented accurately, the anomaly IDS will not be able 
to define a proper reference of normality, and a large amount of false alarms will be 
generated. 
The training process commonly requires collecting large amounts of historical 
data. How much historical data is actually required to conduct the training process is a 
feature that yet needs to be discussed. In [82], the authors indicate that the system has 
to gather ‘enough information’ to make the intrusion detection. But it is dependent on 
the detection system identifying what is enough. The idea that anomaly IDSs 
commonly require long training periods to efficiently detect malicious actions is 
widely assumed. However, using a system that would requires a long period of time to 
create the reference of normality would be a major drawback for an IDS that intends to 
provide intrusion detection in real time. In addition, the characteristics of normal 
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behaviour in wireless network traffic, which is highly dynamic environment, 
frequently changes. If the system requires long training periods, the resulting profile of 
normal behaviour may be biased over time. 
5.2.1 Sliding Window Scheme 
The IDS in this thesis also builds the profile or reference of normality using historical 
data. The time and the amount of information required to effectively generate 
reference of normal wireless network traffic has been reduced as much as is possible. 
To manage the information and handle the non-stationary statistical distribution of the 
data, the proposed system operates on a sliding window scheme. Other researches, 
such as [38], also make use of a sliding window scheme. The content of the slots 
within the sliding window composes the historical data used by the IDS to conduct the 
training process. The length of the sliding window is represented by ݊. The system has 
one sliding window for each of the considered metrics and for each type of IEEE 
802.11 frame. From each new incoming frame, the different metrics are extracted and 
stored in the last available slot, within the respective sliding window. Assuming the 
number of normal frames is larger than the malicious frames, the window would be 
mostly composed of metrics values from non-malicious frames. The content of the 
sliding window is then used to generate the reference of normality. 
The sliding window scheme works as follows. The first time the IDS is run, the ݊ 
slots within the sliding window will be initially filled with frames metrics before being 
able to detecting intrusions. Once the ݊ slots within the sliding window have been 
filled, each of the ݊  frames metrics is analysed and the reference of normality is 
generated. After all the frames within the first sliding window have been analysed and 
the detection implemented, the system slides the window one single slot. The metric 
from the next incoming frame is stored in the slot that becomes empty after sliding the 
window. Then, a new reference of normality is calculated using the previous ሺ݊ െ 1ሻ 
frames along with the last stored frame. After the new reference of normality has been 
calculated, only the last stored frame is analysed, since the previous ሺ݊ െ 1ሻ frames 
have already been analysed. Next, the system slides the window one single slot again 
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and a new frame is included. The described process is constantly repeated. This 
configuration allows detecting attacks as they occur. Figure 5.1 shows a diagram 
describing how the metrics are stored in the sliding window scheme. In the figure, the 
frame #20 is considered malicious; the frame is discarded and replaced by the new 
incoming frame #21. 
5.2.1.1 Benefits of the Sliding Window Scheme 
The way this sliding window scheme is implemented is simple, robust and convenient 
to keep track of all the received frames. As an aside, it also perfectly integrates with 
the concept of array in the C programming language in which the author of this thesis 
has been developed the presented IDS. 
 
Figure 5.1 Sliding Window Scheme - 20 Slots Long. 
From the operational point of view, there are diverse reasons for using this sliding 
window scheme. For instance, let suppose that an attacker launched a flooding attack 
in which numerous frames are injected in a very short period of time. If the metrics 
from all these frames were stored in the sliding window, the statistical reference of 
normality in the sliding window would be skewed, and the malicious frames would be 
misclassified as normal and the non-malicious frames would be erroneously classified 
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as malicious. The use of the sliding window scheme avoids this from occurring by 
sliding only if the currently analysed frame has been classified as normal. Otherwise, 
if the currently analysed frame has been classified as malicious, the sliding window 
stays static, drops the frame classified as malicious and replaces the slot in the sliding 
window that has become unfilled with the next incoming frame. 
There is also the possibility that an attacker could slowly corrupt the profile of 
normality. An attacker may try to mimic some of the communication features of 
normal wireless devices and gradually change the parameters, skewing the reference 
of normality. But it is difficult for an attacker to be able to correctly mimic all the 
measurable features throughout the protocol stack. Attacks could be undetected if an 
IDS only uses information from a single layer [150]. As explained in Section 5.3, 
multi-layer IDSs increases the chances for the detection system to identify the 
presence of intrusions. In turn, it would be highly difficult for an attacker to corrupt 
the reference of normality. 
Despite the previous comments, still there exist one situation in which malicious 
frames could alter the reference of normality. This is the first time the IDS starts 
working, during the process of filling the initial sliding window. The system needs to 
fill the ݊ slots in the sliding window before being able to carry out the detection of 
new incoming frames. It was explained that the number of normal frames is larger 
than the malicious frames. However, if this condition is not met, the very first sliding 
window could contain more predominant number of malicious frames. In the 
unfortunate case that the number of malicious frames was larger than the number of 
non-malicious malicious frames and the detection reference of normality would be 
erroneously calculated. According to the authors in [55], including malicious 
information when the profile of normal behaviour is being created is one of the 
common problems of the anomaly IDS. Nonetheless, as will be explained in Chapter 
7, because of the general structure of the proposed IDS, the proposed methodology 
produces good detection results, even if there exist high proportion of malicious 
frames within the first sliding window. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: PROPOSED INTRUSION DETECTION TECHNIQUE 
95
5.2.1.2 Optimum Sliding Window Length 
Finding the optimum sliding window length is very important for efficient and 
accurate intrusion detection results. The length ݊ of the sliding window will influence 
the overall detection performance of the system. A long window would include, on 
average, a larger proportion of normal frames and the statistics would average out to 
represent the normal profile. However, a larger window length may create 
inconsistency in the reference of normality. The physical properties of the transmitted 
signal in the wireless networks are unstable. In a network with moving wireless 
devices, any change in the geographical location or any obstacle between two nodes 
communicating may alter the metrics collected by the monitoring node, especially the 
metrics from the PHY layer. Therefore, building models of normal wireless network 
traffic over long-term periods may cause that the metrics of the currently monitored 
non-malicious frames could deviate from the reference of normality using frequently 
changing traffic information. This situation would make the IDS generate high 
numbers of FPs. Also, a small sliding window length will allow a prompt adaptability 
to legitimate changes in the network traffic characteristics. On the other hand, if the 
sliding window size is too small, it would possibly provide very little information for 
the training to generate profiles of normal behaviour that accurately represent the 
behaviour of the network, and in turn, the generated profile of normal network 
behaviour would probably be biased. 
In addition, a large window length will also slow down the detection process. For 
each new incoming frame the reference of normality is calculated using all the frame 
metrics in the sliding window. Therefore, the processing time would increase along 
with the sliding window length. The larger the length of the sliding window, the larger 
the processing time. The IDS relies on the time required to reach a decision about the 
real nature of each single frame in order to be an on-line detection system. By using 
the sliding window scheme, if the detection process is fast enough, the frame analysed 
as malicious could be discarded from the sliding window before a new incoming 
frame arrives. As a consequence, numerous successive incoming frames would not 
saturate the detection system. 
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Through empirical experiments, it has been proved in Chapter 7 that the proposed 
IDS requires as little as 50 frames approximately to generate a reference of normality 
that produces highly accurate intrusion detection in real time. The reduced amount of 
information required to effectively generate reference of normal wireless network 
traffic also is another benefit that the sliding window scheme provides. 
5.3 Multi-layer Intrusion Detection 
In Chapter 6 it will be described that six different metrics are extracted from the 
gathered wireless network traffic datasets. All these metrics will be used by the 
detection engine to infer the presence of intrusions. Although each of these metrics are 
going to be initially treated and evaluated independently, the final decision of whether 
there exist evidences of attacks will be reached using the combination of all the 
metrics information. This method of using the combined information is known as a 
multi-layer or cross-layer approach. 
IDSs that make use of a multi-layer approach have shown outperforming results, 
against single-layer detection systems, both in terms of DR and false alarms [37] [38] 
[39]. Although there are cases in which IDSs that utilise the information from a single 
metric might give good detection results, the presence of attacks is rarely accurately 
detectable by examining a single metric from one layer of the protocol stack. Cross-
layer systems can combine information from two or more layers of the protocol stack, 
either adjacent or non-adjacent layers [103]. 
An attacker may try to mimic some of the communication features of normal 
wireless devices. It depends on the configuration of the attack, and how well this 
mimic attempt is implemented to determine if the real identity of the attacker would be 
unnoticed. As explained previously, it is difficult for an attacker to correctly mimic all 
the measurable features throughout the protocol stack. Therefore, the higher the 
number of monitored metrics, the greater the chances to identify inconsistencies in one 
of these features. Similarly, even if the attack is implemented at one layer in particular, 
this attack may have an effect on different layers of the protocol stack. Again, using 
information from the various sources that the multi-layer IDSs provide increases the 
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chances for the detection system to identify the presence of attacks. Also, the greater 
the number of metrics used, the higher the chances for one of these metrics to show a 
difference between normal and malicious nature of the information. 
In the process of combining information from multiple sources, different 
mechanisms could be used. The effectiveness of the combined approach changes from 
one mechanism to another, depending on the characteristics of information that is 
combined. Some mechanisms may produce more accurate results than others 
combining the same information. Therefore, selecting the most appropriate mechanism 
for each case is an essential step in order to obtain accurate detection results [151]. 
One of the mechanisms is the utilisation of data fusion methods to make a combined 
use of the information from the different metrics. 
5.3.1 Data Fusion 
Data fusion can be defined as the process of gathering information from multiple and 
heterogeneous sources about diverse events, activities or situations, and combining 
them towards obtaining a more accurate final result [14] [39]. In the data fusion 
framework presented in this thesis, the detection engine performs an independent 
detection process for each of the considered metrics. Then the independent decisions 
are sent to the data fusion system to merge all these decisions and reach a combined 
final conclusion. 
5.3.2 Data Fusion Techniques 
Two of the most commonly used data fusion techniques are Bayesian Theory and the 
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence. The former technique is based on 
probabilistic information whilst the second technique is based on evidential 
information. According to [40], Bayesian theory computes the occurrence probability 
of an event, assuming that the a priori probability of occurrence for this particular 
event is known. On the other hand, D-S theory mathematically represents evidence of 
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occurrence of an event based on current observations, without additional a priori 
knowledge. 
5.3.2.1 Bayesian Theory 
Bayesian inference is a mathematical discipline used to calculate the probability of 
occurrence of a certain event, based on the experience extracted from previous events. 
This theory uses evidences of information, from previous experience, to infer a 
combined probability of occurrence of a certain event. The operations of Bayesian 
theorem can be included into the category of conditional probability. The concept of 
conditional probability defines a probability of an event obtained using additional 
information, extracted from events that have previously occurred [22]. In tasks of 
intrusion detection, Bayesian would require the a priori probability that an attack is 
present in the analysed dataset. 
5.3.2.1.1 Bayesian Mathematic Framework 
This mathematical discipline provides the probability of an event ܣ to be true, given 
that certain evidences ܧ are already known [23]. The required evidences to calculate 
the conditional probability are extracted from previous events, which previously 
occurred under similar experimental conditions to the event ܣ . The events are 
mutually exclusive states of a system. This means that the system can be in only one 
of these states at a time [39]. The conditional probability provided by the Bayesian 
theory, also known as posterior probability, is written as in Equation 5.1: 
ܲሺܣ|ܧሻ ൌ ܲሺܧ|ܣሻ	ܲሺܣሻܲሺܧሻ ൌ
ܲሺܧ|ܣሻ	ܲሺܣሻ
ሾܲሺܣሻ	ܲሺܧ|ܣሻ 	൅ 	ܲሺ̅ܣሻ	ܲሺܧ|̅ܣሻ	ሿ	 												ሺ5.1ሻ 
According to this definition, Bayesian theory is unable to assign probability in the 
considered event in the absence of any other knowledge. Only after evidence E is 
obtained, can the posterior probability be computed. From the Equation 5.1, three 
terms can be described. The term ܲሺܣሻ reflects the probability that a particular event is 
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true in the absence of evidence. This is generally known as the a priori probability. 
The value of ܲሺܣሻ would be updated along with the posterior repetition of the consider 
event ܣ. 
5.3.2.1.2 Bayesian Theory Implementation Issues 
Although Bayesian theory can be very efficient in certain situations, there exist some 
challenges associated with its utilisation. The main challenge that most of the 
researchers highlight is the fact that the Bayesian requires complete knowledge of both 
the prior and conditional probabilities. These probabilities are very difficult or, in 
some cases, impossible to determine in practice [102]. Furthermore, there may be 
more than one way to formulate a particular problem using Bayesian, considering 
additional or different evidences about the same event. If different or additional 
evidences are taken into consideration, the posterior probability is likely to differ from 
one case to the other. Similarly, the posterior probability may change if the evidences 
are extracted from events, which occurred under different experimental conditions to 
the considered event. In addition, Bayesian theory does not allow the assigning of a 
particular probability to uncertainty. It requires that the probabilities be assigned to the 
occurrence of a state at a time [108]. 
5.3.2.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence 
The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence is a mathematical discipline that 
combines evidences of information from multiple and heterogeneous events in order to 
calculate the belief of occurrence of another event. According to [39] [40], the D-S 
theory can be considered an extension of Bayesian inference. The main purpose of the 
D-S theory is to infer the combined belief of occurrence of a certain event, just based 
on the information provided by the observed evidences. The evidences represent all 
the information available to infer the real state of the system. 
Among different data fusion methods, the D-S theory has been chosen in this 
thesis, due to a number of benefits that this data function method provides over the rest 
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of the methods. One of the benefits for this selection is the potential for managing 
uncertainty. In contrast to Bayesian, D-S theory allows assigning belief, not only to the 
principal system conclusions, but also belief to ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ [108]. Another benefit is 
that D-S theory does not need a priori knowledge or a priori probability distributions 
on the possible system states like Bayesian. This is very useful in many vague and 
unknown environment scenarios [40]. The more important outcome of this property is 
that, in tasks of intrusion detection, D-S is suitable for detecting previously unseen 
attacks because it does not require a priori knowledge. The decision of using the D-S 
theory in this thesis is also supported by the conclusions presented in [39] [102], in 
which the authors present a comparative study of different data fusion methods and 
conclude that D-S theory is more promising than Bayesian. 
Nevertheless, there are three main drawbacks associated with D-S theory. Firstly 
this is the computation complexity, which increases exponentially with the number of 
possible event outcomes. If the system has ݅ possible outcomes, there will be up to 
2௜ െ 1 hypothesis to analyse. With regards to this work, the system has two possible 
outcomes; a frame could be normal or malicious. Therefore, the computational 
complexity of the algorithm would be significantly low. The second main drawback is 
the conflicting beliefs management, which is a widely known problematic situation in 
D-S theory. The conflicting belief phenomenon is nicely illustrated with an example 
from [75]. Given three events {A, B, C} and two sensors. The first sensor might assign 
the following beliefs to the three events, A = 0.9, B = 0.1 and C = 0. Similarly, the 
second sensor might assign the following beliefs to the three events, A = 0, B = 0.1 and 
C = 0.9. Applying the D-S theory on these values, the rule of combination presented in 
the next section will result in the event B having the highest belief value, which is 
clearly wrong. This situation is solved assigning only non-zero values in one of the 
proposed BPA methodologies. D-S also requires the statistical independence of the 
different evidences [40]. D-S theory also requires that the evidences should be 
completely independent. Regarding the independence of the evidences, there has been 
extended discussion whether, in practice, the independence of the evidences really 
affects the performance of D-S theory, and whether this is really necessary. In [21], 
the author explains that the independence is not necessarily assured in many cases. 
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5.3.2.2.1 Dempster-Shafer Mathematical Framework 
The D-S theory of evidence was first formulated in [30]. D-S theory starts by defining 
a frame of discernment, or universe of discourse, Θ ൌ ሼߠଵ, ߠଶ, … , ߠ௡ሽ, which is the 
finite set of all possible mutually exclusive outcomes about some problem domain 
[42]. All the consider observers must have the same frame of discernment when using 
D-S [39]. The power set of the frame of discernment, 2஀, refers to every possible 
mutually exclusive subset composed of the elements of Θ. Each subset of the power 
set is defined as a hypothesis. If Θ is composed of two elements, Θ ൌ ሼߠଵ, ߠଶሽ, the total 
number of hypotheses that it comprises is 2஀ ൌ ሼߠଵ, ߠଶ, ሼߠଵ|ߠଶሽ, ∅ሽ. Similarly, if Θ is 
composed of three elements, Θ ൌ ሼߠଵ, ߠଶ, ߠଷሽ, the total number of hypotheses that it 
comprises would be 2஀ ൌ ሼߠଵ, ߠଶ, ߠଷ, ሼߠଵ|ߠଶሽ, ሼߠଵ|ߠଷሽ, ሼߠଶ|ߠଷሽ, ሼߠଵ|ߠଶ|ߠଷሽ, ∅ሽ. 
With regards to this work, the frame of discernment is comprised of two 
outcomes, ܣ ൌ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and ܰ ൌ ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ, Θ ൌ ሼܣ, ܰሽ. The presented work is able to 
classify gathered frames either as malicious or non-malicious. Therefore, there will be 
a set of four different hypotheses in this work, 2஀ ൌ ሼܣ,ܰ, ሼܣ|ܰሽ, ∅ሽ. The hypotheses 
are ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ, respectively. The hypothesis ∅ refers to the empty set, and 
the hypothesis ሼܣ|ܰሽ refers to ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ. According to [108], ܷ ൌ ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ 
is caused by ambiguity in the evidences. 
Each hypothesis from the power set 2஀ is assigned a belief value, or belief, within 
the range ሾ0, 1ሿ. The belief is assigned, based on the evidence of information. This 
probability assignment is known as the Basic Probability Assignement (BPA), 
represented as the mass probability function ݉. This is: 
݉ ∶ 	2஀ → ሾ0, 1ሿ											݂݅	
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ 	݉	ሺ∅ሻ ൌ 0݉	ሺܣሻ ൒ 0, ∀ܣ ⊆ Θ
෍ ݉	ሺܣሻ ൌ 1
஺	⊆	஀
																									ሺ5.2ሻ 
The function ݉ሺܣሻ is defined as the basic probability number of the hypothesis ܣ. 
This function represents the measure of total belief that is exactly assigned to the 
element ܣ [108]. If the basic probability number of the hypothesis ܣ is a non-zero 
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value, ݉	ሺܣሻ ൐ 0 , the hypothesis is also known as a focal element. Equation 5.2 
shows three conditions that need to be assured. First, the basic probability number of 
the empty set is 0: ݉	ሺ∅ሻ ൌ 0 . Second, the basic probability number of each 
hypothesis could be 0 or any other value, up to 1: ݉	ሺܣሻ ൒ 0. Third, the summation of 
the basic probability number of all the hypothesis in the frame of discernment must 
add 1: ∑ ݉	ሺܣሻ ൌ 1஺	⊆	஀ . 
In order to define the total belief given to a certain hypothesis, two functions are 
defined by the D-S theory. These are the Belief function (ܤ݈݁) and the Plausibility 
function (݈ܲ). The former is the total belief committed to all the subsets of the consider 
hypothesis. The total belief assigned to the hypothesis	ܣ equals the sum of the basic 
probability numbers for all sets	ܤ that are contained in	ܣ [108]. This is: 
ܤ݈݁ሺܣሻ ൌ 	෍݉	ሺܤሻ
஻⊆஺
						∀ܣ ⊆ Θ																																							ሺ5.3ሻ 
One particular feature that makes the D-S theory different from probability theory 
is the absence of the Additivity Rule. If ܤ݈݁ሺܣሻ ൏ 1, the remaining evidence 1 െ
ܤ݈݁ሺ̅ܣሻ  is not equal to ܤ݈݁ሺܣሻ , ܤ݈݁ሺܣሻ ് 1 െ ܤ݈݁ሺ̅ܣሻ  [149]. Therefore, the ݈ܲ 
function is used to assign the total belief that does not refute the considered 
hypothesis. This is: 
݈ܲሺܣሻ ൌ 	1 െ ܤ݈݁ሺ̅ܣሻ ൌ ෍ ݉	ሺܤሻ
஻∩஺ஷ∅
						∀ܣ ⊆ Θ																								ሺ5.4ሻ 
Thus, the belief committed to the hypothesis ܣ is within the interval composed by 
the Belief and the Plausibility functions, [ܤ݈݁ሺܣሻ, ݈ܲሺܣሻ]. This interval is also known 
as the Belief Range. The amount of belief assigned to ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is represented by 
the difference |ܤ݈݁ሺܣሻ െ ݈ܲሺܣሻ| [39]. Nonetheless, the authors of [47] state that the 
Belief and the Plausibility are similar in the case of pure probabilistic information. For 
this work, the amount of belief assigned to ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ represents the amount of 
belief that cannot be assigned either to the hypothesis ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ or ܣݐݐܽܿ݇. 
The main capability of D-S is combining independent evidences of information, 
from different observers with the same frame of discernment, into other single 
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evidence that expresses a common belief assigned to one specific hypothesis. Let 
݉ଵሺܣሻ  and ݉ଶሺܣሻ  be the BPAs in the hypothesis ܣ , from observer 1 and 2, 
respectively. The combination of evidences is implemented using Dempster’s rule of 
combination. Dempster’s rule of combination calculates the orthogonal summation of 
the BPAs values in one hypothesis from two different observers into a single belief, 
and is defined in Equation 5.5 as: 
݉ሺܣሻ ൌ ݉ଵሺܣሻ	⨁	݉ଶሺܣሻ ൌ 	 ∑ ݉ଵሺܺሻ ∗ ݉ଶሺܻሻ௑∩௒ୀ஺1 െ ∑ ݉ଵሺܺሻ ∗ ݉ଶሺܻሻ௑∩௒ୀ∅ 			∀	ܣ ് ∅							ሺ5.5ሻ 
The denominator of Dempster’s rule of combination is generally denoted as 1 െ
ܭ. If the denominator is equal to one, ܭ ൌ 0, the orthogonal summation does not exist, 
and the BPAs of both sensors are said to be completely contradictory. 
Dempster’s rule of combination allows the combining of evidences of information 
from only two different observers at a time. In order to combine evidences from more 
than two observers, Dempster’s rule of combination can be used several times in 
consecutive iterations. The output results of the initial combination process are used as 
input evidences in the next iteration, along with the evidences of information from a 
third observer. 
Example 
To easily understand how to apply the D-S theory, an example is presented here. 
Let us consider one system with three sensors, Sensor 1, Sensor 2 and Sensor 3. 
These sensors monitor and gather frames from a WLAN. Using the combined 
evidences of information provided by the three sensors, the system needs to classify 
the gathered frames either as malicious or non-malicious. 
In such scenario, the frame of discernment is comprised of two possible outcomes, 
ܣ ൌ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and ܰ ൌ ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. Hence, the total number of hypotheses considered for 
this example would be 2஀ ൌ ሼܣ,ܰ, ሼܣ|ܰሽ, ∅ሽ. Each sensor provides an independent 
belief in each possible hypothesis. The beliefs assigned by the three sensors are 
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combined to calculate a final decision; i.e. whether the gathered frames are malicious 
or not. The basic probabilities for one of the frames are tabulated in Table V.I. 
The horizontal axis of the Table V.I represents the beliefs of the Sensor 1, for 
each hypothesis. Similarly, the vertical axis represents the beliefs of the Sensor 2, for 
all the hypotheses. The cells in the Table V.I represent the multiplication of the beliefs 
of both sensors. 
TABLE V.I.  EVENT PROBABILITIES ASSIGNED BY ݉ଵ (HORIZONTAL X) AND ݉ଶ 
(VERTICAL Y). 
݉ଵ ݉ଶ ݉ଵሺܰሻൌ 0.25 
݉ଵሺܣሻൌ 0.32 
݉ଵሺܣ|ܰሻൌ 0.43 ݉ଵሺ∅ሻ ൌ 0 
݉ଶሺܰሻ ൌ 0.1 0.025 0.032 0.043 0 
݉ଶሺܣሻ ൌ 0.35 0.0875 0.112 0.1505 0 
݉ଶሺܣ|ܰሻ ൌ 0.55 0.1375 0.176 0.2365 0 
݉ଶሺ∅ሻ ൌ 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Dempster’s rule of combination is used to combine the beliefs and generate a final 
decision. The results for the first iteration of this example are: 
݉ଵଶሺܰሻ ൌ ሺ0.025 ൅ 0.1375 ൅ 0.043ሻ1 െ ሺ0.0875 ൅ 0.032ሻ ൌ 0.233 
 
݉ଵଶሺܣሻ ൌ ሺ0.112 ൅ 0.1505 ൅ 0.176ሻ1 െ ሺ0.0875 ൅ 0.032ሻ ൌ 0.498 
 
݉ଵଶሺܣ|ܰሻ ൌ
ሺ0.2365ሻ
1 െ ሺ0.0875 ൅ 0.032ሻ ൌ 0.269 
Then, the output results of this initial combination process are used as input 
evidences in the next iteration, along with the evidences of information from the 
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Sensor 3. The horizontal axis of the Table V.II. represents the beliefs of the Sensor 3, 
for each hypothesis. Similarly, the vertical axis represents the combined beliefs of the 
Sensors 1 and 2, for all the hypotheses. 
TABLE V.II.  EVENT PROBABILITIES ASSIGNED BY ݉ଷ (HORIZONTAL X) AND ݉ଵଶ 
(VERTICAL Y). 
݉ଷ ݉ଵଶ ݉ଷሺܰሻൌ 0.27 
݉ଷሺܣሻൌ 0.41 
݉ଷሺܣ|ܰሻൌ 0.32 ݉ଷሺ∅ሻ ൌ 0 
݉ଵଶሺܰሻ ൌ 0.233 0.063 0.0955 0.0745 0 
݉ଵଶሺܣሻ ൌ 0.498 0.134 0.2045 0.1595 0 
݉ଵଶሺܣ|ܰሻ ൌ 0.269 0.073 0.11 0.086 0 
݉ଵଶሺ∅ሻ ൌ 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The results for this iteration are: 
݉ሺܰሻ ൌ ሺ0.063 ൅ 0.073 ൅ 0.0745ሻ1 െ ሺ0.134 ൅ 0.0955ሻ ൌ 0.273 
 
݉ሺܣሻ ൌ ሺ0.2045 ൅ 0.11 ൅ 0.1595ሻ1 െ ሺ0.134 ൅ 0.0955ሻ ൌ 0.615 
 
݉ሺܣ|ܰሻ ൌ ሺ0.086ሻ1 െ ሺ0.134 ൅ 0.0955ሻ ൌ 0.112 
According to the combined results of the evidences of information from the three 
sensors, the belief in the hypothesis ܣ  is higher than the other two hypotheses. 
Therefore, the hypothesis more likely to be true is ܣ, with 61.5% of belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇. 
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5.4 Basic Probability Assignment 
D-S theory has been previously used in the intrusion detection field to enhance the 
detection accuracy. In [39] [40] [41], the authors have proven D-S as a powerful and 
efficient technique to be applied in IDSs. However, a very important step to be 
investigated remains open in D-S theory. This is to find an automatic and self-adaptive 
process of BPA. The BPA process is crucial to the effectiveness of D-S theory [107]. 
The BPA value should be based on the measured characteristics of the monitored 
environment. With regards to the topic of this thesis, the major challenge for applying 
D-S theory on IDS is to automatically determine the BPA values should be based on 
the characteristics of the wireless network traffic measurements [42]. 
In the IDS literature there exist multiple ways of assigning probabilities to each of 
the hypotheses in D-S theory, ranging from data mining techniques to empirical 
approaches. These have been previously described in Chapter 2. However, none of the 
referred works investigates methods to find an automatic and self-adaptive process of 
BPA, and few of them could be used off-the-shelf without a previous training or fine 
tuning period. This section addresses the need for an automatic BPA by proposing a 
novel methodology able to automatically provide accurate belief values and able to 
self-adapt its capabilities to the current characteristics of the wireless network, without 
intervention from an IDS administrator. The low computational complexity of the 
proposed methodology allows implementation in real time. 
5.4.1 Automatic and Self-Adaptive BPA Methodology 
Three different methodologies are proposed in this thesis in order to automatically 
assign the BPA values to each hypothesis of Θ, 2Θ = { ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ , ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ , 
ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ, Ø}. One method generates the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇, and a second method 
generates the belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. Both work concurrently and independently, in order 
to meet the requirement of the independency of the beliefs. Then, based on the belief 
in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ and ܣݐݐܽܿ݇, a third method calculates a balanced belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ, 
which is not completely independent. The two proposed methodologies to generate the 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: PROPOSED INTRUSION DETECTION TECHNIQUE 
107
belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ and the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ could be interchanged with each other, but 
must be independent. The decision of using one methodology for one hypothesis and 
the other methodology for the other hypothesis has been entirely empirical. The 
utilisation of a common methodology to generate the belief in different hypotheses 
would produce situations in which the BPA values are inversely correlated, and the 
independency of the beliefs would not be met. 
Special attention was given to clustering techniques in Chapter 2. The reason for 
that is that two of the three methodologies to calculate the BPA value proposed in this 
thesis are, up to some extent, based on this unsupervised data mining technique. 
Clustering could be described in two ways. First, clustering uses the dispersion of the 
data to generate the different clusters. Data instances closer to the centroid of the 
cluster could be easily categorised into the same category as the centroid. Data 
instances more distant from the centroid could cause misclassification, and be 
categorised incorrectly. Therefore, it could be said that clustering is based on the 
dispersion of the data, and the distribution level of the data within the clusters. Second, 
it could be said that clustering is based on the distance of each individual data instance 
to the centroid of the clusters; being the Euclidean distance the most common method 
to calculate the distance between instances. One of the approaches presented and 
described in the upcoming sections takes in consideration the distribution of the whole 
dataset, whilst the other takes in consideration the distance of individual data instances 
of the dataset to a particular reference point. 
A remark common to both methods, the possible belief in each hypothesis has 
been limited to a maximum of 0.5 (50%). This decision has been based on one of the 
conditions of D-S theory; all the hypotheses must add 1 (100%). Two completely 
independent methodologies assign beliefs in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ and ܣݐݐܽܿ݇, respectively. The 
methodology to assign beliefs in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is based on the outcome of the two 
previous methods, as an adjustment parameter to satisfy the required conditions of D-S 
theory. Limiting the maximum possible belief in each hypothesis either 50% or 100% 
would not alter the final results because, for both values, the final beliefs needs to be 
adjusted to satisfy the conditions of D-S theory. 
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5.4.1.1 Method to Assign Belief in Normal 
The methodology that has been proposed to assign beliefs in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ is based on the 
degree of dispersion of the values in the dataset. This methodology implements the 
Bloxplot [127] data representation approach, which has been adapted for the purpose 
of BPA. Bloxplot is an approach used to represent how the data in a dataset are 
distributed, and is able to show the presence of outliners within the analysed dataset. 
Analogous to clustering that was initially envisioned as a methodology for data 
visualisation and currently is also used in tasks of intrusion detection, Bloxplot has 
been used in this thesis not only to represent the degree of dispersion of the values in 
the dataset, but also as a mechanism to assign beliefs. 
The Bloxplot starts by defining a certain number of parameters, based on the data 
values. These are the total number of instances in the dataset (݊), the first quartile (ܳଵ) 
that defines the boundary for the lower 25% of the data, the second quartile, or median 
(ܯ݁), that defines the boundary for the 50% of the data, and the third quartile (ܳଷ) that 
defines the boundary for the lower 75% of the data. To calculate these three 
parameters, the ݊ instances in the dataset are sorted from the lowest to highest value. 
The ܯ݁ is the data instance that, after being sorted, divides the dataset in half, leaving 
the lowest 50% of the dataset at one side and the highest 50% at the other side. The ܳଵ 
is the data instance that, after being sorted, leaves the lowest 25% of the dataset at one 
side and the highest 75% at the other side. The ܳଷ is the data instance that, after being 
sorted, leaves the lowest 75% of the dataset at one side and the highest 25% at the 
other side. Also, the interquartile range (ܫܴܳ ), the difference between ܳଷ  and ܳଵ 
represented in Equation (5.8), as well as the ܯ݅݊  and ܯܽݔ  values are calculated. 
These two last parameters are calculated using the following Equations 5.6 and 5.7, 
respectively. 
By plotting all these parameters, Bloxplot provides a clean and robust method to 
represent how the values in the datasets are distributed, based entirely on the values of 
the data instances. New datasets with data similarly distributed would produce 
Bloxplot diagrams with similar shape. In contrast, new datasets with data distributed 
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differently would produce Bloxplot diagrams with different shapes. The way the 
Bloxplot is constructed provides a very dynamic method to represent the distribution 
of the dataset. The proposed methodology provides a dynamic and self-adaptive 
methodology to assign the BPA values. In this case, this methodology has been 
defined to assign beliefs in the hypothesis ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. 
ܯ݅݊ ൌ ܳଵ െ 1.5	 ൈ 	ܫܴܳ																																																ሺ5.6ሻ 
ܯܽݔ ൌ ܳଷ ൅ 1.5	 ൈ 	ܫܴܳ																																																ሺ5.7ሻ 
ܫܴܳ ൌ 	ܳଷ െ ܳଵ																																																							ሺ5.8ሻ 
Each of the parameters used to represent the Bloxplot diagrams are used to define 
the boundaries of different classes. A particular BPA value is assigned to each of these 
classes. Figure 5.2 illustrates the different classes and the belief value associated to 
each of them. If the value of the currently analysed frame metric coincides with ܯ݁, 
the belief is 50%. If the value is falls between the ܳଵ and ܯ݁, or ܳଷ and ܯ݁, the belief 
in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ is 40%. Values between ܯ݅݊ and ܳଵ, or ܳଷ and ܯܽݔ will acquire belief of 
30%. The rest of the values will acquire belief of 15% in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. All these belief 
values have been empirically calculated. Considering the ܯ݁ the reference point in the 
dataset, the closer the data instances are to the ܯ݁, the higher the belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. 
 
Figure 5.2 BPA Scale For Belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. 
Any time a new metrics value is included into the sliding window, all the 
described parameters are recalculated, the boundaries of the classes are redefined and 
the belief is assigned. The metrics of each new incoming frame are allocated within 
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one of these classes. Depending on the class that the currently analysed frame is 
allocated to, the system assigns the belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. Although the boundaries of the 
classes are fixed, their value changes every time a new frame is included in the sliding 
window, and the parameters are, again, calculated. This methodology always assigns a 
non-zero BPA value to the instances. Therefore, it solves the issue of the conflicting 
belief phenomenon. 
Example 
To easily understand how the proposed methodology to assign beliefs in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ 
works, an example is presented here. Let us consider a sliding window with length 
݊ ൌ 17. The gathered metric values are as follows, with the 11th value, -26, being the 
only malicious value in the sliding window. 
-36, -36, -34, -34, -36, -36, -36, -34, -36, -36, -26, -34, -36, -36, -34, -36, -36 
After sorting all the values from lowest to highest: 
-36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -34, -34, -34, -34, -34, -26 
where ܳଵ ൌ െ36 , ܯ݁ ൌ െ36 , and ܳଷ ൌ െ34 . Using these values, ܫܴܳ ൌ 	െ34 െ
ሺെ36ሻ ൌ 2 , ܯ݅݊ ൌ െ36 െ 1.5	 ൈ 	2 ൌ െ39 , and ܯܽݔ ൌ െ34 ൅ 1.5	 ൈ 	2 ൌ െ31 . 
Hence, the boundaries of the classes are: 
 
Figure 5.3 Example - BPA Scale For Belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. 
The instances with value -36 are assigned 50% belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ  and the 
instances with value -34 are assigned 40% belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ, whereas the malicious 
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instance with value -26 are assigned 15% belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. These results are in line 
with the desired BPA results to identify the malicious instance. 
5.4.1.2 Method to Assign Belief in Attack 
The methodology that has been proposed to assign beliefs in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ is based on the 
distance from the currently analysed instance to a point of reference. It is necessary to 
start by defining a certain number of parameters. Again, ݊ represents the total number 
of instances in the dataset. It is required to identify a point of reference, as well as the 
data instance with the highest value (ܪ݅) and the instance with the lowest value (ܮ݋). 
After sorting the ݊ instances in the dataset, it is straightforward to select ܪ݅ and ܮ݋. To 
select the point of reference, both parameters, the Mean (ܯ) and the Mode (ܯ݋), have 
been proposed and evaluated. As will be presented in Chapter 7, selecting the ܯ and 
ܯ݋ will produce slightly different detection results. The parameter ܯ  is calculated 
using the Equation 5.9. 
ܯ ൌ 1݊෍ܽ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
																																																									ሺ5.9ሻ 
where ݊ is the total number of instances. 
Once the point of reference is selected, the Euclidean distances from the point of 
reference to the lowest value (ܮ݋) and the highest value (ܪ݅) are calculated. The value 
with the largest Euclidean distance (ܦ௠௔௫) from the point of reference represents the 
maximum possible belief in the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇. Next, the Euclidean distance from 
the point of reference to the currently analysed data instance (ܦ) is also calculated. 
Finally, the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ is assigned using a simple linear function, making use of 
the different parameters calculated. 
Similar to the previous methodology, any time a new frame is included into the 
sliding window, all the described parameters are recalculated and the new belief is 
assigned. Figure 5.4 illustrates the definition of the distance values. 
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Figure 5.4 BPA Scale For Belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Based on Distance. 
Example 
Another example is presented to easily understand how the proposed methodology to 
assign beliefs in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ works. The considered sliding window with length ݊ ൌ 17 is 
similar to the previous example. Again, the 11th value, -26, is the only malicious value 
in the sliding window. In this example, the ܯ defines the point of reference. 
-36, -36, -34, -34, -36, -36, -36, -34, -36, -36, -26, -34, -36, -36, -34, -36, -36 
After sorting all the values from lowest to highest: 
-36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -34, -34, -34, -34, -34, -26 
where ܮ݋ ൌ െ36 and ܪ݅ ൌ െ26. Using Equation 5.9, ܯ ൌ 	∑ ௔೔೙೔సభ௡ ൌ െ34.823. The 
distance from the point of reference to ܮ݋ is 1.177, and the distance to ܪ݅ is 8.823. 
Therefore, for this example, the ܦ௠௔௫ ൌ 8.823 and represents the maximum possible 
belief in the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇, 50%. The distance to the instances with value -36 is 
ܦିଷ଺ ൌ 1.177. For these values, the belief in the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ is 6.67%. The 
distance to the instances with value -34 is ܦିଷସ ൌ 0.823. For these values, the belief 
in the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ is 4.664%. Finally, the distance to the instance with value -
26 is ܦିଶ଺ ൌ 8.823. For this value, the belief in the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ assigned to 
these instances is 50%. Once more, these results are in line with the desired BPA 
results to identify the malicious instance. 
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5.4.1.2.1 Modified Method to Assign Belief in Attack 
During the implementation of the experiments presented in this thesis, it appears that, 
in some particular situations, the proposed IDS did not always generate the best 
achievable intrusion detection results. Especially when the sliding window length was 
too small. The more significant reason is that the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ is, some times, low. 
Some of the malicious frames were misclassified as non-malicious. 
During the experiments implemented to improve the intrusion detection results, it 
was decided to include an additional parameter in the method to assign the belief in 
the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇. This was the frequency (ܨ) of the data instances within the 
sliding window, which is the value with the highest frequency value. Using the 
previous example, the frequency value is ܨ ൌ 11 , since -36 is repeated 11 times 
within the sliding window. However, including this additional parameter requires a 
method to correlate both parameters, the distance and the frequency, and produce the 
belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇. 
One feasible approach to correlate the frequency value and the distance is to use 
the angle generated by both parameters. Again, the instance with the lowest value (ܮ݋) 
and the data instance with the highest value (ܪ݅) are identified after sorting the values 
from lowest to highest. Similarly, selecting ܯ and ܯ݋ will produce slightly different 
detection results, as will be presented in Chapter 7. The parameter ܦ௠௔௫  and the 
parameter ܦ  are calculated as previously explained. Now, as an addition to the 
previous methodology, the angle that ܨ  and ܦ௠௔௫  form is calculated. This angle, 
referred as the angle alpha (α), represents the maximum possible belief in the 
hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇. Next, the angle that ܨ and the distance to the currently analysed 
data instance (ܦ) form is also calculated. This angle is referred as the angle beta (β). 
Finally, the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ is assigned using a simple linear function between both 
angles. The angles α and β are calculated using Equation 5.10 and 5.11, respectively. 
The minimum belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇, 0%, is defined by the angle 0°. 
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ߙ ൌ cosିଵ ቌ ܨ
൫ܦ௠௔௫ଶ ൅ ܨଶ൯
ଵ
ଶ
ቍ																																						ሺ5.10ሻ 
 
ߚ ൌ cosିଵ ൭ ܨ
ሺܦଶ ൅ ܨଶሻଵଶ
൱																																										ሺ5.11ሻ 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the definition of the different parameters and angles. Once 
more, any time a new frame is included into the sliding window, all the described 
parameters are recalculated and the belief is assigned. 
 
Figure 5.5 BPA Scale For Belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Based on Angle. 
Example 
Similar to the previous methodologies, an example is presented to easily understand 
how the proposed methodology to assign beliefs in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇  works. The considered 
sliding window with length ݊ ൌ 17 is similar to the previous examples. Again, the 11th 
value, -26, is the only malicious value in the sliding window. In this example, ܯ 
defines the point of reference. 
-36, -36, -34, -34, -36, -36, -36, -34, -36, -36, -26, -34, -36, -36, -34, -36, -36 
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After sorting all the values from lowest to highest: 
-36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -36, -34, -34, -34, -34, -34, -26 
where ܮ݋ ൌ െ36, ܪ݅ ൌ െ26, ܯ ൌ െ34.823 and ܨ ൌ 11. The distance from the point 
of reference to ܮ݋  is 1.177, and the distance to ܪ݅  is 8.823. Therefore, for this 
example, ܦ௠௔௫ ൌ 8.823. To represent the maximum possible belief in the hypothesis 
ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ , 50%, the angle ߙ ൌ cosିଵ ቆ ଵଵ
ሺ଼.଼ଶଷమାଵଵమሻ
భ
మ
ቇ ൌ 38°43′ . The distance to the 
instances with value -36 is ܦିଷ଺ ൌ 1.177. For these values, the angle β is ߚିଷ଺ ൌ
6°6′, and the belief in the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ assigned to these instances is 7.884%. 
The distance to the instances with value -34 is ܦିଷସ ൌ 0.823. For these values, the 
angle β is ߚିଷସ ൌ 4°16′, and the belief in the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ assigned to these 
instances is 5.523%. Finally, the distance to the instance with value -26 is ܦିଶ଺ ൌ
8.823. For this value, the belief in the hypothesis ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ assigned to these instances is 
50%. 
A comparison of the detection results generated by both methodologies, using the 
same dataset, is presented in Chapter 7. An extended discussion is presented in that 
chapter about which of the methodologies generate the best results. 
5.4.1.3 Method to Assign Belief in Uncertainty 
One last methodology to assign beliefs in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ needs to be proposed. The 
methodology that has been proposed to assign beliefs in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is based on the 
outcome of the two previous methodologies. The ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ has been considered as 
an adjustment parameter to satisfy the required conditions of D-S theory. 
The outcome of the two previous methods could provide four different and 
mutually exclusive situations: 
 Low belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and high belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. 
 High belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and low belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. 
 High belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and high belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. 
 Low belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and low belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ. 
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For the first and second cases, both methods have reached consistent conclusions. 
Hence, it is expected that the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ should be low. In contrast, in the 
third and fourth cases, both methods have reached contradictory conclusions. 
Therefore, the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ  is expected to be high in both cases. The 
proposed methodology normalises the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ to assign 
the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ. 
The methodology to assign the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ normalises the smaller of 
the other two beliefs (ܤ݈݁݅݁ ெ݂௜௡) to the largest (ܤ݈݁݅݁ ெ݂௔௫). In line with the previous 
two methodologies, the maximum BPA value has been limited to 50%. The belief in 
ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is calculated using Equation 5.12. 
ܤ݈݁݅݁ ௎݂௡௖. ൌ 0.5 ∗ ܤ݈݁݅݁ ெ݂௜௡ܤ݈݁݅݁ ெ݂௔௫ 																																										ሺ5.12ሻ 
Example 
To easily understand how the proposed methodology to assign beliefs in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ 
works, the results from the previous two examples are used. Table V.III shows the 
tabulated BPA results for the instances with value -36, -34 and -26. 
For the instances with value -36, the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is 7.884%. For the 
instances with value -34, the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is 6.903%. Finally, the belief in 
ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is 15% for the instances with value -26. In the three cases, the calculated 
belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is low. 
TABLE V.III.  EXAMPLE - INITIAL BPA VALUES. 
Metric Value -36 -34 -26 
Belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ 50 % 40 % 15 % 
Belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ 7.884 % 5.523 % 50 % 
Belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ 7.884 % 6.903 % 15 % 
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This example represents a situation in which both methodologies reach consistent 
conclusions. The belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ  is relatively low. Now consider another 
showcasing example in which that the belief in Normal and Attack are 40% and 
49.7%, respectively. For these values, the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ  is 40.2%. As 
expected, the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ is high. 
5.4.1.4 Adjustment Value 
One of the conditions of D-S theory indicates that the summation of the three BPA 
values, for each of the hypothesis must add to 100%. This is: ∑ ݉	ሺܣሻ ൌ 1஺	⊆	஀ . None 
of the cases in the previous examples satisfy this condition. Therefore, an adjustment 
value ψ needs to be calculated. The value ψ will be subtracted to each of the three 
BPA values, and is calculated as follows: 
ψ ൌ ܺ െ 13 																																																								ሺ5.18ሻ 
where ܺ  is the summation of the BPA values. Continuing with the previous 
examples, for the instances with value -36, ψିଷ଺ ൌ ሺ0.65768 െ 1ሻ/3 ൌ െ	0.1141. 
Therefore, the beliefs in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ, ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ are readjusted to 61.41%, 
19.295% and 19.295%, respectively. For the instances with value -34, ψିଷସ ൌ
ሺ0.52426 െ 1ሻ/3 ൌ െ	0.1586 . Therefore, the beliefs in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ , ܣݐݐܽܿ݇  and 
ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ are readjusted to 55.86%, 21.38% and 22.76%, respectively. Finally, for 
the instances with value -26, ψିଶ଺ ൌ ሺ0.8 െ 1ሻ/3 ൌ െ	0.067. Therefore, the beliefs in 
ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ , ܣݐݐܽܿ݇  and ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ  are readjusted to 21.65%, 56.7% and 21.65%, 
respectively. 
To summarise, the BPA results for the instances with value -36, -34 and -26 have 
been tabulated Table V.IV. According to these results, the proposed methodology 
considers the instances with value -36 and -34 as non-malicious because the belief in 
ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ is the highest of the three hypotheses, which are, in fact, of non-malicious 
nature. On the other hand, the instance with value -26 is considered to be malicious 
because the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ is the highest of the three hypotheses. 
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TABLE V.IV. EXAMPLE - ADJUSTED BPA VALUES. 
Metric Value -36 -34 -26 
Belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ 61.41 % 55.86 % 21.65 % 
Belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ 19.295 % 21.38 % 56.7 % 
Belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ 19.295 % 22.76 % 21.65 % 
 
5.4.2 Manual BPA Methodology 
Before designing the automatic and self-adaptive BPA methodologies presented in the 
previous section, multiple experiments were implemented using fixed functions. The 
graphical representation of these functions is presented in Figure 5.6. These functions 
were experimentally designed. 
These fixed functions allowed verifying the correct implementation of D-S theory, 
and proving that the combined used of multiple metrics outperforms the intrusion 
detection results of single layer approaches.  The different metrics will be described in 
Chapter 6. The first set of experiments and results generated using the manual BPA 
methodology was presented in [33]. A comparison study between the manual and 
automatic BPA methodologies, detecting wireless-specific attacks was presented in 
[32]. Although the manual BPA methodology proved effective, this approach presents 
the same drawbacks to the systems that use fixed functions, described in Chapter 2. 
This methodology is unable to automatically adjust to changes in the network traffic 
behaviour, without the intervention of the IDS administrator. 
5.5 System Framework 
The IDS proposed in this work is composed of a number of interlinked modules or 
components as shown in Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.6 Manual BPA Assignment Functions. 
The first of these components is the ‘Frames Collector’. This represents the 
monitoring module in which TShark [17] performs its functions, gathering the traffic 
within the wireless network. The gathered information is stored in the form of pcap 
files. The pcap files hold most information related to packets that pass through a 
network. They are the default format used when monitoring a computer network [43]. 
Although the IDS is able to implement the intrusion detection process on-line, in real 
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time, storing the data in pcap files allows further analysis of the gathered wireless 
network traffic to be performed. It also allows the detection performance of the IDS to 
be subsequently evaluated. 
 
Figure 5.7 Schematic Representation of The Proposed IDS. 
Once the raw traffic information has been gathered, the pcap files are sent to the 
‘MAC Address Filter’. This module filters out the information that does not meet the 
filtering criteria. Only frames from the AP, and destination MAC address, broadcast or 
the wireless client, are kept. The following module is the ‘Field Filter’. For the 
remaining frames in the dataset, the six metrics described in Chapter 6, along with the 
type and subtype values are extracted from each of the frames. Each metric value is 
isolated and stored in a readable format for the detection system. All these filtering 
processes have been implemented using the filtering capabilities of TShark: 
MAC Addresses Filter: 
tshark -l -T fields -R "(wlan.da==2x:xx:xx:xx:xx:x6 || wlan.da==ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
&& (wlan.sa==0x:xx:xx:xx:xx:x3)" -r /path/… 
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Field Filter: 
tshark -l -T fields -e wlan.fc.type -e wlan.fc.subtype -e radiotap.dbm_antsignal -e 
radiotap.datarate -e ip.ttl -e wlan.duration -e wlan.seq -e frame.time_delta" - r 
/path/… 
The metric values are divided into three separate streams of information, based on 
the type of frames; IEEE 802.11 Data frames, Management frames and Control 
Frames. The module ‘Frame Type Filter’ is in charge of implementing this division. 
Similar to the work presented in [38], a sliding window scheme has been employed in 
this work. Figure 5.7 shows three sets of sliding windows, one for each type of WiFi 
frame. Each of these sets contains as many sliding windows as the metrics used. The 
module ‘Find Statistic Values’ is in charge of calculating the required statistical 
parameters. The same statistical parameters are calculated for each sliding window, 
each time a new frame is included. The statistical parameters are sent to the modules 
‘BPA Normal’ and ‘BPA Attack’, along with the actual content of the sliding 
windows. Intuitively, the ‘BPA Normal’ is in charge of generating the belief in the 
hypothesis that the currently analysed frame is non-malicious, whereas the ‘BPA 
Attack’ is in charge of generating the belief in the hypothesis that the currently 
analysed frame is, in fact, malicious. Using the outcome of both modules, the module 
‘BPA Uncertainty’ generates the belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ. Finally, the outcome of the 
three modules, ‘BPA Normal’, ‘BPA Attack’, and ‘BPA Uncertainty’ are fused in the 
module ‘D-S Data Fusion’, to generate final set of belief results. For each analysed 
frame, the outcome of the system is always a 3-fold result, Belief in ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ, Belief in 
ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and Belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ. The hypothesis with the highest beliefs of the 
three is considered as the most likely to be the correct hypothesis. 
The only module that has not been specifically developed for this thesis is the 
filtering module, which makes use of functions provided by TShark. The modules 
listed in the previous paragraph have been explicitly developed for this thesis. The 
flowchart of the detection methodology is presented in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8 Flowchart of The Proposed BPA Methodology. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has described the detection techniques used to determine whether the 
analysed information is malicious or normal, and internal architecture design of the 
presented IDS. In this thesis, a sliding window scheme is used to manage the 
information, implement the training process and construct an accurate statistical 
reference of normal behaviour. The system has one sliding window for each of the 
considered metrics and for each type of IEEE 802.11 frame. This is a simple, robust 
and convenient technique to keep track of all the received frames. One example of the 
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benefits provided by this scheme is that the use of the sliding window scheme avoids 
an attacker from altering the statistical reference of normality when launching a 
flooding attack. 
This chapter has also explained the concepts of multi-layer intrusion detection and 
data fusion techniques have also been introduced. IDSs that make use of a multi-layer 
approach have shown outperforming results, against single-layer detection systems. 
The D-S theory of evidence is the data fusion technique chosen as the most 
appropriate for the presented detection system because this technique provides a series 
of benefits over other data fusion techniques. A thorough description of the D-S 
theoretical and mathematical framework is presented, along with a series of practical 
examples describing how this technique works. D-S theory has been previously used 
in the intrusion detection field to enhance the IDSs accuracy. However, an automatic, 
unsupervised and self-adaptive process of BPA, based on the measured characteristics 
of the monitored environment, able to operate in real time has not been proposed yet. 
Such BPA approach has been presented in this chapter. 
Three different techniques have been proposed. Only two of these techniques 
work independently in order to meet the requirement of the independency of the 
beliefs. The third technique is based on the outcome beliefs of the other two. The 
decision of using one methodology that lacks of statistical independence was 
deliberate, supported by other researchers opinion (e.g. [21]), which explains that the 
independence is not necessary in many cases. Despite being rather simplistic, and 
dissimilar to well-known information management techniques, the combined 
utilisation of the three techniques applied to the different wireless network metrics 
produce a highly accurate detection system. In addition, the low computational 
complexity of the proposed methodology allows implementation in real time. The 
results presented in Chapter 7 will prove the efficiency and accuracy of the presented 
IDS. 
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Chapter 6  
Wireless Network Traffic Datasets 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the analysed real IEEE 802.11 network traffic datasets, the live 
operational testbed and the data gathering process are described. Firstly, the chapter 
addresses the decision of whether utilise well-known and publicly available network 
datasets, synthetically generated dataset using network simulation software, or utilise 
network traffic datasets gathered from a live operational and physically deployed 
network. The experiments implemented in this thesis have been tested utilising 
datasets from a live operational IEEE 802.11 network, physically deployed in the 
laboratory of the High Speed Network Group, at Loughborough University. The 
description of the pros and cons of this decision have been presented. 
The wireless network traffic is composed of numerous measurable metrics, which 
are in last instance, the information that would allow IDSs to identify the presence of 
attack. This chapter continues presenting an extensive description of the different 
metrics that have been considered for this thesis. This chapter also explains with a 
practical example the drawback that the D-S theory produces when too many metrics 
are fused. This is, the larger the number of metrics to be fused, the lower the influence 
of the Belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ  in the final results. Additionally, the statistical 
description of these metrics is presented, along with a discussion of whether these 
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metrics are appropriate for the detection of wireless-specific attacks. Lastly, the 
chapter concludes with a brief description of the concept of feature selection and the 
general need for this approach, as well as the description of the concept of curse of 
dimensionality. 
6.2 Using Real Network Traffic Datasets 
Using network traffic datasets from a live operational network to evaluate the 
proposed IDS provides a series of advantages to the system. A physically deployed 
testbed provides more realistic parameters than a simulated scenario or synthetically 
generated dataset. However, generating network traffic datasets from live operational 
networks also has some disadvantages. This environment might not properly scale to a 
real-life network containing more nodes and more external factors, out of the control 
of the network administrator. In a real-life environment, it is hard to guarantee that the 
data does not contain traces of attacks that the administrator does not know about 
[141]. Even in a controlled network, these datasets are subject to the risk of containing 
external attacks [36], especially in wireless environments. 
Also, the datasets generated in physically deployed testbeds generally contain 
large amounts of redundant and irrelevant information. Commonly, the datasets would 
require the application of preprocessing mechanisms to clean the dataset and to make 
it suitable for the analysis system. Additionally, it is important to know the real nature 
of all the instances in the datasets for training and evaluation purposes. Real network 
traffic datasets lack of labelling, which is a major drawback for the supervised 
detection systems. The real nature of all the instances in the analysed dataset must be 
known in order to evaluate the efficiency of IDSs correct detection performances. It is 
impossible to provide evaluation measurements without correctly labelled datasets. 
Collecting labelled datasets from live operational networks is highly complicated 
[146], and in many cases impossible. In normal conditions, real network traffic is not 
labelled. Currently, the task of labelling the instances in the datasets is primarily 
carried out using previous off-line forensic analysis. 
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6.2.1 Lack of Public Available Network Traffic Datasets 
Despite the disadvantages, there are researchers that still prefer to generate their own 
datasets, for two particular reasons. On the one hand, the benefits explained about the 
use of real network traffic datasets. On the other hand, the lack of publicly available 
network traffic datasets. Among the research community there exists a general concern 
about the lack of publicly available network traffic datasets [57], to evaluate IDSs. 
Working with a common evaluation dataset would allow comparisons of the efficiency 
of different IDSs. The lack of an appropriate publicly available dataset impairs the 
evaluation of the efficiency of the different IDSs [147]. 
A common approach among researchers in the field of IDS has been to generate 
datasets in a controlled and deterministic environment to analyse, test, and evaluate 
IDSs [147]. In [57], the authors explain that there have been some efforts for providing 
a framework for the researchers to generate datasets in a way that these could be 
replicable by other researchers. 
Although researchers are generating their own network traffic datasets, these are 
reluctant to share such information and to make the datasets publicly available. One of 
the main problems of releasing real network traffic datasets relies on privacy concerns 
[148]. According to the authors of [147], the main reason for this reluctance is privacy 
concerns related to sharing too much private information, such as passwords contained 
in the payload of the IP packets. 
The option that has been most commonly used over the years to evaluate IDS is 
the DARPA 1999 dataset [45]. Nowadays, many researchers, e.g. [105], keep 
evaluating their systems in an off-line environment by using the DARPA 1999 dataset. 
This publicly available dataset is a common benchmark for IDSs evaluation, which 
provides a framework in which the number and type of attacks are accurately known, 
fully and correctly labelled. This dataset contains complete network traffic packets, 
stored in tcpdump format. One portion of the dataset was real network traffic, whereas 
the rest of the dataset was simulated. The fact that the background traffic of this 
dataset was simulated attracts most of the criticism that this dataset receives. During 
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the five weeks of the collection process, four main particular types of attack were 
included. Additional descriptions about these attacks can be found in [148]. 
This dataset has been useful for evaluating IDSs because it provides a framework 
in which the number and type of attacks is accurately known. However, this approach 
remains an in vitro process, and does not consider the profile of real traffic of a 
wireless network. Numerous researchers [46] [148] highlight that the main 
disadvantage of the DARPA 1999 dataset is the uncertain accuracy of the simulated 
background traffic inserted into this dataset. For instance, the authors of [148] have 
found quantitative differences between the simulated background traffic of this dataset 
and real traffic. The authors of [46] also highlight that this dataset is obsolete for 
evaluating current IDS, since it was made publicly available almost fifteen years ago. 
In fact, the DARPA 1999 dataset is not representative of current wireless networks. 
For all these drawbacks, the option of using the DARPA 1999 dataset has been 
discarded in this thesis. 
6.3 Wireless Network Testbed 
The experiments implemented in this thesis have been tested in a live operational 
IEEE 802.11 network, physically deployed in the laboratory of the High Speed 
Network Group, at Loughborough University. This is a physically deployed testbed, 
yet also a controlled networked environment that allowed the generation of network 
traffic datasets composed of real IEEE 802.11 information. None of the datasets or any 
portion of the information compressed in them has been artificially simulated. 
The principal components of this network are: 
- An Access Point (AP); 
- A monitoring node utilising the TShark software for collecting frames, and 
being responsible for performing the proposed intrusion detection; 
- An attacker implementing a series of wireless-specific attacks; 
- A client associated with the AP, accessing various websites hosted on the 
Internet across different geographical locations. 
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A schematic representation of the wireless network testbed and a picture of the 
actual testbed are presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Schematic representation of the wireless network testbed. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Deployed real IEEE 802.11 network testbed. 
 
Although the topology of this testbed has been modified for the implementation of 
some particular experiments, the main components of the testbed are those listed. The 
used AP is a Linksys WRT54GL AP, transmitting through channel 6 at a variable 
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transmission rate, and using the IEEE 802.11b standard. The machine used by the 
attacker is a desktop PC running the BackTrack Linux OS. In this machine, a 
PCMCIA wireless card was installed, using the Atheros AR5213A chipset. Similar to 
the attacker, the monitoring device also used a desktop PC using a PCMCIA wireless 
card with Atheros chipset. The OS was Ubuntu 12.04 Linux. Both the traffic 
monitoring software and the detection system presented and implemented for this 
thesis were installed in the monitoring device. The machine used by the wireless client 
acting as the victim of the wireless-specific attacks a MacBook Air running the Snow 
Leopard OS X, and uses the built-in wireless card. 
6.4 Wireless Network Traffic Gathering 
The gathered frames were stored in the form of pcap files [19], using TShark. This 
type of file is the default format used when monitoring a computer network [43]. 
When monitoring the wireless network, a large amount of unnecessary information is 
also gathered. The room in which the testbed network has been deployed was 
surrounded by different adjacent research laboratories, using their own wireless 
networks. Some of them were even using the same wireless transmission channel as 
the one used in the deployed testbed. Hence, once the pcap files have been gathered, it 
is highly probable that these files would contain traces of communications from 
wireless networks that are not being protected. All the gathered datasets are accessible 
and publicly available in the personal website of Dr. Kyriakopoulos [20], from 
Loughborough University. 
6.4.1 Filtering Wireless Network Traffic 
The external information from adjacent networks may be characterised by different 
parameters or configuration from the protected network. Keeping these measurement 
values in the analysed information may distort the detection results. In order to provide 
protection to wireless devices, including information only transmitted from/to the 
protected device would be necessary. It would be necessary to discard all this external 
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information that is not of the interest of the proposed detection system. Hence, a data 
cleansing process has been carried out before performing the intrusion detection. As 
part of this data cleansing process, the detection process is carried out only on the 
connection between the AP and the wireless client. The network traffic is filtered out 
using two criteria based on the source and destination MAC addresses of the network 
traffic. First, the source MAC address should be the MAC address of the AP. Second, 
the destination MAC address should be either the broadcast MAC address 
(ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) or the MAC address of the wireless client. This is implemented using 
the filtering capabilities of TShark previously explained in the Section 5.5. 
The use of the MAC address filter removes the information from the adjacent 
wireless networks, and helps to reduce the total amount of information that the 
detection system needs to process and analyse. In turn, the computational cost is also 
reduced. On the other hand, the MAC address filter provides a simplistic first 
mechanism of protection. The attacker could implement the attacks using its own 
MAC address or the MAC address of a non-existing device. Although this is not 
entirely realistic because the attacker would normally take the precaution of hiding its 
identity to avoid being identified, it is a feasible situation. In a real scenario, nothing 
stops an attacker implementing the attacks using a different MAC address from the 
MAC address of the AP. Therefore, filtering out traffic external to the protected 
connection would eliminate malicious frames injected not using MAC address 
spoofing capabilities. 
In theory, the filter guarantees that the detection system analyses only information 
from the connection link between the protected devices. But the attacker is still 
capable to hide its identity by spoofing the MAC address of any of the legitimate 
devices, as explained in Chapter 3. In each of the different experiments implemented 
throughout this thesis, it is assumed that the attacker spoofs the MAC address of the 
AP. In these cases, the MAC address filter would be ineffective in filtering out the 
traffic injected by the attacker. Therefore, apart from the legitimate information from 
the wireless networks, the generated pcap files would include any malicious frames 
injected by the attacker. 
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6.5 Wireless Network Metrics 
The audited information also plays an important role for achieving efficient intrusion 
detection results [79]. Apart from the detection technique, IDSs rely on the quality of 
the information datasets to produce accurate detection results. Central to the 
implementation of the proposed IDS is the analysis of different metrics from the IEEE 
802.11 frame header. The monitoring node identifies a particular set of metrics from 
each frame, and sends the value of these metrics to the detection engine. One of the 
most important aspects about the set of metrics is that they should provide accurately 
evidence for the detection system to identify the difference between normal and 
malicious frames. The detection system would only have a limited set of metrics 
available to assess the real nature of the analysed frames. 
6.5.1 Selection of Metrics 
The presented IDS developed in this thesis obtains the information from a particular 
number of metrics extracted from the IEEE 802.11 frames. The selection of the 
metrics has been conducted experimentally, after the evaluation of all the available set 
of metrics. The relevance of the different metrics and selection of the most appropriate 
set of metrics can be evaluated empirically [94]. For instance, in the feature ranking 
techniques used in [91], the system administrator selects a specific set of metrics based 
on empirical approaches. 
Among all the available metrics, six have been experimentally selected as the 
most appropriate for detecting the attacks. The six selected metrics are the ܴܵܵܫ and 
the Frames Interarrival Time (߂ܶ݅݉݁) value at the PHY layer; the Injection Rate 
(ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘), the Network Allocation Vector (ܰܣܸ) value and the Sequence Numbers 
difference (ܵܧܳ஽௜௙) at the MAC layer; and the Time To Live (ܶܶܮ) value at the 
Network layer. These six metrics have been used in all the evaluated experiments. All 
these metrics are thoroughly described below in following sections. ܶܶܮ is the only 
metric that has not been used in the experiments with deauthentication attack, due to 
the fact that management frames lack this metric. 
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All these metrics show distinctive values between the wireless communication of 
a legitimate device and the wireless communication of an attacker spoofing the 
identity of the legitimate wireless device. This difference is based on two factors. The 
first factor is the technical implementation of the attack. Different attacking tools are 
implemented differently. Some attacking tool would be more efficient than others 
spoofing the identity of the legitimate devices. The capability to completely imitate the 
communication characteristics of a legitimate wireless relies on how well implemented 
the tool is. The second factor is the level of difficulty for an attacker to replicate the 
values of the metrics. The circumstance that five out of the six of the chosen metrics 
are collected at the two lower layers of the protocol stack makes these metrics more 
difficult to replicate than other available metrics. 
Another aspect to be considered when choosing the metrics is the privacy of the 
transmitted information. Firstly, gathering metrics from the higher layers of the 
protocol stack and analysing the payload of the transmitted frames would arise privacy 
concerns over the transmitted information of the user. In addition, the wireless 
communication between the legitimate client and the AP may be encrypted. If an IDS 
had to analyse encrypted information, this system would need to know the 
cryptographic material to decrypt the content of the frames. On top of that, the IDS 
might not always be installed in the protected devices. It might be installed in a third 
party device, or it might work as a cooperative IDS and the information shall be shared 
with numerous devices. Hence, the most optimum metrics would be from the two 
lower layers of the protocol stack, which are never encrypted. 
Using the same set of metrics repeatedly could be perceived as a risky 
implementation, in which the detection capability of the system is constrained by these 
metrics. However, as was empirically proven in [31], this set of metrics efficiently 
adapts the detection capability of the system to different attacks. There may be 
situations in which, one particular metric of the six would provide stronger evidences 
of intrusion than the rest of metrics for one particular type of attack. Although the 
evidences that the rest of metrics provide could be very weak, the strong evidence of 
intrusion of this single metric would dominate the detection decision of the IDS. 
Whereas, there may be situations in which this particular metric would be ineffective 
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detecting another type of attack, because the evidences of intrusion that this metric 
provides are very weak. In such situation, another metric or metrics should provide 
strong evidence of intrusion to achieve efficient detection. Metrics that provide poor 
evidence of attack are compensated with the rest of metrics that provide strong 
evidences. By using the combination of all these six metrics, the best results overall in 
detecting malicious injected frames are produced. 
6.5.1.1 Too Many Metrics for Dempster-Shafer 
During the development of this work, another factor has been identified that makes the 
reduction in the number of metrics necessary. It is related with the data fusion 
technique, D-S theory of evidence that has been introduced in Chapter 5. The problem 
with D-S is that the larger the number of metrics to be fused, the lower the influence of 
the Belief in ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ in the final results. One of the benefits provided by this 
fusion approach managing is not obtainable after successive fusions. Therefore, using 
the smallest possible set of metrics would take full advantage of the D-S theory, and 
its capability to manage ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ. 
In order to better understand the effect of the number of metrics on the data fusion 
technique clearer, we consider the following example using real belief measurements 
extracted from one of the experiments in this thesis. These belief values are calculated 
using the different techniques presented in Chapter 5. Six independent sensors monitor 
a particular parameter, and conclude the belief values in the three hypotheses (i.e. 
ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ, ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ and ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ) presented in Table VI.I. The belief values for the 
three considered hypotheses are sorted by the particular sensor that provides these 
beliefs. 
The belief values of each sensor, for each hypothesis are sequentially fused to 
reach a final conclusion. Only the beliefs from two sensors can be fused at a time. The 
resulting beliefs of the current fusion are then fused with the beliefs of the next sensor. 
This process is repeated until the beliefs of the last sensor are fused. Using Dempster’s 
rule of combination, the different beliefs have been fused. The results after the fusion 
process are presented in Table VI.II. As can be seen in the highlighted bottom row of 
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the table, the values of the belief in Uncertainty follows a decreasing trend, as more 
fusion processes are implemented. This phenomenon works against one of the 
characteristics that make D-S theory attractive in the field of unsupervised IDS. This is 
the capability of managing Uncertainty, which is an advantage over other fusion 
approaches. Nevertheless, due to this phenomenon, due to the reduced value of the 
belief in Uncertainty, the D-S fusion process becomes almost similar to a process of 
Bayesian fusion. 
 
TABLE VI.I.  BELIEF VALUES - EXAMPLE. 
 
Sensor 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
Hypothesis 
Normal 0.3 0.217 0.667 0.667 0.217 0.217 
Attack 0.4 0.567 0.167 0.167 0.567 0.567 
Uncertainty 0.3 0.216 0.166 0.166 0.216 0.216 
 
 
TABLE VI.II.  RESULTS OF SUCCESSIVE BELIEF VALUES FUSION - EXAMPLE. 
 
Iteration 
#1 - #2 R - #3 R - #4 R - #4 Final Results 
Hypothesis 
Normal 0.262 0.857 0.187 0.746 0.475 
Attack 0.65 0.107 0.751 0.247 0.524 
Uncertainty 0.088 0.036 0.062 0.007 0.001 
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The presented phenomenon is another practical reason for selecting the smallest 
possible set of metrics that could allow the IDS detect the evaluated attacks, without 
compromising the efficiency of the system. The whole fusion process is presented in 
more detail in Figure 6.3. The column in the left hand side shows the beliefs that the 6 
different sensors assign to each of the considered hypotheses. Although these are 
independent, some of the sensors assign similar belief values to the hypotheses. The 
second column shows the succession of beliefs combination, tabulated in tables. The 
first table shows the belief multiplication of the sensor 1 and sensor 2. The second 
table shows the belief multiplication for the outcome of the previous combination and 
the beliefs of the sensor 3, and so on. The third column shows the calculation of the 
denominator of the Dempster’s rule of combination, for each of the combinations. 
Finally, the column in the right hand side shows the outcome belief values after each 
of the combinations. 
 
Figure 6.3 Complete Results of Successive Belief Values Fusion - Example. 
6.5.1.2 Received Signal Strength Indication – ܀܁܁۷ 
The ܴܵܵܫ  value is a value associated with the transmission and reception of the 
communication that represents the power level received by the wireless NIC, in dBm. 
A wireless NIC configured in monitoring mode can measure the ܴܵܵܫ value of the 
received information. The ܴܵܵܫ depends on many factors such as distance between 
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source and destination, physical obstacles, WLAN equipment, used frequency channel 
and an environmental coefficient [32]. 
Despite being a volatile value, the ܴܵܵܫ for most of the frames transmitted by a 
particular wireless device follows a fairly tight and predictable Normal distribution 
[72]. The measurement of consecutive ܴܵܵܫ  values from the same transmitter can 
generate a ܴܵܵܫ fingerprint, which could be used to unequivocally identify individual 
transmitter devices [76]. Two different wireless devices positioned at the same 
geographical location, transmitting with similar signal strength will generate different 
distributions of ܴܵܵܫ at the reception device [72]. The radio chipset and firmware of 
the wireless NIC characterises individual wireless devices with a unique ܴܵܵܫ 
fingerprint [10]. Many circumstances must converge for an attacker to be able to 
replicate the ܴܵܵܫ fingerprint of a particular legitimate wireless device, and most of 
them are out of the control of the attacker. Hence, it will be almost impossible for an 
attacker to imitate the ܴܵܵܫ fingerprint of a specific wireless device [72]. 
Detection systems that employ the ܴܵܵܫ  to identify the presence of MAC 
spoofing attacks are very sensitive to mobile devices [76]. The effectiveness of the 
IDS that make use of the ܴܵܵܫ fingerprint to detect MAC spoofing attacks may be 
reduced if the protected device is a moving wireless device. In that case, this type of 
methodology could generate a high number of FPs. 
6.5.1.3 Injection Rate – ۷ۼ۸ࡾ࡭ࢀࡱ 
The ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘  is the speed at which the information is transmitted by the wireless 
devices. Several ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘  have been standardised in the IEEE 802.11. Some are 
mandatorily supported whilst others are optional [112]. The ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘  at which each 
frame is transmitted depends on many factors such as the distance between the source 
device and destination device, physical obstacles in the propagation path of the radio 
signal, the environmental conditions and the particular selected modulation scheme 
utilised by the source of the wireless communication [32]. The ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ directly affects 
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other parameters of the communication, such as throughput or the probability of 
packet loss. 
Multipath fading is a propagation phenomenon in which the transmitted signal 
traverses multiple different paths from the transmitter to the receiver. The effect is that 
the receiver signal is distorted by reflexion of the same transmitted signal. In order to 
deal with this phenomenon, many vendors configure their NICs to reduce the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
[112]. Using low ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ provides higher throughput in the wireless communications. 
The lower the used ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘, the higher the probability for a transmitted signal to be 
properly received by the receiver. The approach followed by legitimate NIC vendors is 
also used by most of the attacking tools, which tend to inject forged frames at low 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ in order to be more efficient [33]. 
Transmitting at low ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ is not exclusive to malicious devices. A legitimate 
device would commonly transmit management frames using low ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘. However, 
the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ value can also be used to reveal the presence of an attacker implementing 
a MAC spoofing attack. 
6.5.1.4 Frame Interarrival Time – ઢ܂ܑܕ܍ 
The ߂ܶ݅݉݁ is defined as the time lapse between the two consecutive received frames. 
The ߂ܶ݅݉݁ has been previously used in tasks such as Internet traffic classification 
[34] or congestion bottleneck in wired networks [35]. Additionally, ߂ܶ݅݉݁ has been 
also used to identify the presence of MAC spoofing attacks [69]. 
The description presented in [69] explains the statistical distribution difference 
that would produce a non-malicious wireless device transmitting at a fixed interval and 
an attacker implementing MAC spoofing attacks. The statistical distribution of the 
time lapse between two consecutive frames, when only the legitimate device is 
transmitting, would be different from the distribution generated when both devices are 
transmitting. Using similar approach, the ߂ܶ݅݉݁ could also be used by the proposed 
IDS framework to identify the presence of MAC spoofing attacks. 
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6.5.1.5 Network Allocation Vector – ۼۯ܄ 
The ܰܣܸ value is a 16 bits-long field transmitted in the MAC header of the frames 
that indicates the amount of time a wireless node reserves the wireless medium to 
complete a communication. The wireless nodes aiming to transmit should compete 
with other nodes for the control of the transmission medium. The ܰܣܸ  value is 
specified in μseconds, with a maximum value of 32767 μseconds. A non-zero ܰܣܸ 
value informs to all the nodes in the wireless network to defer to complete a 
communication. The nodes are allowed to transmit only if the ܰܣܸ value reaches 0. 
The definition of this value is primarily based on the length of the transmitted 
frames and the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ [32]. Different hardware vendors and different software drivers 
define the ܰܣܸ  value differently. The different between ܰܣܸ  values could help 
towards detecting attackers spoofing the identity of legitimate wireless devices. On top 
of that, the ܰܣܸ value is central to the implementation of the virtual jamming attack 
explained in Chapter 3. An attacker intending to occupy the wireless transmission 
medium and make all the wireless devices in the network postpone any transmission 
would use ܰܣܸ values higher than for normal frames. Some publications in the field 
of IDS have analysed this metric in order to identify misbehaving wireless nodes. In 
[82], the authors compare the ܰܣܸ value against the actual duration of the current 
transmission to identify inconsistencies in both values. Therefore, finding 
inconsistency in the ܰܣܸ value in the analysed frames may evidence the presence of 
attacks. 
6.5.1.6 Sequence Number Difference – ܁۳ۿࡰ࢏ࢌ 
The Sequence Number at the MAC layer is a value included in all the management 
and data frames, which acts as a counter for each frame that is transmitted by a 
wireless device. Every single wireless device keeps its own sequence number stream. 
The sequence number value monotonically increments, from 0 to 4095, every time a 
non-fragmented data or management frame is transmitted [72]. The sequence number 
remains constant in all the retransmitted frames [70]. 
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The analysis of the sequence number stream is a common method to identity 
MAC spoofing attacks. Abrupt changes in the sequence number may indicate the 
presence of a MAC spoofing attack [10] [69] [71]. If an attacker implements a MAC 
spoofing attack, the monotonic incrementing series of sequence numbers will produce 
two different streams of sequence numbers [69] [72]. Two different streams, along 
with MAC address of the transmitting node can be used to detect this attack. 
Traditional detection systems that use the sequence number to identify MAC 
spoofing attacks are based on the analysis of the difference between the sequence 
numbers of two consecutive frames, the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ [72]. In theory, the value of ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
should be constantly 1. One simple methodology is keeping tack of the monotonic 
increment of the sequence number value, and reporting an alarm if the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ differs 
by more than 1. However, this methodology may generate excessive number of false 
alarms [68]. The occurrence of frame loss, duplicated frames or frames retransmitted 
out of order makes the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ different from 1. Most of the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ values are from 0 
to 2 [68]. The difference between the sequence numbers of two consecutive frames 
can also be a negative value. The authors of [68] also report that, if an AP gives 
priority to beacon and probe response frames before the data frames, the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ could 
be -1 or -2. Therefore, alternative methodologies must be implemented if ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ is 
used for intrusion detection. The work presented in [68] proposes a MAC spoofing 
detection system based on the analysis of the sequence numbers. This system takes 
into account the fact that the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ can be different from 1. It defines bounds in the 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ and considers that a sequence number is abnormal if the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ is any value 
between 3 and 4092. The authors of this work explain that the proposed system is 
unable to detect each spoofed frame if the attacker replicates the sequence number of 
the previous legitimate transmitted frame. 
However, some NICs allow changing the sequence number in each frame [71]. 
Attackers could try to replicate the sequence number of the previous legitimate 
transmitted frame, in order to avoid being detected. Also, the sequence number cannot 
be used to identify the attacks that utilise crafted control frames, since these frames do 
not include sequence number [10]. Additionally, the analysis of the sequence number 
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streams is ineffective in case the legitimate wireless device is not transmitting [71]. In 
addition, IEEE 802.11e-enabled devices would generate high number of false alarms 
because this standard allows multiple sequence number streams from the same 
wireless device [76]. This fact could lead this methodology to generate high number of 
FPs. Hence, the implementation of detection systems that use the only sequence 
numbers are insufficiently robust [119]. 
6.5.1.7 Time To Live – ܂܂ۺ 
Finally, the ܶܶܮ is another metric that should be analysed because it provides evidence 
of attacks exploiting HTTP sessions. The metric ܶܶܮ is an 8-bit long field in the IP 
packets that determines the maximum numbers of hops a packet can make, between 
the source and destination, before being dropped from the network. Every time an IP 
packet is forwarded by a router or switch in the network, the ܶܶܮ value is decremented 
by 1. Decrementing the ܶܶܮ  value requires modification of the header of the IP 
packet. The IP packet whose ܶܶܮ value reaches zero is dropped from the network. The 
ܶܶܮ  is a mechanism to avoid an IP packet from entering in a loop, hopping 
indefinitely between routers. The sender of the IP packet sets the ܶܶܮ  value. 
Commonly, the initial ܶܶܮ value is set to 32, 64, 128 or 255, depending on the OS of 
the sender device [109]. Different OSs define different ܶܶܮ values. Outdates OSs such 
as Windows 95 use 32 as the ܶܶܮ value. Linux OS or MacOS use the ܶܶܮ value 64, 
whereas recent versions of Windows OS use ܶܶܮ value 128, as default [134]. 
An Internet user accessing different websites generates multiple HTTP request 
packets. Although different websites may be hosted on different web servers across 
different geographical locations, the content of some websites are hosted in the same 
web server. In that case, the content of the website will follow an almost similar path 
through the Internet, before being received by the user. Therefore, all the packets will 
be assigned similar initial ܶܶܮ value, and will be forwarded by the almost similar 
number of routers through the Internet. For instance, in a simple conducted 
experiment, it was evaluated that the number of hops required to access to Google 
(http://www.google.co.uk) and the BBC website (http://www.bbc.co.uk), was in both 
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cases 14 hops. The initial ܶܶܮ value was 64, and the ܶܶܮ value of the IP packets when 
arriving to the laptop was 50. 
An attacker implementing attacks exploiting HTTP sessions may implement the 
functionality of assigning the most common initial ܶܶܮ value to the crafted packets, to 
try to replicate the behaviour of legitimate web servers. The attacker could be also 
configured to dynamically adjust the ܶܶܮ value. These mechanisms would make the 
receiver believe that the IP packets are actually received from the legitimate web 
server. Identifying gaps in the ܶܶܮ value when requesting the content of a website 
may evidence the attacks exploiting HTTP sessions. The use of the ܶܶܮ value in task 
of intrusion detection has been also implemented by [117] [134]. 
6.5.2 Analysis of the Network Traffic Datasets 
The purpose of this section is to individually analyse each of the described metrics, for 
each of the datasets and for each type of attack. The analysis will provide a clear 
understanding of the distribution shape of these metrics, and will indicate if the normal 
and malicious traffic are statistically differentiable from each other. One dataset has 
been gathered when no attackers were present in the wireless network. Three separate 
datasets have been gathered when the Airpwn attack experiments were implemented. 
Another two datasets have been gathered when the deauthentication attack 
experiments were implemented. 
6.5.2.1 Normal Dataset 
The first analysed dataset contains only non-malicious communication traffic between 
the AP and the wireless client. This experiment is used to evaluate the performance of 
the proposed detection system, in situations of normal operations. It is important that 
the proposed detection system does not produce FP alarms when no attacks exist. In 
total, 3631 network frames compose this dataset of non-malicious wireless network 
traffic information. 70.8% of this dataset, 2572 instances, is composed of data frames 
whilst 29.2% of this dataset, 1059 instances, is composed of management frames. 
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 ܴܵܵܫ 
The average value for the ܴܵܵܫ in this normal dataset is -32.54, and the standard 
deviation value is 2.52. Figure 6.4.a shows a histogram representing the frequency 
of the metric ܴܵܵܫ in this dataset free of malicious instances. The skewness and 
the kurtosis are -5.454 and 100.084, respectively. Figure 6.4.b also shows the 
distribution of the ܴܵܵܫ values. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.4 Normal Dataset - ܴܵܵܫ: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
For the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘, the average value is 38.5373, and the standard deviation value is 
24.0918. Figures 6.5.a and 6.5.b show a histogram representing the frequency of 
the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘  and the boxplot representing the distribution of the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘  in this 
dataset. The skewness is -0.917, and the kurtosis is -1.16. As can be clearly 
appreciated, the distributions of both metrics are very dissimilar. In contrast to the 
values of the ܴܵܵܫ that are mostly concentrated on one particular value, the values 
of ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ concentrate on two distinct values, distant from each other. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.5 Normal Dataset - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 ܶܶܮ 
For the ܶܶܮ , the average value is 48.07, and the standard deviation value is 
48.356. Again, Figures 6.6.a and 6.6.b show a histogram representing the 
frequency of the ܶܶܮ in this dataset, and the boxplot representing the distribution 
of these values. The skewness is 2.196, and the kurtosis is 6.66. The distribution of 
this metric has a shape dissimilar to the two previous metrics. Although most of 
the measurements are also concentrated on one particular value, the values of the 
ܶܶܮ are more distributed than the values of the ܴܵܵܫ. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.6 Normal Dataset - ܶܶܮ: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
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 ܰܣܸ 
The average value for the ܰܣܸ  is 31.17, and the standard deviation value is 
20.002. The frequency of the ܰܣܸ in this dataset is shown in Figure 6.7.a. The 
skewness is -0.917, and the kurtosis is -1.159. Figure 6.7.b also shows the 
distribution of the ܰܣܸ  values. Similar to the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ , the values of ܰܣܸ 
concentrate on two distinct values. However, in this case, the values are not distant 
from each other. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.7 Normal Dataset - ܰܣܸ: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 ߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
The average value for ߂ܶ݅݉݁ is 0.0061, and the standard deviation value is 0.014. 
The frequency and the distribution of ߂ܶ݅݉݁  in this dataset are shown in the 
Figures 6.8.a and 6.8.b. The skewness is 12.713, and the kurtosis is 229.215. Most 
of the ߂ܶ݅݉݁ measurements are also concentrated in one particular value, similar 
to ܴܵܵܫ and ܶܶܮ. 
 ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
Finally, for ܵܧܳ஽௜௙, the average value is 0.38, and the standard deviation value is 
68.058. The frequency distribution of the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙  in this dataset is shown in 
Figures 6.9.a and 6.9.b. The skewness is -60.055, and the kurtosis is 3614.931. 
  
CHAPTER 6: WIRELESS NETWORK TRAFFIC DATASETS 
145
Once more, most of the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ measurements are concentrated in one particular 
value, with outliners produced by normal communication operations. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.8 Normal Dataset - ߂ܶ݅݉݁: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.9 Normal Dataset - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 
It is clear that the distributions of the different histograms are statistically 
dissimilar from each other. Generating a common statistical profile of normal traffic 
that could adapt to the distribution of all the considered metrics would not be feasible. 
Numerous FP alarms may be generated. Therefore, an individual statistical profile 
should be generated for each of the metrics, independently. 
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6.5.2.2 Airpwn Attack Experiments Datasets 
6.5.2.2.1 Airpwn Attack 01 Dataset 
The testbed from which the second dataset was gathered includes the attacker. This 
dataset comprises network traffic information from the attacker, and from the 
communication between the AP and the wireless client. For the following three 
datasets, the main target is to evaluate the performance of the proposed detection 
system detecting different types of attacks. 
In this particular experiment, the attacker has implemented the first type of 
Airpwn attack, ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01. This dataset is composed of 1361 network frames in total, 
20.1% data frames and 79.9% management frames. 99.2% of this dataset, 1350 
instances, is of non-malicious nature. The wireless client sent these frames. The 
remaining 0.8% of this dataset, 11 instances, is malicious information. 
 ܴܵܵܫ 
The average value for the ܴܵܵܫ in this dataset containing both malicious and non-
malicious instances is -31.99, and the standard deviation value is 2.069. Figure 
6.10.a shows a histogram representing the frequency of the metric ܴܵܵܫ in this 
dataset. The skewness is 1.854, and the kurtosis is 12.383. Figure 6.10.b also 
shows the distribution of the ܴܵܵܫ values, based on the real nature of the frames. 
Considering only the value for the ܴܵܵܫ  of the non-malicious frames in this 
dataset, the average value is -32.1, and the standard deviation value is 1.691. 
Considering only the value for the ܴܵܵܫ of the malicious frames, the average value 
and the standard deviation value are -18.73 and 1.009, respectively. 
 ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
For the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘, the average value is 11.2028, and the standard deviation value is 
20.9038. Figure 6.11.a shows a histogram representing the frequency distribution 
of ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ in this dataset. The skewness is 1.562, and the kurtosis is 0.439. Figure 
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6.11.b shows the distribution of the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ values, based on the real nature of the 
frames. Considering only the value for the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ of the non-malicious frames in 
this dataset, the average value is 11.2859, and the standard deviation value is 
20.9685. Whilst, considering only the value for the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘  of the malicious 
frames, the average value and the Standard Deviation value are 1 and 0, 
respectively. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.10 Airpwn Dataset - ܴܵܵܫ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.11 Airpwn Dataset - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
 ܶܶܮ 
For the ܶܶܮ , the average value is 22.57, and the standard deviation value is 
56.249. Again, Figures 6.12.a and 6.12.b show a histogram representing the 
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frequency of the ܶܶܮ  in this dataset, and the distribution of the ܶܶܮ  values, 
respectively. The skewness is 2.881, and the kurtosis is 7.663. Considering only 
the value for the ܶܶܮ of the non-malicious frames in this dataset, the average value 
is 20.68, and the standard deviation value is 52.399. Considering only the value for 
the ܶܶܮ  of the malicious frames, the average value and the standard deviation 
value are 255 and 0, respectively. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.12 Airpwn Dataset - ܶܶܮ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 ܰܣܸ 
The average value for the ܰܣܸ  is 11.01, and the standard deviation value is 
32.391. The frequency distribution of the ܰܣܸ in this dataset is shown in Figure 
6.13.a. The skewness is 6.803, and the kurtosis is 59.415. The distribution of the 
ܰܣܸ values, based on the real nature of the frames, is shown in Figure 6.13.b. 
Considering only the value for the ܰܣܸ  of the non-malicious frames in this 
dataset, the average value is 8.54, and the standard deviation value is 17.408. 
Considering only the value for the ܰܣܸ of the malicious frames, the average value 
and the standard deviation value are 314 and 0, respectively. 
 ߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
The average value for ߂ܶ݅݉݁ is 0.101, and the standard deviation value is 0.0129. 
The frequency of ߂ܶ݅݉݁  in this dataset is shown in the Figure 6.14.a. The 
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skewness is 10.886, and the kurtosis is 202.704. The boxplot representing the 
distribution of the ߂ܶ݅݉݁ values is shown in the figure 6.14.b. Considering only 
the value for the ߂ܶ݅݉݁ of the non-malicious frames in this dataset, the average 
value is 0.0102, and the standard deviation value is 0.0129. Considering only the 
value for the ߂ܶ݅݉݁ of the malicious frames, the average value is 0.0036 and the 
standard deviation value is 0.0009. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.13 Airpwn Dataset - ܰܣܸ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.14 Airpwn Dataset - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
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 ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
Finally, for ܵܧܳ஽௜௙, the average value is -1.07, and the standard deviation value is 
361.446. Figure 6.15.a shows a histogram representing the frequency of the metric 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ in this dataset, whilst Figure 6.15.b shows the distribution of the ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
values, based on the real nature of the frames. The skewness is -1.046, and the 
kurtosis is 68.64. Considering only the value for ܵܧܳ஽௜௙  of the non-malicious 
frames in this dataset, the average value is -21.61, and the standard deviation value 
is 267.468. Considering only the value for ܵܧܳ஽௜௙  of the malicious frames, the 
average value and the standard deviation value are 2519.82 and 1034.159, 
respectively. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.15 Airpwn Dataset - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
Similar to the datasets that only contains non-malicious information, the 
distributions of the different histograms are statistically dissimilar from each other. 
Comparing the distributions of the histograms of the dataset ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 against the 
distributions of the histograms of the Normal traffic dataset, by metric have a very 
similar distribution. Focusing on the difference between the normal and malicious 
instances, both types of information are statistically differentiable. The difference is 
more noticeable in some of the metrics such as ܰܣܸ  than others. This statistical 
difference is visually represented by the boxplots. 
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6.5.2.2.2 Airpwn Attack 02 Dataset 
For the third dataset, the attacker implemented the second type of Airpwn attack, 
ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02. This dataset, which is substantially larger that the two previous datasets, 
also comprises network traffic information from the attacker, and from the 
communication between the AP and the wireless client. This dataset is composed of 
14493 network frames in total, 90.6% data frames and 9.4% management frames. 
93.1% of this dataset, 13498 instances, is of non-malicious nature, whilst the 
remaining 6.9% of this dataset, 995 instances, is malicious information. The analysis 
of different metrics in this dataset is tabulated in Table VI.III. Histograms representing 
the frequency different metrics in this dataset, as well as bloxplot diagrams 
representing the distribution of the metrics are shown in Figures 6.16.a – 6.21.b. 
TABLE VI.III.  AIRPWN ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 DATASET ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Dataset Content Average Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ܴܵܵܫ 
Normal - Malicious -33.72 3.049 1.378 8.135 
Normal -34.37 1.894   
Malicious -24.82 1.374   
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
Normal - Malicious 45.3609 19.566 -1.825 1.334 
Normal 48.6309 15.9778   
Malicious 1 0   
ܶܶܮ 
Normal - Malicious 73.25 67.461 1.895 2.379 
Normal 59.85 47.663   
Malicious 255 0   
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ܰܣܸ 
Normal - Malicious 58.4 70.57 3.02 8.866 
Normal 39.55 13.262   
Malicious 314 0   
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
Normal - Malicious 0.0023 0.0094 29.526 1285.574 
Normal 0.0019 0.0079   
Malicious 0.0077 0.0204   
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
Normal - Malicious -0.05 410.425 -0.397 43.102 
Normal 9.05 302.615   
Malicious -123.49 1093.643   
Dataset Content Average St. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.16 Airpwn Dataset - ܴܵܵܫ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.17 Airpwn Dataset - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.18 Airpwn Dataset - ܶܶܮ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.19 Airpwn Dataset - ܰܣܸ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.20 Airpwn Dataset - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.21 Airpwn Dataset - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
The distributions of the different metrics in the dataset ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02  have apparent 
similarities to the previous two datasets. The difference in the amount of information 
contained in this dataset does not significantly change the statistical characteristics of 
the metrics distributions. Focusing on the difference between the normal and malicious 
instances, both types of information are also statistically differentiable, similar to the 
dataset ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01. This statistical difference is visually represented by the different 
boxplots. 
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6.5.2.2.3 Mixed Airpwn Attack Dataset 
One last dataset contains both network traffic information from the attacker and from 
the wireless communication between the legitimate devices. In contrast to the previous 
datasets, this experiment alternates periods of only normal wireless traffic with periods 
in which the attacker implements attacks. An initial period of only normal wireless 
traffic was followed by a defined period of time in which the attacker implemented the 
ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01. Then, another period of normal traffic was followed by another period of 
malicious activity. This last time, the attacker implemented the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02. 
The main purpose was to evaluate the performance of the proposed detection 
system in situations in which different attacks were present. The adaptability of the 
proposed detection system to different attacks is verified through this experiment. This 
dataset is composed of 12130 network frames in total, 88.1% data frames and 11.9% 
management frames. 99.1% of this dataset, 12016 instances, is of non-malicious 
nature. The remaining 0.9%, 114 instances, is malicious information. Focusing on the 
particular type of attack, 6.14% of the malicious information in this dataset, 7 
instances, corresponds to the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 , whereas 93.86% of this dataset, 107 
instances, corresponds to the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 . Figure 6.22 provides a graphical 
representation of the proportion of the instances present in the dataset. 
 
Figure 6.22 Mixed Airpwn Attack Dataset Information Proportion. 
The analysis of different metrics in this dataset, ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇, is tabulated in 
Table VI.IV. Histograms representing the frequency different metrics in this dataset, 
as well as bloxplot diagrams representing the distribution of the metrics are shown in 
Figures 6.23.a – 6.28.b. 
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TABLE VI.IV.  AIRPWN ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ DATASET ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Dataset Content Average Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ܴܵܵܫ 
Normal - Malicious -32.11 2.606 -1.176 34.203 
Normal -32.21 2.354   
Malicious -21.53 5.065   
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
Normal - Malicious 47.1866 17.7299 -2.22 2.933 
Normal 47.6248 17.2308   
Malicious 1 0   
ܶܶܮ 
Normal - Malicious 62.76 54.651 2.268 4.89 
Normal 60.93 51.584   
Malicious 255 0   
ܰܣܸ 
Normal - Malicious 41.3 30.137 6.659 60.459 
Normal 38.72 14.304   
Malicious 314 0   
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
Normal - Malicious 0.0022 0.0072 24.358 858.046 
Normal 0.0021 0.0072   
Malicious 0.0066 0.0049   
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
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ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
Normal - Malicious -0.11 159.712 -6.792 227.98 
Normal 5.31 127.928   
Malicious -571.83 815.421   
Dataset Content Average St. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.23 Airpwn Dataset - ܴܵܵܫ ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.24 Airpwn Dataset - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.25 Airpwn Dataset - ܶܶܮ ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.26 Airpwn Dataset - ܰܣܸ ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.27 Airpwn Dataset - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.28 Airpwn Dataset - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Traffic: (a) Histogram, (b) 
Boxplot. 
6.5.2.3 Deauthentication Attack Experiments Datasets 
6.5.2.3.1 Short Distance Datasets 
Another attack implemented in this thesis was the deauthentication attack. For this 
type of attack, two separate datasets were gathered. In the first dataset, the attacker 
was placed close to the AP, around 1.5 metres away. This dataset is composed of 203 
network frames in total. 139 instances, 68.5% of the dataset, are normal frames from 
the communication between the AP and the wireless client. The remaining 31.5% of 
the dataset, 64 deauthentication frames, is malicious. The analysis of different metrics 
in this dataset is tabulated in Table VI.V. 
TABLE VI.V. DEAUTHENTICATION SHORT DISTANCE DATASET ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Dataset Content Average Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ܴܵܵܫ 
Normal - Malicious -37.41 10.295 -0.075 -1.69 
Normal -42.78 7.877   
Malicious -25.75 1.447   
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ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
Normal - Malicious 1.7833 6.411 8.102 64.284 
Normal 2.1439 7.7296   
Malicious 1 0   
ܰܣܸ 
Normal - Malicious 129.03 154.301 0.37 -1.878 
Normal 43.87 108.066   
Malicious 314 0   
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
Normal - Malicious 0.0499 0.0487 0.105 -1.976 
Normal 0.0711 0.0446   
Malicious 0.0038 0.0095   
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
Normal - Malicious 0.86 23.246 -1.025 20.039 
Normal -4.12 20.905   
Malicious 11.67 24.531   
Dataset Content Average St. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Histograms representing the frequency different metrics in this dataset, as well as 
bloxplot diagrams representing the distribution of the metrics are shown in Figures 
6.29.a – 6.33.b. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.29 Deauthentication Attack - ܴܵܵܫ Short Distance Traffic: (a) Histogram, 
(b) Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.30 Deauthentication Attack - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ Short Distance Traffic: (a) 
Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.31 Deauthentication Attack - ܰܣܸ Short Distance Traffic: (a) Histogram, 
(b) Boxplot. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.32 Deauthentication Attack - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ Short Distance Traffic: (a) 
Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.33 Deauthentication Attack - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ Short Distance Traffic: (a) 
Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
6.5.2.3.2 Long Distance Datasets 
In the second experiment, a similar deauthentication attack was implemented. 
However, the testbed from which the second dataset was gathered included a 
modification in the distances between the attacker and the AP. The attacker was placed 
farther away from the AP, around 10 metres away. This modification of the position of 
the attacker will alter the metric values of the network traffic datasets. Therefore the 
main objective for this change is to evaluate how changes in the testbed topology 
might affect the performance of the proposed detection system. This dataset is 
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composed of 229 network frames in total. 72.1% of this dataset, 165 instances, is of 
non-malicious nature. The remaining 27.9%, 64 instances, is malicious information. 
The analysis of different metrics in this dataset is tabulated in Table VI.VI. 
Histograms representing the frequency different metrics in this dataset, as well as 
bloxplot diagrams representing the distribution of the metrics are shown in Figures 
6.34.a – 6.33.b. 
TABLE VI.VI.  DEAUTHENTICATION LONG DISTANCE DATASET ANALYSIS 
RESULTS 
Dataset Content Average Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ܴܵܵܫ 
Normal - Malicious -39.91 8.495 0.879 -0.976 
Normal -45.04 1.072   
Malicious -26.67 1.448   
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
Normal - Malicious 1.6943 6.0395 8.621 72.956 
Normal 1.9636 7.1028   
Malicious 1 0   
ܰܣܸ 
Normal - Malicious 111.64 150.115 0.613 -1.635 
Normal 33.15 95.656   
Malicious 314 0   
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
Normal - Malicious 0.0558 0.0484 -0.137 -1.947 
Normal 0.0761 0.0417   
Malicious 0.0035 0.0096   
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ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
Normal - Malicious 0.93 461.067 -0.035 7.625 
Normal -97.99 372.782   
Malicious 225.97 562.039   
Dataset Content Average St. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.34 Deauthentication Attack - ܴܵܵܫ Long Distance Traffic: (a) Histogram, 
(b) Boxplot. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.35 Deauthentication Attack - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ Long Distance Traffic: (a) 
Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.36 Deauthentication Attack - ܰܣܸ Long Distance Traffic: (a) Histogram, 
(b) Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.37 Deauthentication Attack - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ Long Distance Traffic: (a) 
Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 6.38 Deauthentication Attack - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ Long Distance Traffic: (a) 
Histogram, (b) Boxplot. 
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Similar to the evaluated datasets when the Airpwn attacks were launched, the 
distributions of the different histograms generated when the Deauthentication attack 
was implemented are statistically dissimilar from each other. Again, trying to generate 
a common statistical profile of normal traffic that could adapt to the distribution of all 
the considered metrics may cause numerous FP alarms. 
With the statistical results presented through this section, it has been evidenced 
that all of the metric measurements follow non-homogeneous distributions. The 
characteristic measures for each of the six used metrics are statistically dissimilar from 
each other. In addition, there are no statistical distributions that the different metrics 
values could adapt to. Therefore, trying to generate a common statistical profile of 
normal traffic that could adapt to the distribution of all the considered metrics may 
cause numerous FP alarms. Hence, for all the evaluated datasets, all the metrics should 
be analysed and treated independently. 
In order to simplify the analysis of the parameters that describe the different 
datasets, a summary is presented in Table VI.VII. Figure 6.39 represents the number 
of frames within each dataset. Figure 6.40 represents the proportion of the frames 
within each dataset. 
TABLE VI.VII.  DATASETS CHARACTERISTICS. 
Attack Type of Attack 
Number of Frames Proportion 
Normal Malicious Normal Malicious 
Normal n/a 3631 n/a 100% n/a 
Airpwn 
Attack01 1350 11 99.2% 0.8% 
Attack02 13498 995 93.1% 6.9% 
Mixture 12016 114 99.1% 0.9% 
Deauthentication 
Long 
Distance 165 64 72.1% 27.9% 
Short 
Distance 139 64 68.5% 31.5% 
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Figure 6.39 Number of Frames In Each Dataset - Bar Chart. 
 
Figure 6.40 Proportion of Frames In Each Dataset - Bar Chart. 
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6.5.3 Metric Conditions 
Previously, it was explained that anomaly IDSs require that the number of normal 
frames must be larger than the malicious frames, and the difference between metrics of 
the normal and malicious frames in the assessed datasets must be statistically 
differentiable and quantifiable. 
Regarding the first condition, the authors of [80] indicate that the number of 
normal data instances is more predominant than malicious data instances in real 
network data traffic. The analysis of the network traffic datasets in the previous 
section has proven that the generated datasets are, in fact, composed of more normal 
data instances than malicious. Therefore, the first of the condition does not entitle a 
problem for the proposed detection system. Regarding the second condition, in the 
next section, it has been also presented the results of the unpaired ݐ-test analysis 
conducted to prove that both type of metrics are statistically differentiable. This 
statistical analysis has been implemented with the statistical analysis software ‘IBM 
SPSS Statistics’ [152]. 
6.5.3.1 Unpaired ࢚-Test for Metric Analysis 
The ݐ -test is a parametric test used to determine whether the means of two 
uncorrelated data samples differ from each other [153]. Since the instances evaluated 
in this method are independent, the particular type of test is the unpaired ݐ-test. 
Two hypotheses have been defined as part of the Hypothesis Testing Framework. 
The Null hypothesis ܪ଴  assumes that the means of the normal and anomalous 
instances of the metrics to be analysed are not statistically differentiable. On the other 
hand, the Alternative hypothesis ܪ஺  assumes that the means of both instances are 
statistically differentiable between each other. The significance level considered in the 
following analyses is 5%, which is the default value for the ݐ -test in IBM SPSS 
Statistics. The results of the unpaired ݐ-test for each metric and each dataset have been 
tabulated in the following tables. 
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The first dataset to be analysed is the Airpwn ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 dataset. The results of 
this analysis are presented in the Table VI.VIII. For most of the metrics (ܴܵܵܫ, ܶܶܮ, 
ܰܣܸ  and ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ ) there exist evidence of a difference between the instances of 
malicious and non-malicious nature. The significance level (݌ = 0) is lower than 5%. 
Hence, these four metrics can provide evidence of distinction between both types of 
information, for this dataset. However, the significance level for the metrics ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
(݌ = 0.104) and ߂ܶ݅݉݁ (݌ = 0.095) are both higher than 5%. Hence, these two metrics 
cannot provide evidences of distinction between both types of information, for this 
dataset. 
TABLE VI.VIII.  AIRPWN DATASET - ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 - ݐ-TEST ANALYSIS 
 ݐ-test for Equality of Means 
Metrics Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Inter. of the Diff. 
Lower Upper 
ܴܵܵܫ 0.000 െ13.371 െ14.373 െ12.368 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 0.104 10.286 െ2.121 22.692 
ܶܶܮ 0.000 െ234.323 െ265.327 െ203.319 
ܰܣܸ 0.000 െ305.461 െ315.761 െ295.161 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 0.000 െ2541.429 െ2708.227 െ2374.63 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 0.095 0.0065 െ0.0011 0.0141 
 
The next dataset to be analysed is the Airpwn ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 dataset. The results of 
this analysis are presented in the Table VI.IX. For this dataset there exists evidence of 
a statistical difference between the instances of malicious and non-malicious nature, 
for all the metrics. The significance level (݌ = 0) is lower than 5%. Hence, the six 
metrics can provide evidences of distinction between both types of information, for 
this dataset. 
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TABLE VI.IX.  AIRPWN DATASET - ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 - ݐ-TEST ANALYSIS 
 ݐ-test for Equality of Means 
Metrics Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Inter. of the Diff. 
Lower Upper 
ܴܵܵܫ 0.000 െ9.547 െ9.667 െ9.427 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 0.000 47.63 46.638 48.623 
ܶܶܮ 0.000 െ195.149 െ198.111 െ192.187 
ܰܣܸ 0.000 െ274.446 െ275.27 െ273.622 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 0.000 132.534 106.194 158.874 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 0.000 െ0.0057 െ0.0063 െ0.0051 
The results of the unpaired ݐ-test analysis for the Airpwn ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ dataset 
are presented in Table VI.X. Again, there exists evidence of a statistical difference 
between the instances of malicious and non-malicious nature, for all the metrics. The 
significance level (which is ݌  = 0) is lower than 5%. Hence, the six metrics can 
provide evidences of distinction between both types of information, for this dataset. 
TABLE VI.X. AIRPWN DATASET - ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ - ݐ-TEST ANALYSIS 
 ݐ-test for Equality of Means 
Metrics Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Inter. of the Diff. 
Lower Upper 
ܴܵܵܫ 0.000 െ10.68 െ11.122 െ10.239 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 0.000 46.624 43.461 49.788 
ܶܶܮ 0.000 െ194.069 െ203.539 െ184.598 
ܰܣܸ 0.000 െ275.284 െ277.91 െ272.658 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 0.000 577.143 549.531 604.755 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 0.000 െ0.0045 െ0.0058 െ0.0032 
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The results of the unpaired ݐ-test analysis for the Deauthentication Short Distance 
dataset are presented in Table VI.XI. For most of the metrics (ܴܵܵܫ, ܰܣܸ, ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ and 
߂ܶ݅݉݁) there exists evidence of a difference between the instances of malicious and 
non-malicious nature. The significance level (݌ = 0) is lower than 5%. Hence, these 
four metrics can provide evidences of distinction between both types of information, 
for this dataset. However, the significance level for the metric ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ (݌ = 0.238) is 
higher than 5%. Hence, this metric cannot provide evidences of distinction between 
both types of information, for this dataset. 
TABLE VI.XI.  DEAUTHENTICATION DATASET - SHORT DISTANCE - ݐ-TEST 
ANALYSIS 
 ݐ-test for Equality of Means 
Metrics Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Inter. of the Diff. 
Lower Upper 
ܴܵܵܫ 0.000 െ17.034 െ18.993 െ15.075 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 0.238 1.144 െ0.764 3.052 
ܰܣܸ 0.000 െ270.129 െ296.801 െ243.458 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 0.000 െ15.794 െ22.379 െ9.21 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 0.000 0.0674 0.0562 0.0785 
 
Finally, the results of the unpaired ݐ-test analysis for the Deauthentication Long 
Distance dataset are presented in Table VI.XII. Again, for the four metrics ܴܵܵܫ , 
ܰܣܸ, ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ and ߂ܶ݅݉݁ there exists evidence of a difference between the instances 
of malicious and non-malicious nature. The significance level (݌ = 0) is lower than 
5%. Hence, these four metrics can provide evidences of distinction between both types 
of information, for this dataset. However, the significance level for the metric ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
( ݌  = 0.28) is higher than 5%. Hence, this metric cannot provide evidences of 
distinction between both types of information, for this dataset. 
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TABLE VI.XII.  DEAUTHENTICATION DATASET - LONG DISTANCE - ݐ-TEST 
ANALYSIS 
 ݐ-test for Equality of Means 
Metrics Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Inter. of the Diff. 
Lower Upper 
ܴܵܵܫ 0.000 െ18.371 െ18.946 െ17.795 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 0.28 0.964 െ0.788 2.715 
ܰܣܸ 0.000 െ280.848 െ304.441 െ257.256 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 0.000 െ353.963 െ479.801 െ228.124 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 0.000 0.0725 0.0621 0.0829 
 
All the results presented in this section assure the two conditions described as 
necessary for the proposed methodology to be effective. 
6.5.4 Feature Selection 
Feature Selection is a widely used concept among the intrusion detection, machine 
learning and data mining systems, which refers to a group of techniques able to reduce 
the number of metrics in a given dataset to the minimum and optimise the selection 
process of the most relevant set of metric [92]. Optimising the selection of network 
traffic metrics has also a significant impact on the performance and speed of the IDSs 
[91] [142]. Analysing datasets containing irrelevant and redundant information may 
slow the intrusion detection process down [130]. In [142], the authors practically 
showcases that the utilisation of feature selection techniques contributes to improve 
overall accuracy of their system, reducing the number of false alarms and improving 
the DR. Ideally, all IDSs should implement feature selection as part of their 
framework to improve the attack detection accuracy. 
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Irrelevant and redundant metrics introduce inappropriate information in the 
training or analysis dataset, degrading the accuracy of the intrusion detector [9]. These 
metrics will cause what is known as ‘curse of dimensionality’ [48]. When 
implementing feature selection techniques, IDSs should have the precautions not to 
unintentionally delete more metrics than should be deleted. In that case, relevant 
metrics could be removed and the IDS may end up misclassifying attacks. IDSs need 
to verify that results with similar accuracy are produced using both the complete and 
the preprocessed dataset. 
The implementation of automatic feature selection techniques for unsupervised 
IDSs is still a great challenge for researchers in intrusion detection [54], especially if 
the IDSs perform the detection in real time. It requires a period of time to be executed. 
The larger the number of metrics in the dataset, the longer the required time. An IDS 
that preforms attack detection in real time may not be able to afford too much time on 
this preprocessing procedure. 
6.5.4.1 Curse of Dimensionality 
The term curse of dimensionality refers to the degrading effect that the utilisation of an 
excessive number of metrics causes to the results of data analysis, intrusion detection, 
machine learning and data mining systems. Curse of dimensionality is caused by the 
utilisation of datasets containing irrelevant and redundant information. 
One of the main characteristics for an IDS to produce accurate detection results is 
to have enough network traffic metrics to analyse [48]. IDSs rely on the relevance of 
the evidences provided by these metrics to produce accurate intrusion detection 
results. But having an excessive number of metrics could be more prejudicial for the 
results than having too few metrics to analyse. For instance, in [9], the author presents 
the results of implementing K-means clustering on a given dataset. The results that this 
work presents show that selecting 8 specific metrics out of all the available metrics 
produce the best intrusion detection results. The use of this set of 8 metrics maximises 
the accuracy of the detection systems. The author of this work assessed the results that 
would be obtained if more metrics were utilised. The results show that increasing the 
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number of metrics up to 19 metrics produces a drop of 17% in the detection accuracy. 
This deterioration of the results is the direct consequence of the curse of 
dimensionality. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has described several aspects regarding the IEEE 802.11 network traffic 
datasets used in this thesis. Firstly, this chapter addresses the decision of whether 
utilise publicly available network datasets, dataset generated using network simulation 
software, or utilise network traffic datasets gathered from a live operational network. 
The experiments in this thesis have been implemented with network traffic datasets 
gathered from a live operational IEEE 802.11 network. Using network traffic datasets 
from this network to evaluate the proposed IDS provides a series of advantages. The 
dataset would contain more realistic parameters than a synthetically generated dataset. 
This datasets would commonly require being processed to clean it and make it suitable 
for the detection process. As part of the preprocessing process, this chapter has 
explained the filtering procedure used to remove the unnecessary information gathered 
adjacent wireless networks, and helps to reduce the total amount of information that 
the detection system needs to analyse. The network traffic is filtered out using MAC 
address of the AP and the wireless client. 
This chapter has also presented an extensive description of the different metrics 
that have been considered for this thesis. Six metrics have been experimentally 
selected as the most appropriate for detecting the attacks, after the evaluation of all the 
available metrics. The selection of the metrics plays an important role in the 
generation of accurate intrusion detection results. As it has been explained in this 
chapter, the number of the metrics is also an important to be considered. An example 
has been practically described that shows the problem with D-S using a large number 
of metrics. The influence of the belief in Uncertainty follows a decreasing trend, as 
more metrics are fused. 
The chapter has also presented the statistical description of all the used metrics in 
all the datasets, along with a discussion of whether these metrics are appropriate for 
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the detection of wireless-specific attacks. This analysis proves that the number of 
normal data instances is more predominant than malicious data instances in the 
analysed network traffic datasets. On the other hand, this analysis also statistically 
proves that the metrics can provide distinction between both normal and malicious 
frames. These are the two conditions that need to be met for the anomaly IDSs to be 
accurate. In addition, the statistical distribution of each metric is dissimilar from each 
other. Generating a common statistical profile of normal traffic that could adapt to the 
distribution of all the considered metrics would not be feasible. 
Lastly, the chapter concludes with a brief description of the concept of feature 
selection and the general need for this approach, as well as the description of the 
concept of curse of dimensionality. 
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Chapter 7  
Results Evaluation 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the unsupervised anomaly based IDS 
framework presented in this thesis. The approach followed in this chapter to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the detection system is to compare the detection 
results generated using the multi-layer approach (i.e. when all the considered metrics 
are used) against the same methodology utilising different sets of metrics. The purpose 
is to verify whether the combined use of all the selected metrics outperforms the same 
methodology, utilising other combinations with fewer number of metrics. For the 
Normal and Airpwn datasets (i.e. Attack01, Attack02 and Mixed Attack), there exist 
2଺ െ 1 different metrics combinations, whereas for the deauthentication datasets (i.e. 
Long Distance and Short Distance), there exist 2ହ െ 1 different metrics combinations. 
The results are used to prove different aspects of the IDS proposed in this thesis. It 
is important that the detection system should be able to provide very high or even 
perfect detection capabilities. Hence, one of the aims of this results evaluation is to 
prove that the proposed IDS is accurate providing extra level of protection to wireless 
networks. Also, it is important to prove the effectiveness of the proposed system 
against different type of attacks, as well as to find the methodology that best results 
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generates (i.e. mean or mode, and distance or angle). The application of one 
mechanism or the other may directly affect the final results of the proposed detection 
system. Therefore, a fundamental part of the evaluation experiments is to assess the 
performance of the system using each of the configurations. Another aspect to be 
evaluated is the sliding window length that generates the best detection results. In 
addition, it is important to verify whether or not the proposed methodology is capable 
of being implemented in real time, and to estimate the maximum number of malicious 
frames that could be included within the initial sliding window before the accuracy of 
the detection results deteriorate. 
This chapter will present a thorough description of the generated results, for all 
the considered datasets and all the possible metric combinations. Using these results, 
this chapter will address all the points previously described. Nonetheless, before 
presenting the experiments results, this chapter introduces the evaluation functions 
used to examine these results. 
7.2 Statistical Evaluation Parameters 
The efficiency of IDSs could be evaluated using multiple parameters, such as the 
amount of resources (CPU, Memory, etc.) the system consumes, or the required time 
to conduct the detection. Nonetheless, the most important aspect to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed intrusion detection methodology is its ability to make 
correct predictions [58]. This is achieved using a series of evaluation functions over 
the generated system outcome. These evaluation functions have been widely used 
among the researching community in the field of IDSs. Before listing the functions, it 
is also necessary to define four evaluation parameters utilised in the functions. These 
parameters provide quantifiable evidence of how effective are the IDSs at making 
correct detections. These are: 
 True Positive (ܶܲ) refers to one attack frame that has been correctly classified as 
malicious. 
 True Negative (ܶܰ ) refers to one non-attack frame that has been correctly 
classified as legal frame. 
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 False Positive (ܨܲ) refers to one non-attack frame that has been misclassified as 
malicious. 
 False Negative (ܨܰ) refers to one attack frame that has been misclassified as legal 
frame. 
These parameters provide quantifiable evidence of how effective are the IDSs at 
making correct detections. All these parameters are utilised to calculate the following 
evaluation functions; Equations 7.1 – 7.6: 
 Detection Rate (ܦܴ ) is the proportion of attack frames correctly classified as 
malicious, among all the attack frames. 
ܦܴ	ሺ%ሻ ൌ ܶܲܨܰ ൅ ܶܲ																																																		ሺ7.1ሻ 
 
 False Positive Rate (ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘) is the proportion of non-attack frames misclassified as 
malicious, among all the evaluated frames. 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘	ሺ%ሻ ൌ ܨܲܶܲ ൅ ܨܲ ൅ ܶܰ ൅ ܨܰ																																			ሺ7.2ሻ 
 
 False Negative Rate (ܨ ோܰ௔௧௘) is the proportion of attack frames misclassified as 
legal, among all the attack frames. 
ܨ ோܰ௔௧௘	ሺ%ሻ ൌ ܨܰܶܲ ൅ ܨܰ																																															ሺ7.3ሻ 
 
 Overall Success Rate (ܱܴܵ) or ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ is the proportion of the total number of 
frames correctly classified, among all the evaluated frames. 
ܱܴܵ	ሺ%ሻ ൌ ܶܰ ൅ ܶܲܶܲ ൅ ܨܲ ൅ ܶܰ ൅ ܨܰ																																						ሺ7.4ሻ 
 
 ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊  or ܴ݈݈݁ܿܽ  is the proportion of attack frames correctly classified as 
malicious, among all the alarms generated. 
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ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊	ሺ%ሻ ൌ ܶܲܶܲ ൅ ܨܲ																																											ሺ7.5ሻ 
 
 ܨ– ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ or ܨ–ܯ݁ܽݏݑݎ݁ is a tradeoff between Precision and DR. The ܨ– ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ 
produces a high result when ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ and DR are both balanced [14] [97]. The 
higher the ܨ– ܵܿ݋ݎ݁, the better the ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ and the DR. 
ܨ– ܵܿ݋ݎ݁	ሺ%ሻ ൌ 2 ∗ ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ∗ ܦܴܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ൅ ܦܴ 																																			ሺ7.6ሻ 
 
The most important action for the IDSs is to generate the maximum number of 
ܦܴ and not generating any false alarm. Generating either ܨܰ or ܨܲ is not desirable. 
Both situations show decrease of the effectiveness of an IDS detecting intrusions. 
However, cost of generating ܨܰݏ is often higher than the cost of ܨܲݏ [80]. An IDS 
that generates too many ܨܲݏ works against legitimate communications. However, the 
protected system is not actually compromised by any threat. The administrator of the 
IDS might ignore the raised attack alerts [78]. On the other hand, every single ܨܰ is 
an attack that has gone undetected and reached the protected system. 
7.3 Results Evaluation 
This section describes the experiment results generated by the unsupervised anomaly 
based IDS framework presented in this thesis. The principal objective of the described 
experiments is to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms. There are a 
series of additional points that have been also evaluated and verified through the 
implementation of these experiments. 
One of these points is to compare the detection results generated using the multi-
layer approach (i.e. when all the considered metrics are used) against the same 
methodology utilising different sets of metrics. The purpose is to verify whether the 
combined use of all the selected metrics outperforms the same methodology, utilising 
other combinations with fewer number of metrics. 
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It is necessarily to evaluate the results that the proposed methodology produces, 
using all the possible combinations of metrics. For the Normal and Airpwn datasets 
(i.e. Attack01, Attack02 and Mixed Attack) there exist 2଺ െ 1  possible metric 
combinations, since six different metrics have been selected. Therefore, to evaluate the 
results of the proposed methodology, the same wireless network dataset is evaluated 
63 times. For the deauthentication datasets (i.e. Long Distance and Short Distance) 
there exist 2ହ െ 1 possible metric combinations, since five different metrics have been 
selected. Therefore, the same wireless network dataset is evaluated 31 times. 
Another point that needs to be addressed is to find the sliding window length that 
generates the best detection results. The same dataset has been evaluated multiple 
times varying the length of the sliding window. In the case of Airpwn attack, the 
length value has been gradually increased from one slot to a length of 200 slots, 
ሾ1 ൑ ݊ ൑ 200ሿ. In the case of the deauthentication attack, the length value increased 
only up to 135 slots, ሾ1 ൑ ݊ ൑ 135ሿ. This is because the number of instances in both 
datasets, Deauthentication Long Distance and Deauthentication Short Distance, is too 
small. Using ݊ ൌ 200 would not allow the sliding window to slide. For each of the 
different values of the sliding window length, the same evaluation parameters are 
calculated evaluating the same dataset. 
Another objective of the experiments presented in this section is to verify whether 
or not the proposed methodology is capable of being implemented in real time. A 
challenging requirement of the intrusion detection mechanism proposed in this thesis 
is to operate in a per-frame basis. As already mentioned in Chapter 5, the length value 
of the sliding window has a direct impact on the required time to implement the 
detection. Therefore, in order to prove that the system can operate in real time, the 
time required to assess each captured frame has been calculated. 
In addition, the results of the experiments that use the automatic BPAs 
methodologies have been used also to evaluate the maximum number of malicious 
frames that could be included within the initial sliding window before the accuracy of 
the detection results were affected. An attacker could alter the first statistical reference 
of normality if an attack were launched before the initial sliding window is completed 
  
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS EVALUATION 
181
with captured frames. In that case, the characteristics of the malicious frames would 
dominate the sliding window and the detection system would classify normal traffic as 
malicious. This vulnerability makes it necessarily to assess the percentage of malicious 
frames that could be included within the initial sliding window, in correlation with the 
sliding window length, before the accuracy of the detection results were affected. 
Also, it is important to find the methodology that generates the best detection 
results. As have been explained in Chapter 5, there are four possible system 
configurations that could be implemented to assign belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇. One of these 
configurations uses the Euclidean distance of the current frame from the current 
reference of normality. The modified configuration uses the angle generated by the 
Euclidean distance and frequency of the data. The application of one mechanism or the 
other may directly affect the final results of the proposed detection system. Therefore, 
a fundamental part of the evaluation experiments presented is to assess the 
performance of the system using each of the configurations. Another parameter that 
needs to be evaluated through the implementation of the following experiments is the 
reference of normality. It is necessarily to assess whether the mechanism to determine 
the reference of normality is adequate or not to provide efficient results. Two simple 
statistical parameters (i.e. mean or mode) have been used to define this reference. 
7.3.1 Deauthentication Attack Experiment Results 
One of the implemented attacks is the deauthentication attack. The detection was 
possible only using management and control frames, and data frames information from 
the two lower layers of the protocol stack. Firstly, because the network was encrypted 
with WPA2, and with the assumption that the monitor node does not have the key, it 
was not possible or necessary to retrieve information above the MAC layer. 
Two sets of experiments, using the same attack have been implemented. In a first 
experiment (Long Distance), the attacker is placed 10 metres away from the victim. In 
the second experiment (Short Distance) the attacker is placed 1.5 metres away from 
the victim. The experiment results presented in this section assess the effect of changes 
in the proximity of the attacker from the victim on the final results. The testbed for the 
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detection of the deauthentication attack is the generic testbed described in Chapter 6. 
All the devices are located in a stationary geographical location. Since five metrics 
have been selected, the same wireless network dataset has been evaluated 31 times. 
7.3.1.1 Deauthentication Attack Results – Long Distance 
The multi-layer results for the deauthentication Long Distance dataset, using the five 
considered metrics for the four assessed system configurations, are presented in Figure 
7.1. The figure represents the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results, modifying the length value of the sliding 
window. In the figure, the Y-axis of the graph represents the percentage of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. 
The X-axis of the graph represents the length value of the sliding window. 
All the configurations provide completely perfect detection for any sliding 
window length larger than 3 slots. 100% of ܦܴ is constantly achieved for 3 ൑ 	݊. In 
terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘, the detection system using the mean as reference of normality and 
Euclidean distance, distance-mean, always generates results lower than 2% for any 
sliding window length larger than 3 slots, 11 ൑ ݊. After the sliding window reaches 
31 slots long, 31 ൑ ݊, the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ is constantly reduced to 0.87%, and for 79 ൑ 	݊ the 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  is constantly reduced to 0.43%. Using the configuration angle-mean, the 
detection ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results are slightly higher than the previous case. Only after the 
sliding window length reaches 81 slots long, 81 ൑ ݊, the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ is constantly reduced 
to 0.43%. The ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results for the distance-mode and angle-mode outperform the 
results of both, distance-mean and angle-mean for any length value of the sliding 
window. The percentage of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ does not reach 1.75% for any ݊ value. Also, the 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ is constantly reduced to 0.43% in both configurations for 79 ൑ ݊. 
As a method to compare the four different assessed configurations, Table VII.I 
shows the results for each of the four configurations when the length value of the 
sliding window is ݊ ൌ 29 . The results show that the distance-mode configuration 
produces the best results overall for this dataset. Nonetheless, the difference with the 
other three methodology configuration variations is very small, almost unnoticeable. 
The value of the sliding window length that best results produces is 68 ൑ ݊. However, 
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selecting a sliding window length ݊ ൌ 29 can be considered a good option, because 
the results 100% ܦܴ and 0.87% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ can be considered an acceptable result. 
TABLE VII.I.  DEAUTHENTICATION LONG DISTANCE - 5 METRICS RESULTS - 29 SLOTS 
Configuration ܦܴ ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ ܨ ோܰ௔௧௘ ܱܴܵ ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ܨܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ܶ݅݉݁	ሺμݏ݁ܿሻ
Distance // 
Mean 100 0.87 0 0.99 0.969 0.98 25 
Distance // 
Mode 100 0.87 0 0.99 0.969 0.98 20 
Angle//Mean 100 1.74 0 0.98 0.941 0.97 17 
Angle//Mode 100 1.3 0 0.98 0.955 0.98 27 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the average processing time required to provide a final decision 
for each frame. The four assessed configurations require almost the same processing 
time. For ݊ ൌ 29, the average processing time is between 17µsec and 27µsec, being 
20µsec for the distance-mode configuration. For ݊ ൌ 68, the average processing time 
would increase to 76µsec. This average processing time represents the time from the 
moment a frame is captured to the moment a final decision is reached. Since the 
average interarrival time between two consecutive frames is 55msec, the intrusion 
detection can be implemented in real time. 
Figures 7.3 – 7.6 represent the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results of any possible combination of four 
metrics when the system uses the methodology configurations distance-mean, 
distance-mode, angle-mean and angle-mode, respectively. The only set of 4 metrics 
that outperforms the combination of all the considered metrics is ܴܵܵܫ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ
ܰܣܸ െ ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ (No ߂ܶ݅݉݁). The ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ is slightly lower than for the combination of 
5 metrics. The detection results in terms of ܦܴ are not shown in this graph but these 
are always 100% for any case when 12 ൑ ݊. 
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Figure 7.1 Deauthentication Long Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ Results Comparison. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Deauthentication Long Distance - Per Frame Detection Analysis 
Processing Time. 
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Figure 7.3 Deauthentication Long Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 4 Metrics - Distance & Mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Deauthentication Long Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 4 Metrics - Angle & Mean. 
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Figure 7.5 Deauthentication Long Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 4 Metrics - Distance & Mode. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Deauthentication Long Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 4 Metrics - Angle & Mode. 
Figure 7.7 represents a close comparison of the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results for the 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 −𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ − 𝑁𝐴𝑉 − 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"# combination. The 𝐷𝑅 results are not represented because 
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they are similar to the case of the 5 metrics. For 3 ≤ 𝑛, the system produces 100% 𝐷𝑅. 
The detection system does not generate 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results higher than 1.75% for any 𝑛 
value. This shows an increase in the effectiveness of the 5 metrics results. The 
configuration distance-mode produces again the best result overall. Specifically, the 
system generates 0.43% 𝐹𝑃!"#$when the sliding window is [26 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 53], and for 54 ≤ 𝑛, the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ result is 0%. For this particular sliding window length, the average 
processing time to produce perfect detection is 71µsec as shown in Figure 7.8. 
 
Figure 7.7 Deauthentication Long Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ Results Comparison -       
4 Metrics - 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ 𝑁𝐴𝑉 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"#. 
Table VII.II shows a comparison of the evaluation results for the metric 
combination 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 − 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ − 𝑁𝐴𝑉 − 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"#. The top four rows of the table show 
the results when 𝑛 = 29. This is the length of the sliding window for which the 
system, using all the considered metrics, produced the best results. The bottom four 
rows of the table show the results when 𝑛 = 54, which produces the best results for 
the metrics combination 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 − 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ − 𝑁𝐴𝑉 − 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"# . The presented results 
prove that not including 𝛥𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  improves the final intrusion detection results. 
However, the length of the sliding window needs to be almost doubled to be able to 
produce these results, which also increases the probability to include malicious frames 
in the initial sliding window. 
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Figure 7.8 Deauthentication Long Distance - 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ 𝑁𝐴𝑉 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"# -  
 4 Metrics - Per Frame Detection Analysis Processing Time. 
 
TABLE VII.II.  DEAUTHENTICATION LONG DISTANCE RESULTS -   
        4 METRICS 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$  𝑁𝐴𝑉 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"#  - 29 // 54 SLOTS. 
Configuration 𝐷𝑅 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 𝐹𝑁!"#$ 𝑂𝑆𝑅 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒   µμ𝑠𝑒𝑐  
Distance // 
Mean 100 0.87 0 0.99 0.969 0.98 21 
Distance // 
Mode 100 0.43 0 0.99 0.984 0.99 20 
Angle // Mean 100 0.87 0 0.99 0.969 0.98 18 
Angle // Mode 100 0.87 0 0.99 0.969 0.98 20 
Distance // 
Mean 100 0.43 0 0.99 0.984 0.99 45 
Distance // 
Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 71 
Angle // Mean 100 0.43 0 0.99 0.984 0.99 54 
Angle // Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 48 
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Figures 7.9 and 7.10 show the 	ܦܴ  and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results for the configuration 
distance-mean using all the possible combination of metrics, when the sliding window 
length is ݊ ൌ 29  and ݊ ൌ 54 , respectively. In order to record all the possible 
combination of metrics for the experiments with the deauthentication attack, the 
different metric combinations have been categorised in the indexes represented in 
Table VII.III. The index D1 referrers to the set that combines all the considered 
metrics, and the index D31 referrers to a single metric set. Therefore, the best results 
are to be expected from the test index D1. The Y-axis of the graphs represents the 
percentage of ܦܴ and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. The X-axis of the graphs represents the indexes shown 
in the table, which correspond to the different metric combinations. 
TABLE VII.III.  INDEXES OF THE USED METRICS IN DEAUTHENTICATION 
ATTACK. 
Index-Metrics Index-Metrics Index-Metrics Index-Metrics 
D1 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D9 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D17 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
D25 - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
- ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D2 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
D10 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
D18 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
D26 - ܰܣܸ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D3 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D11 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ D19 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܰܣܸ D27 - ܴܵܵܫ 
D4 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D12 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܰܣܸ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D20 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ D28 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
D5 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D13 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
D21 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ D29 - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
D6 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D14 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D22 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ D30 - ܰܣܸ 
D7 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
D15 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - ܰܣܸ 
- ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D23 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ D31 - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D8 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ 
D16 - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
- ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
D24 - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ  
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In Figures 7.9 and 7.10, using the distance-mean configuration there are a number 
of combinations that generate extremely poor 𝐷𝑅 results, reaching 𝐷𝑅 0% in some 
cases. These metric combinations are D7, D11, D14, D16, D18, D21, D24, D25, and 
D29. One metric that is present in all the mentioned metric combinations is the 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$. This is the effect of the curse of dimensionality, because the frames are 
constantly transmitted at a fixed 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ of 1Mbps by the client and the attacker. This 
fact makes the 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ an irrelevant metric for the intrusion detection process. 
 
Figure 7.9 Deauthentication Long Distance - 29 Slots - Distance & Mean. 
 
Figure 7.10 Deauthentication Long Distance - 54 Slots - Distance & Mean. 
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR Precision F9Score Processing+Time+(msec)
D1 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,969 0,98 0,025
D2 100 5,22 0 0,94 0,842 0,91 0,018
D3 100 1,74 0 0,98 0,941 0,97 0,017
D4 100 3,91 0 0,96 0,876 0,93 0,016
D5 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,969 0,98 0,021
D6 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,914 0,96 0,016
D7 3,12 1,74 96,87 0,71 0,33 0,06 0,017
D8 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,761 0,86 0,025
D9 100 10 0 0,9 0,735 0,85 0,017
D10 100 1,3 0 0,98 0,955 0,98 0,016
D11 1,56 0 98,44 0,72 1 0,03 0,024
D12 100 1,3 0 0,98 0,955 0,98 0,019
D13 98,44 8,7 1,56 0,9 0,759 0,86 0,027
D14 0 2,17 100 0,7 0 0 0,018
D15 100 11,74 0 0,88 0,703 0,83 0,022
D16 1,56 0,43 98,44 0,72 0,5 0,03 0,019
D17 100 17,39 0 0,82 0,615 0,76 0,015
D18 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,018
D19 100 5,65 0 0,94 0,831 0,91 0,022
D20 100 4,78 0 0,95 0,853 0,92 0,018
D21 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,018
D22 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,761 0,86 0,025
D23 100 11,3 0 0,88 0,711 0,83 0,016
D24 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,017
D25 0 0 100 0,72 0 0 0,018
D26 100 3,04 0 0,97 0,901 0,95 0,018
D27 100 17,39 0 0,82 0,615 0,76 0,025
D28 100 23,48 0 0,76 0,542 0,7 0,017
D29 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,023
D30 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,761 0,86 0,016
D31 100 6,52 0 0,93 0,81 0,9 0,017
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR Precision F9Score Processing+Time+(msec)
D1 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,969 0,98 0,044
D2 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,927 0,96 0,046
D3 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,969 0,98 0,062
D4 100 3,04 0 0,97 0,901 0,95 0,059
D5 100 0,43 0 0,99 0,984 0,99 0,045
D6 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,914 0,96 0,044
D7 1,56 1,3 98,44 0,71 0,25 0,03 0,043
D8 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,761 0,86 0,042
D9 100 6,52 0 0,93 0,81 0,9 0,042
D10 100 1,3 0 0,98 0,955 0,98 0,043
D11 1,56 0 98,44 0,72 1 0,03 0,044
D12 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,969 0,98 0,043
D13 98,44 8,7 1,56 0,9 0,759 0,86 0,042
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DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
D14 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,044
D15 100 10,87 0 0,89 0,719 0,84 0,064
D16 1,56 0,43 98,44 0,72 0,5 0,03 0,044
D17 100 14,35 0 0,85 0,659 0,8 0,04
D18 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,043
D19 100 6,09 0 0,93 0,802 0,9 0,042
D20 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,914 0,96 0,041
D21 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,042
D22 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,761 0,86 0,044
D23 100 12,17 0 0,87 0,695 0,82 0,04
D24 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,044
D25 0 0 100 0,72 0 0 0,044
D26 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,927 0,96 0,042
D27 100 9,13 0 0,9 0,752 0,86 0,045
D28 100 17,83 0 0,82 0,609 0,76 0,042
D29 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0 0,061
D30 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,761 0,86 0,043
D31 100 6,09 0 0,93 0,82 0,9 0,043
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Comparing both figures helps to understand the effect that increasing the length of 
the sliding window produces on the detection results. In terms of ܦܴ, the results for 
݊ ൌ 29  and ݊ ൌ 54  remain are similar. In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ , there are 13 metric 
combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, in the case of ݊ ൌ 29. Six 
out of these 13 metric combinations (D9, D15, D17, D23, D27, and D28) produce 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results higher than 10%. In the case of ݊ ൌ 54 , there are 12 metric 
combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5% and only 4 of these 12 metric 
combinations (D15, D17, D23, and D28) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 10%. In 
general, 15 metric combinations reduce the number of ܨܲ alarms, and only 2 cases are 
increased. These results show that increasing the length value of the sliding window 
reduces the number of ܨܲ alarms. 
The ܦܴ  and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results for the configuration angle-mean, using ݊ ൌ 29 and 
݊ ൌ 54, are presented in Figures 7.11 and 7.12. In the case of ݊ ൌ 29, the utilisation 
of angle-mean makes D7 and D14 generate 100% ܦܴ, as a difference to the distance-
mean configuration that the ܦܴ results for the two metric combinations were 3.12% 
and 0%, respectively. Similarly, increasing the length value of the sliding window 
reduces the number of ܨܲ  alarms. In the case of ݊ ൌ 29 , there are 14 metric 
combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, and 5 out of these 14 metric 
combinations produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 10%. These are D9, D15, D17, D27, 
and D28. In the case of ݊ ൌ 54, there are 13 metric combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
results higher than 5%, and only 5 out of these 13 metrics combinations produce 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 10%. These are D9, D15, D17, D23, and D28. Although the 
difference is not very large, 16 metric combinations reduce the number of ܨܲ alarms, 
and only 3 cases are increased. Again, increasing ݊ reduces the number of ܨܲ alarms. 
Comparing both configurations, the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results for both sliding window length 
are substantially increased using the distance-mean configuration. Using angle-mean, 
three particular metric combinations clearly exceed a 35% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘,  when ݊ ൌ 29 . 
These are (D17) ܴܵܵܫ െ ߂ܶ݅݉݁, (D27) ܴܵܵܫ, and (D28) ߂ܶ݅݉݁. When ݊ ൌ 54, there 
are also three particular metric combinations that produce a drastic increase of ܨܲ 
alarms. However, in this case, the metric combinations are (D17) ܴܵܵܫ െ ߂ܶ݅݉݁ , 
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(D23) 𝛥𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"#, and (D28) 𝛥𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒. Eventually, the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ result of D27 is 
reduced to 9.13%. Hence, the presented 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results indicate that angle, instead of 
distance, increases the number of 𝐹𝑃 alarms for some combination of metrics with low 
number of metrics. 
 
Figure 7.11 Deauthentication Long Distance - 29 Slots - Angle & Mean. 
 
Figure 7.12 Deauthentication Long Distance - 54 Slots - Angle & Mean. 
Figures 7.13 and Figure 7.14 show the 𝐷𝑅 and 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results for the distance-
mode configuration, when the sliding window length is 𝑛 = 29  and 𝑛 = 54 , 
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR Precision F9Score Processing+Time+(msec)
D1 100 1,74 0 0,98 0,97 0,017
D2 100 5,22 0 0,94 0,91 0,018
D3 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,022
D4 100 6,52 0 0,93 0,9 0,017
D5 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,98 0,018
D6 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,96 0,019
D7 100 3,04 0,97 0,95 0,017
D8 100 9,13 0 0,9 0,86 0,017
D9 100 14,78 0 0,85 0,79 0,017
D10 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D11 1,56 0 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,018
D12 100 1,74 0 0,98 0,97 0,017
D13 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,019
D14 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,96 0,018
D15 100 13,04 0 0,87 0,81 0,016
D16 1,56 0,43 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,019
D17 100 48,26 0 0,51 0,54 0,016
D18 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,018
D19 100 7,83 0 0,92 0,88 0,017
D20 100 4,78 0 0,95 0,92 0,017
D21 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,018
D22 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,019
D23 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,019
D24 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,017
D25 0 0 100 0,72 0 0,017
D26 100 4,78 0 0,95 0,92 0,017
D27 100 39,57 0 0,6 0,58 0,018
D28 100 70 0 0,3 0,44 0,015
D29 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,019
D30 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,032
D31 100 6,52 0 0,93 0,9 0,023
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR Precision F9Score Processing+Time+(msec)
D1 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,98 0,043
D2 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,042
D3 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,98 0,043
D4 100 5,22 0 0,94 0,91 0,042
D5 100 0,43 0 0,99 0,99 0,054
D6 100 3,48 0 0,96 0,94 0,067
D7 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,043
D8 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,041
D9 100 13,04 0 0,87 0,81 0,041
D10 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,043
D11 1,56 0 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,044
D12 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,044
D13 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,043
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Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Long+Distance+2+Angle/Mean+2+SW+29+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
D14 1,56 1,74 98,44 0,7 0,03 0,043
D15 100 11,74 0 0,88 0,83 0,04
D16 1,56 0,43 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,044
D17 100 28,7 0 0,71 0,66 0,043
D18 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,045
D19 100 6,52 0 0,93 0,9 0,045
D20 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,96 0,045
D21 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,044
D22 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,05
D23 100 40,87 0 0,59 0,58 0,017
D24 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,043
D25 0 0 100 0,72 0 0,043
D26 100 4,78 0 0,95 0,92 0,042
D27 100 9,13 0 0,9 0,86 0,043
D28 100 69,13 0 0,3 0,45 0,04
D29 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,043
D30 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,041
D31 100 6,09 0 0,93 0,9 0,041
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Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Long+Distance+2+Angle/Mean+2+SW+54+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
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respectively. Similar to what occurs with the distance-mean configuration, the metric 
combinations D7, D11, D14, D16, D18, D21, D24, D25, and D29 generate extremely 
poor ܦܴ results, generating 0% of ܦܴ in some cases; direct consequence of curse of 
dimensionality when using the ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘. In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results, there are 12 metric 
combinations that produce results higher than 5%, in the case of ݊ ൌ 29. Four out of 
these 12 metric combinations (D15, D23, D27, and D28) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results 
higher than 10%. In the case of ݊ ൌ 54, there are 11 metric combinations which 
produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, and only 5 out of these 11 metric combinations 
(D9, D15, D17, D23, and D28) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 10%. Similar to the 
previous results, increasing the length value of the sliding window reduces the number 
of ܨܲ alarms. In total, 11 metric combinations reduce the number of ܨܲ alarms and 6 
cases are increased, after increasing the sliding window length. 
The utilisation of the distance-mode reduces the number of ܨܲ alarms compared 
to the distance-mean, for the two assessed sliding window lengths. In the case of 
݊ ൌ 29, 9 of the metric combinations produce fewer numbers of ܨܲ alarms, and 14 of 
the metric combinations produce similar number of ܨܲ  alarms to the same metric 
combination for the case of distance-mean. On the other hand, 8 cases generate higher 
number of ܨܲ alarms. In the case of ݊ ൌ 54, 5 of the metric combinations produce 
fewer numbers of ܨܲ  alarms, and 5 of the metrics combinations produce higher 
number of ܨܲ alarms than the same metrics combination when using distance-mean. 
Finally, Figure 7.15 shows the ܦܴ and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results for the configuration angle-
mode, when the sliding window length is ݊ ൌ 29, and Figure 7.16 shows the same 
results for the configuration angle-mode, when the sliding window length is ݊ ൌ 54. 
Again, 5 particular metric combinations generate 0% ܦܴ (D18, D21, D24, D25, and 
D29), using both of the assessed sliding window lengths. These are the same metrics 
combinations that generate 0% of ܦܴ for the configuration angle-mean. In terms of 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results, there are 13 metric combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results higher 
than 5%, in the case of ݊ ൌ 29. Six out of these 13 metrics combinations (D9, D15, 
D17, D23, D27, and D28) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results higher than 10%. In the case of 
݊ ൌ 54, there are 12 metric combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, 
  
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS EVALUATION 
194 
and only 5 out of these 12 metric combinations produce 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results higher than 
10%. These are D9, D15, D17, D23, and D28. Once more, increasing 𝑛 reduces the 
number of 𝐹𝑃𝑠. In total, 11 metrics combinations reduce the 𝐹𝑃𝑠 and only 4 metric 
combinations increased the 𝐹𝑃𝑠 after increasing the sliding window length. 
 
 
Figure 7.13 Deauthentication Long Distance - 29 Slots - Distance & Mode. 
 
 
Figure 7.14 Deauthentication Long Distance - 54 Slots - Distance & Mode. 
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR Precision F9Score Processing+Time+(msec)
D1 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,98 0,02
D2 100 6,09 0 0,93 0,9 0,02
D3 100 1,3 0 0,98 0,98 0,022
D4 100 3,48 0 0,96 0,94 0,02
D5 100 0,43 0 0,99 0,99 0,02
D6 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D7 6,25 2,17 93,75 0,71 0,11 0,021
D8 100 9,13 0 0,9 0,86 0,022
D9 100 7,83 0 0,92 0,88 0,02
D10 100 1,74 0 0,98 0,97 0,019
D11 1,56 0 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,02
D12 100 1,3 0 0,98 0,98 0,021
D13 98,44 8,7 1,56 0,9 0,86 0,019
D14 0 2,17 100 0,7 0 0,025
D15 100 11,74 0 0,88 0,83 0,024
D16 1,56 0,43 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,029
D17 100 9,57 0 0,9 0,85 0,019
D18 0 0,87 100 0,71 0 0,033
D19 100 4,78 0 0,95 0,92 0,025
D20 100 3,48 0 0,96 0,94 0,021
D21 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,021
D22 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,019
D23 100 11,74 0 0,88 0,83 0,019
D24 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,021
D25 0 0 100 0,72 0 0,02
D26 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D27 100 26,52 0 0,73 0,68 0,018
D28 100 23,48 0 0,76 0,7 0,018
D29 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,02
D30 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,026
D31 100 7,39 0 0,92 0,88 0,019
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR Precision F9Score Processing+Time+(msec)
D1 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,98 0,052
D2 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,051
D3 100 0 0 1 1 0,054
D4 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,96 0,063
D5 100 0 0 1 1 0,071
D6 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,96 0,054
D7 1,56 2,17 98,44 0,7 0,03 0,051
D8 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,049
D9 100 10 0 0,9 0,85 0,048
D10 100 1,3 0 0,98 0,98 0,049
D11 1,56 0 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,05
D12 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,049
D13 98,44 8,7 1,56 0,9 0,86 0,048
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Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Long+Distance+2+Distance/Mode+2+SW+29+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
D14 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,053
D15 100 10,87 0 0,89 0,84 0,07
D16 1,56 0,43 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,05
D17 100 12,17 0 0,87 0,82 0,045
D18 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,057
D19 100 4,78 0 0,95 0,92 0,047
D20 100 3,91 0 0,96 0,93 0,046
D21 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,049
D22 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,047
D23 100 12,17 0 0,87 0,82 0,047
D24 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,078
D25 0 0 100 0,72 0 0,052
D26 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,055
D27 100 9,13 0 0,9 0,86 0,046
D28 100 18,7 0 0,81 0,75 0,053
D29 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,052
D30 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,054
D31 100 6,09 0 0,93 0,9 0,052
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Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Long+Distance+2+Distance/Mode+2+SW+54+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
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Figure 7.15 Deauthentication Long Distance - 29 Slots - Angle & Mode. 
 
Figure 7.16 Deauthentication Long Distance - 54 Slots - Angle & Mode. 
Comparing the 𝐹𝑃!"#$  results produced by the angle-mean and angle-mode 
configurations, the utilisation of the mode improves the intrusion detection results. In 
the case of 𝑛 = 29, 11 different metric combinations produce fewer numbers of 𝐹𝑃 
alarms than using the mean, while only 4 of the metric combinations produce higher 
numbers of 𝐹𝑃 alarms than using the mean. The remaining 16 metric combinations 
produce similar number of 𝐹𝑃 alarms for both configurations. In the case of 𝑛 = 54, 9 
different metrics combinations produce fewer numbers of 𝐹𝑃 alarms than using the 
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR Precision F9Score Processing+Time+(msec)
D1 100 1,3 0 0,98 0,98 0,027
D2 100 6,09 0 0,93 0,9 0,02
D3 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D4 100 4,35 0 0,95 0,93 0,033
D5 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,98 0,02
D6 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D7 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D8 100 9,13 0 0,9 0,86 0,02
D9 100 12,17 0 0,87 0,82 0,023
D10 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D11 1,56 0 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,032
D12 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D13 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,02
D14 100 2,61 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D15 100 13,04 0 0,87 0,81 0,03
D16 1,56 0,43 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,021
D17 100 18,26 0 0,81 0,75 0,021
D18 0 0,87 100 0,71 0 0,021
D19 100 5,22 0 0,94 0,91 0,02
D20 100 4,35 0 0,95 0,93 0,02
D21 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,021
D22 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,023
D23 100 13,04 0 0,87 0,81 0,019
D24 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,021
D25 0 0 100 0,72 0 0,021
D26 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,02
D27 100 30 0 0,7 0,65 0,027
D28 100 39,13 0 0,6 0,59 0,02
D29 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,021
D30 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,02
D31 100 7,39 0 0,92 0,88 0,02
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR Precision F9Score Processing+Time+(msec)
D1 100 0,87 0 0,99 0,98 0,05
D2 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,048
D3 100 0,43 0 0,99 0,99 0,049
D4 100 3,04 0 0,97 0,95 0,048
D5 100 0 0 1 1 0,048
D6 100 3,48 0 0,96 0,94 0,048
D7 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,048
D8 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,047
D9 100 12,61 0 0,87 0,82 0,047
D10 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,048
D11 1,56 0 98,44 0,72 0,03 0,05
D12 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,048
D13 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,047
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Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Long+Distance+2+Angle/Mode+2+SW+29+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
D14 1,56 1, 4 98,44 0,7 0,03 ,05
D15 1 0 11 4 0 0,88 0,83 0,047
D16 1,56 0,43 98,44 0, 2 0,03 0,051
D17 1 0 18,7 0 0,81 0,75 0,048
D 8 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 , 1
D19 1 0 5,22 0 0,94 0,91 0,076
D20 1 0 4 35 0 0,95 0,93 0,049
D21 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,049
D22 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,047
D23 100 13,04 0 0,87 0,81 0,072
D24 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,049
D25 0 0 100 0,72 0 0,05
D26 100 2,17 0 0,97 0,96 0,048
D27 100 9,13 0 0,9 0,86 0,049
D28 100 30,43 0 0,69 0,65 0,051
D29 0 1,3 100 0,7 0 0,052
D30 100 8,7 0 0,91 0,86 0,051
D31 100 6,09 0 0,93 0,9 0,048
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mean, while only 1 of the metric combinations produces higher numbers of ܨܲ alarms 
than using the mean. The remaining 22 metric combinations produce similar number 
of ܨܲ alarms. Hence, based on these results, the utilisation of the mode improves the 
efficiency of the deauthentication attack detection results. Additionally, using the 
angle-mean configuration, three particular metrics combinations generated ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
results higher than 28%, whilst using angle-mode reduces the number of ܨܲ alarms in 
these particular metrics combinations. The ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results in D17 drops from 28.7% to 
18.7%, D23 drops from 40.87% to 13.04%, and D28 drops from 69.13% to 30.43%. 
The presented results for the experiment using the deauthentication Long distance 
dataset indicate that the configuration of the methodology that produces the best 
results overall is the utilisation of the Euclidean distance along with the mode to 
establish the reference of normality (distance-mode), when the length value of the 
sliding window is ݊ ൒ 54. For this ݊ value, the required processing time per frame 
ranges between 45µsec and 71µsec. Nonetheless, any of the other three system 
configurations are able to generate highly accurate detection results. 
7.3.1.2 Deauthentication Attack Results – Short Distance 
The multi-layer results for the deauthentication Short Distance dataset experiments are 
presented in this section. The detection of spoofed frames using all methodology 
configurations is completely perfect in terms of ܦܴ, generating 100% ܦܴ for 3 ൑ ݊. 
In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘, the configuration distance-mean always generates ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results 
lower than 3% for any sliding window length. The best ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results are generated 
when the sliding window is between 58 and 72 slots long, ሾ58 ൑ ݊ ൑ 72ሿ , (0% 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ ), and after the sliding window reaches 80 slots, 80 ൑ ݊ , the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  is 
constantly 0.98%. 
The angle-mean configuration generates ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results slightly higher than the 
previous case. Perfect detection (0% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘) is never reached. Only after the sliding 
window length reaches 54 slots, 54 ൑ ݊, is the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ is reduced to 0.98%. The best 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results are generated when the sliding window is ሾ66 ൑ ݊ ൑ 75ሿ , which 
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generate 0.49% 𝐹𝑃!"#$. Using the distance-mode configuration, 0% 𝐹𝑃!"#$ is reached 
when the sliding window is 60 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 76 , and for any sliding window length larger 
than 90 slots, 90 ≤ 𝑛. For any other sliding window length, the detection system does 
not generate a 𝐹𝑃!"#$ higher than 3%. 
These results evidence that utilising the mode generates better detection results 
than using the mean in terms of 𝐹𝑃!"#$. Similarly, the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results generated using 
the configuration angle-mode also improve on the results generated utilising the angle-
mean. The system generates 0% 𝐹𝑃!"#$ when 90 ≤ 𝑛. For any other length value of 
the sliding window, the detection system generates 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results higher than 4% only 
in one case, 𝑛 = 84. 
In order to shown which of the four different assessed configurations is the most 
appropriate, Figure 7.17 represents a close comparison of the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results of the 
detection systems for the four different assessed methodology configurations. The 
utilisation of the distance-mode configuration again produces the best results overall. 
The value of the sliding window length that best results produces is 60 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 76. 
Table VII.IV shows the results for each of the four cases when 𝑛 = 60. For that 
particular sliding window length, the results generated by the distance and either the 
mean or the mode, are identical. 
 
Figure 7.17 Deauthentication Short Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ Results Comparison. 
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The average processing time required by the detection system to provide a final 
decision is shown in Figure 7.18. The average processing time for the four different 
assessed configurations, when sliding window length is 𝑛 = 60, is between 55µsec 
and 77µsec, being the distance-mode the configuration that longest processing time 
requires. As can be seen, all the assessed configurations require almost the same 
processing time, and follow a similar increasing trend. Similar to the long distance 
experiments, the intrusion detection process can fairly be implemented in real time 
because the average interarrival time between two consecutive frames is 49msec. 
 
Figure 7.18 Deauthentication Short Distance - Per Frame Detection Analysis 
Processing Time. 
TABLE VII.IV.  DEAUTHENTICATION SHORT DISTANCE - 5 METRICS RESULTS - 
60 SLOTS 
Configuration 𝐷𝑅 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 𝐹𝑁!"#$ 𝑂𝑆𝑅 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒   µμ𝑠𝑒𝑐  
Distance // 
Mean 100 0 0 1 1 1 55 
Distance // 
Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 77 
Angle//Mean 100 0.98 0 0.99 0.969 0.98 70 
Angle//Mode 100 0.49 0 0.99 0.984 0.99 59 
 
Process'Time'msec Process'Time'msec Process'Time'msec Process'Time'msec
Distance 0,004 Distance 0,008 Angle 0,002 Angle 0,007
Mean 0,004 Mode 0,004 Mean 0,003 Mode 0,007
0,004 0,005 0,003 0,008
0,005 0,004 0,004 0,006
0,004 0,004 0,004 0,008
0,004 0,005 0,005 0,006
0,005 0,007 0,005 0,006
0,005 0,008 0,005 0,006
0,006 0,007 0,007 0,007
0,006 0,008 0,006 0,008
0,006 0,007 0,007 0,008
0,007 0,007 0,007 0,009
0,006 0,008 0,007 0,01
0,007 0,008 0,008 0,013
0,007 0,009 0,008 0,01
0,008 0,01 0,009 0,011
0,008 0,01 0,01 0,011
0,009 0,011 0,011 0,012
0,009 0,012 0,011 0,012
0,01 0,012 0,012 0,013
0,011 0,013 0,013 0,014
0,011 0,014 0,014 0,015
0,012 0,015 0,013 0,015
0,013 0,016 0,014 0,017
0,013 0,016 0,015 0,017
0,015 0,018 0,02 0,018
0,015 0,018 0,017 0,019
0,016 0,019 0,017 0,02
0,017 0,02 0,018 0,022
0,023 0,021 0,018 0,024
0,027 0,022 0,02 0,022
0,034 0,023 0,02 0,027
0,032 0,024 0,021 0,029
0,024 0,025 0,023 0,036
0,033 0,026 0,023 0,033
0,026 0,042 0,024 0,03
0,037 0,033 0,026 0,029
0,037 0,031 0,036 0,03
0,041 0,03 0,033 0,031
0,031 0,031 0,028 0,032
0,032 0,032 0,028 0,033
0,047 0,034 0,033 0,034
0,036 0,035 0,03 0,036
0,036 0,036 0,033 0,036
0,038 0,038 0,033 0,038
0,039 0,039 0,034 0,039
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The multi-layer results for the deauthentication Short Distance dataset present 
more inconsistent 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results than the multi-layer results for the deauthentication 
Long Distance dataset. Also, the sliding window length should be larger for the short 
distance deauthentication attack experiments than the long distance experiments to 
generate the best intrusion detection results. Hence, the average required processing 
time would also increase. This is a direct effect of the changes in the metric 
characteristics generated by the modification in the wireless network topology. It is 
also very important to highlight the fact that the 𝐷𝑅 results remain unaltered from one 
set of experiments to the other, despite the modification in the network topology. 
The intrusion detection results generated when using fewer numbers of metrics are 
shown next. Figures 7.19 – 7.22 represent the 𝐹𝑃!"#$  results of the metric 
combinations D2, D3, D4, D5, and D6, when the system uses the configurations 
distance-mean, distance-mode, angle-mean and angle-mode, respectively. Similar to 
the long distance experiments, only one metric combination outperforms the overall 
results of D1 for the four assessed methodology configurations. This is the D5 
combination of 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 − 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ − 𝑁𝐴𝑉 − 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"# .  The four methodology 
configurations generate similar 𝐷𝑅 results. These results are constantly 100% when 
the sliding window is 8 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 118 . In contrast to the results for D1, the intrusion 
detection effectiveness drastically drops after 𝑛 reaches 119 slots long. 
 
Figure 7.19 Deauthentication Short Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 4 Metrics - Distance & Mean. 
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Figure 7.20 Deauthentication Short Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 4 Metrics - Angle & Mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.21 Deauthentication Short Distance -𝐹𝑃!"#$ 4 Metrics - Distance & Mode. 
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Figure 7.22 Deauthentication Short Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 4 Metrics - Angle & Mode. 
 
Figure 7.23 represents the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results of D5 for the four different assessed 
methodology configurations. The detection system does not generate 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results 
higher than 2.5% for any 𝑛  value. The experiments using the distance-mode 
configuration produce the best result overall. Specifically, when the sliding window is 42 ≤ 𝑛, the system generates 0% 𝐹𝑃!"#$. For this sliding window length, the average 
processing time to produce perfect detection is 35µsec. The experiment using distance-
mean also generates 0% 𝐹𝑃!"#$  when 42 ≤ 𝑛. However, using the distance-mean 
configuration, the system generates higher number of 𝐹𝑃 alarms when the sliding 
window 3 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 15 .  In this case, the average processing time is 30µsec. The 
experiments that use the angle produce slightly higher numbers of 𝐹𝑃 alarms than 
using the distance. 
Table VII.V shows a comparison of all the methodology configurations for the 
two different sliding window lengths. The top four rows of the table show the results 
when 𝑛 = 42, which produces the best results for the metric combination D5. The 
bottom four rows of the table show the results when 𝑛 = 60, which is the length value 
of the sliding window that produces the best results for the metric combination D1. 
0"
2"
4"
6"
8"
10"
12"
14"
1" 3" 5" 7" 9" 11
"
13
"
15
"
17
"
19
"
21
"
23
"
25
"
27
"
29
"
31
"
33
"
35
"
37
"
39
"
41
"
43
"
45
"
47
"
49
"
51
"
53
"
55
"
57
"
59
"
61
"
63
"
65
"
67
"
69
"
71
"
73
"
75
"
77
"
79
"
81
"
83
"
85
"
87
"
89
"
91
"
93
"
95
"
97
"
99
"
Fa
ls
e&
Po
si
*v
e&
(%
)&
Sliding&Window&Size&
Deauthen*ca*on&A<ack&Results&?&False&Posi*ve&Comparison&?&Short&Distance&?&Angle&Mode&
DEL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_DEL_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_DEL_RATE_NAV"
RSSI_DEL_RATE_SEQ"
RSSI_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_DEL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
  
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS EVALUATION 
202 
 
Figure 7.23 Deauthentication Short Distance - 𝐹𝑃!"#$ Results Comparison -  𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ 𝑁𝐴𝑉 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"#. 
 
TABLE VII.V.  DEAUTHENTICATION LONG DISTANCE RESULTS -   
 4 METRICS - 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$  𝑁𝐴𝑉 𝑆𝐸𝑄!"#  - 42 // 60 SLOTS. 
Configuration 𝐷𝑅 𝐹𝑃!"#$ 𝐹𝑁!"#$ 𝑂𝑆𝑅 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒   µμ𝑠𝑒𝑐  
Distance // 
Mean 100 0 0 1 1 1 30 
Distance // 
Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 35 
Angle//Mean 100 0.98 0 0.99 0.969 0.98 33 
Angle//Mode 100 0.49 0 0.99 0.984 0.99 35 
Distance // 
Mean 100 0 0 1 1 1 62 
Distance // 
Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 63 
Angle//Mean 100 0 0 1 1 1 52 
Angle//Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 58 
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Figures 7.24 and 7.25 show the 𝐷𝑅  and 𝐹𝑃!"#$  results for the configuration 
distance-mean using all the possible combinations, using 𝑛 = 42 and 𝑛 = 60. The Y-
axis of the graphs represents the percentage of 𝐷𝑅 and 𝐹𝑃!"#$. The X-axis of the 
graphs represents the different metrics combinations indexes. Similar to the long 
distance experiments, there exist a particular number of metric combinations that 
generate extremely poor 𝐷𝑅 results, generating 0% 𝐷𝑅 in some cases. These metric 
combinations are D7, D11, D14, D16, D18, D21, D24, D25, and D29. Again, the 𝐼𝑁𝐽!"#$ is the principal cause of these poor 𝐷𝑅 results. 
 
Figure 7.24 Deauthentication Short Distance - 42 Slots - Distance & Mean. 
 
Figure 7.25 Deauthentication Short Distance - 60 Slots - Distance & Mean. 
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR F8Score Processing+Time+(msec) Precision
D1 100 0 1,96 0,98 0,97 0,047
D2 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,029
D3 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,033
D4 100 0 8,82 0,91 0,88 0,029
D5 100 0 0 1 1 0,03
D6 100 0 3,92 0,96 0,94 0,029
D7 1,56 98,44 1,47 0,67 0,03 0,031
D8 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,034
D9 100 0 10,29 0,89 0,86 0,029
D10 100 0 0,49 0,99 0,99 0,029
D11 1,56 98,44 0,49 0,68 0,03 0,039
D12 100 0 4,41 0,95 0,93 0,031
D13 98,44 1,56 6,86 0,92 0,89 0,029
D14 0 100 1,96 0,66 0 0,032
D15 100 0 8,82 0,91 0,88 0,035
D16 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,038
D17 100 0 20,1 0,79 0,76 0,034
D18 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,031
D19 100 0 9,8 0,9 0,86 0,033
D20 100 0 6,86 0,93 0,9 0,035
D21 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,033
D22 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,045
D23 100 0 11,27 0,88 0,85 0,038
D24 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,037
D25 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,033
D26 100 0 4,9 0,95 0,93 0,045
D27 100 0 12,25 0,87 0,84 0,032
D28 100 0 22,06 0,77 0,74 0,032
D29 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,03
D30 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,044
D31 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,031
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR F8Score Processing+Time+(msec) Precision
D1 100 0 0 1 1 0,055
D2 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,055
D3 100 0 0,49 0,99 0,99 0,055
D4 100 0 5,39 0,94 0,92 0,054
D5 100 0 0 1 1 0,062
D6 100 0 0 1 1 0,054
D7 1,56 98,44 1,47 0,67 0,03 0,054
D8 100 0 8,82 0,91 0,88 0,057
D9 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,058
D10 100 0 0,98 0,99 0,98 0,054
D11 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,06
D12 100 0 4,41 0,95 0,93 0,089
D13 98,44 1,56 1,47 0,98 0,97 0,06
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D1+ D2+ D3+ D4+ D5+ D6+ D7+ D8+ D9+ D10+ D11+ D12+ D13+ D14+ D15+ D16+ D17+ D18+ D19+ D20+ D21+ D22+ D23+ D24+ D25+ D26+ D27+ D28+ D29+ D30+ D31+
Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Short+Distance+2+Distance/Mean+2+SW+42+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
D14 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,053
D15 100 0 5,88 0,94 0,91 0,052
D16 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,053
D17 100 0 27,94 0,72 0,69 0,078
D18 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,052
D19 100 0 8,33 0,91 0,88 0,051
D20 100 0 6,37 0,93 0,91 0,051
D21 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,053
D22 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,054
D23 100 0 11,76 0,88 0,84 0,052
D24 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,053
D25 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,053
D26 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,052
D27 100 0 8,82 0,91 0,88 0,051
D28 98,44 1,56 37,75 0,61 0,62 0,067
D29 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,054
D30 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,055
D31 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,055
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Comparing these two graphs, the presented ܦܴ  results of both cases remain 
unchanged after increasing the sliding window length. There is a small ܦܴ drop for 
the single metric ߂ܶ݅݉݁ (D28). In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘, there are 15 metric combinations 
that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, in the case of ݊ ൌ 42. Seven out of these 
15 metrics combinations (D8, D9, D17, D22, D23, D27, and D28) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
results higher than 10%. In the case of ݊ ൌ 60, there are 14 metric combinations that 
produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, and only 3 out of these 14 metric combinations 
produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results higher than 10%. These are D17, D23, and D28. In two 
particular cases (D17 and D28), increasing the length value of the sliding window 
makes the number of ܨܲ  alarms drastically increase from 20.1% to 27.94% and 
22.06% to 37.75%, respectively. However, 16 different metric combinations reduce 
the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results by increasing the sliding window length. 
The ܦܴ  and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results for the configuration angle-mean are presented in 
Figures 7.26 and 7.27, respectively. In both cases, the metric combinations D11, D14, 
D16, D18, D21, D24, D25, and D29 generate extremely poor ܦܴ results. In the case of 
݊ ൌ 42, there are 17 metric combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, 
and ten out of these 17 metric combinations produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 10%. 
In the case of ݊ ൌ 60, there are 14 metric combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results 
higher than 5%. Nine out of these 14 metric combinations produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results 
higher than 10%. In particular, D8, D15, D17, D22, D23, and D28, overpass 25% 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘, two of these metric combinations overpass 50% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. One particular metric 
that is included in all these metric combination is the ߂ܶ݅݉݁. These results show that 
increasing the sliding window length, degrades the intrusion detection results when the 
angle-mean configuration is used. In general, 11 metric combinations reduce the 
number of ܨܲ alarms and 9 cases increase the number of ܨܲ alarms, after increasing 
the length value of the sliding window. Comparing the detection results generated by 
the angle-mean against the distance-mean configuration, the utilisation of the angle 
makes the system to produce higher number of ܨܲ alarms for this dataset. 
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Figure 7.26 Deauthentication Short Distance - 42 Slots - Angle & Mean. 
 
Figure 7.27 Deauthentication Short Distance - 60 Slots - Angle & Mean. 
Figure 7.28 shows the 𝐷𝑅 and 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results for the distance-mode configuration, 
when the sliding window length is 𝑛 = 42. There are 15 metric combinations that 
produce 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results higher than 5%. Six out of these 15 metric combinations (D8, 
D17, D22, D23, D27, and D28) produce 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results higher than 10%. Comparing 
these results against the results generated by the distance-mean configuration, 7 metric 
combinations improve the distance-mean results while 5 metric combinations generate 
higher number of 𝐹𝑃 alarms. Figure 7.29 shows the 𝐷𝑅 and 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results for the 
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR F8Score Processing+Time+(msec) Precision
D1 100 0 3,92 0,96 0,94 0,033
D2 100 0 9,8 0,9 0,86 0,029
D3 100 0 3,92 0,96 0,94 0,029
D4 100 0 13,24 0,86 0,83 0,032
D5 100 0 0,98 0,99 0,98 0,033
D6 100 0 3,92 0,96 0,94 0,029
D7 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,03
D8 100 0 11,27 0,88 0,85 0,038
D9 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,033
D10 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,031
D11 1,56 98,44 0,49 0,68 0,03 0,033
D12 100 0 5,88 0,94 0,91 0,033
D13 100 0 9,8 0,9 0,86 0,03
D14 1,56 98,44 3,43 0,65 0,03 0,03
D15 100 0 13,24 0,86 0,83 0,034
D16 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,038
D17 100 0 48,53 0,51 0,56 0,029
D18 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,034
D19 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,034
D20 100 0 8,33 0,91 0,88 0,042
D21 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,03
D22 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,029
D23 100 0 12,25 0,87 0,84 0,03
D24 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,03
D25 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,03
D26 100 0 6,86 0,93 0,9 0,032
D27 100 0 31,86 0,68 0,66 0,029
D28 100 0 67,16 0,32 0,48 0,029
D29 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,03
D30 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,031
D31 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,028
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR F8Score Processing+Time+(msec) Precision
D1 100 0 0,98 0,99 0,98 0,07
D2 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,052
D3 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,067
D4 100 0 13,24 0,86 0,83 0,051
D5 100 0 0 1 1 0,052
D6 100 0 0 1 1 0,052
D7 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,069
D8 100 0 33,82 0,66 0,65 0,068
D9 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,059
D10 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,052
D11 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,054
D12 100 0 8,33 0,91 0,88 0,052
D13 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,053
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Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Short+Distance+2+Angle/Mean+2+SW+42+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
D14 1,56 98,44 1,47 0,67 0,03 ,053
D15 1 0 0 28,43 0,71 0,69 ,078
D16 1,56 98,44 0 ,69 0,03 ,054
D17 1 0 0 57,84 0,42 0,52 ,056
D 8 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 ,055
D19 1 0 0 15,2 0,84 0, 1 ,055
D20 1 0 0 6,86 0,93 0,9 ,056
D21 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,053
D22 100 0 35,29 0,64 0,64 0,053
D23 100 0 28,43 0,71 0,69 0,052
D24 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,059
D25 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,053
D26 100 0 10,29 0,89 0,86 0,051
D27 100 0 7,84 0,92 0,89 0,055
D28 100 0 68,14 0,31 0,48 0,051
D29 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,059
D30 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,051
D31 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,056
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configuration distance-mode, when the sliding window length is 𝑛 = 60. Eleven of the 
metric combinations produce 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results higher than 5%, and only 4 out of these 11 
metric combinations produce 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results higher than 10%. These are D17, D23, 
D27, and D28. Again, increasing the length value of the sliding window reduces the 
number of 𝐹𝑃 alarms. In total, 18 metric combinations reduce the number of 𝐹𝑃 
alarms and the number of 𝐹𝑃 alarms generated by 13 metric combinations reaming 
unchanged. None of the metric combinations increase the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results. 
 
Figure 7.28 Deauthentication Short Distance - 42 Slots - Distance & Mode. 
 
Figure 7.29 Deauthentication Short Distance - 60 Slots - Distance & Mode. 
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR F8Score Processing+Time+(msec) Precision
D1 100 0 1,96 0,98 0,97 0,034
D2 100 0 8,33 0,91 0,88 0,034
D3 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,035
D4 100 0 8,82 0,91 0,88 0,036
D5 100 0 0 1 1 0,035
D6 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,035
D7 1,56 98,44 1,47 0,67 0,03 0,034
D8 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,034
D9 100 0 9,8 0,9 0,86 0,033
D10 100 0 0,49 0,99 0,99 0,034
D11 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,048
D12 100 0 3,43 0,96 0,95 0,034
D13 98,44 1,56 6,37 0,93 0,9 0,035
D14 0 100 1,96 0,66 0 0,037
D15 100 0 7,84 0,92 0,89 0,033
D16 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,036
D17 100 0 20,1 0,79 0,76 0,032
D18 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,034
D19 100 0 9,8 0,9 0,86 0,033
D20 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,032
D21 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,034
D22 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,033
D23 100 0 11,76 0,88 0,84 0,032
D24 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,037
D25 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,034
D26 100 0 3,43 0,96 0,95 0,033
D27 7,81 92,19 29,41 0,41 0,08 0,033
D28 100 0 22,06 0,77 0,74 0,034
D29 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,035
D30 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,034
D31 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,034
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR F8Score Processing+Time+(msec) Precision
D1 100 0 0 1 1 0,077
D2 100 0 0,49 0,99 0,99 0,062
D3 100 0 0,98 0,99 0,98 0,064
D4 100 0 3,92 0,96 0,94 0,065
D5 100 0 0 1 1 0,063
D6 100 0 0 1 1 0,062
D7 1,56 98,44 1,47 0,67 0,03 0,069
D8 100 0 9,8 0,9 0,86 0,061
D9 100 0 7,84 0,92 0,89 0,06
D10 100 0 0,49 0,99 0,99 0,062
D11 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,061
D12 100 0 2,94 0,97 0,96 0,061
D13 98,44 1,56 1,47 0,98 0,97 0,06
0+
10+
20+
30+
40+
50+
60+
70+
80+
90+
100+
D1+ D2+ D3+ D4+ D5+ D6+ D7+ D8+ D9+ D10+ D11+ D12+ D13+ D14+ D15+ D16+ D17+ D18+ D19+ D20+ D21+ D22+ D23+ D24+ D25+ D26+ D27+ D28+ D29+ D30+ D31+
Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Short+Distance+2+Distance/Mode+2+SW+42+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
D14 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,064
D15 100 0 3,43 0,96 0,95 0,061
D16 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,061
D17 100 0 14,22 0,85 0,82 0,058
D18 0 100 0,49 0,68 0 0,066
D19 100 0 8,33 0,91 0,88 0,058
D20 100 0 6,37 0,93 0,91 0,057
D21 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,061
D22 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,059
D23 100 0 11,76 0,88 0,84 0,076
D24 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,053
D25 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,06
D26 100 0 3,43 0,96 0,95 0,059
D27 100 0 11,27 0,88 0,85 0,073
D28 98,44 1,56 18,63 0,8 0,76 0,085
D29 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,062
D30 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,062
D31 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,06
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The utilisation of the distance-mode configuration reduces the number of ܨܲ 
alarms compared to the utilisation of the mean, for the two assessed sliding window 
lengths. In the case of ݊ ൌ 60, the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results generated by the distance-mode 
configuration outperform the results by the distance-mean configuration. Ten of the 
metric combinations produce fewer numbers of ܨܲ  alarms, and 18 of the metric 
combinations produce similar number of ܨܲ alarms than the same metric combination 
for the case of distance-mean. On the other hand, only 3 cases generate higher 
numbers of ܨܲ alarms. The reduction of the number of ܨܲ alarms of the short distance 
experiments utilising the mode instead of the mean for the cases in which more 
metrics are combined, is not as noticeable as the long distance deauthentication attack 
experiment. Although very small, there is improvement in the efficiency of the 
detection results when the mode is used. 
Finally, Figure 7.30 shows the ܦܴ and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results for the configuration angle-
mode, using ݊ ൌ 42, and Figure 7.31 shows the same results for the configuration 
angle-mode, when the sliding window length is ݊ ൌ 60. In the case of ݊ ൌ 42, there 
are 15 metric combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, and 11 out of 
these 15 metric combinations produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 10%. Three of these 
metric combinations overpass 30% of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. In the case of ݊ ൌ 60, there are 11 
metric combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, and 5 out of these 11 
metric combinations produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results higher than 10%. Only the metric 
combination ߂ܶ݅݉݁  (D28) overpasses 30% of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘.  Once more, increasing the 
length value of the sliding window reduces the number of ܨܲ alarms. In total, 18 
metric combinations reduce the number of ܨܲ alarms and none metric combination 
increased the number of ܨܲ alarms, after increasing the sliding window length. 
Comparing the results generated by the angle-mode configuration against the 
results generated by the angle-mean configuration, 11 metric combinations improve 
the angle-mean results while 5 metric combinations generate higher number of ܨܲ 
alarms, in the case of ݊ ൌ 42 . The ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results generated by the remaining 14 
metric combinations are unchanged. In the case of ݊ ൌ 60, 14 metric combinations 
improve the angle-mean results while 2 metric combinations generate higher number 
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of 𝐹𝑃 alarms. The 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results generated by the remaining 15 metric combinations 
are unchanged. 
 
Figure 7.30 Deauthentication Short Distance - 42 Slots - Angle & Mode. 
 
Figure 7.31 Deauthentication Short Distance - 60 Slots - Angle & Mode. 
The utilisation of the mode as reference of normality generally improves the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results of the detection system, for the deauthentication Short Distance dataset 
experiment. On the other hand, comparing the 𝐹𝑃!"#$ results produced by the angle-
mode against distance-mode configuration, the utilisation of the angle to assign the 
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR F8Score Processing+Time+(msec) Precision
D1 100 0 2,94 0,97 0,96 0,034
D2 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,034
D3 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,035
D4 100 0 11,27 0,88 0,85 0,033
D5 100 0 0,49 0,99 0,99 0,035
D6 100 0 3,92 0,96 0,94 0,048
D7 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,035
D8 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,033
D9 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,033
D10 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,037
D11 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,049
D12 100 0 3,43 0,96 0,95 0,044
D13 100 0 6,37 0,93 0,91 0,035
D14 1,56 98,44 3,43 0,65 0,03 0,034
D15 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,035
D16 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,056
D17 100 0 30,88 0,69 0,67 0,032
D18 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,041
D19 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,035
D20 100 0 8,82 0,91 0,88 0,034
D21 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,035
D22 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,114
D23 100 0 12,25 0,87 0,84 0,033
D24 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,035
D25 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,035
D26 100 0 3,43 0,96 0,95 0,033
D27 7,81 92,19 38,73 0,32 0,07 0,033
D28 100 0 33,82 0,66 0,65 0,035
D29 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,036
D30 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,034
D31 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,033
Index Detection+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) False+Positive+Rate+(%) OSR F8Score Processing+Time+(msec) Precision
D1 100 0 0,49 0,99 0,99 0,059
D2 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,058
D3 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,06
D4 100 0 4,41 0,95 0,93 0,059
D5 100 0 0 1 1 0,058
D6 100 0 0 1 1 0,06
D7 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,059
D8 100 0 9,8 0,9 0,86 0,059
D9 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,059
D10 100 0 0,49 0,99 0,99 0,066
D11 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,06
D12 100 0 3,43 0,96 0,95 0,059
D13 100 0 1,47 0,98 0,98 0,058
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Deauthen(ca(on+A-ack+Results+2+Short+Distance+2+Angle/Mode+2+SW+42+Slots+
DetecHon+Rate+(%)+ False+PosiHve+Rate+(%)+
D14 1,56 98,44 0,98 0,68 0,03 0,059
D15 100 0 4,41 0,95 0,93 0,058
D16 1,56 98,44 0 0,69 0,03 0,059
D17 100 0 25,49 0,74 0,71 0,062
D18 0 100 0,49 0,68 0 0,063
D19 100 0 9,8 0,9 0,86 0,062
D20 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,062
D21 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,06
D22 100 0 10,78 0,89 0,85 0,224
D23 100 0 12,25 0,87 0,84 0,058
D24 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,059
D25 0 100 0 0,68 0 0,059
D26 100 0 3,43 0,96 0,95 0,059
D27 100 0 12,75 0,87 0,83 0,063
D28 100 0 31,86 0,68 0,66 0,058
D29 0 100 1,47 0,67 0 0,06
D30 100 0 9,31 0,9 0,87 0,077
D31 100 0 7,35 0,92 0,9 0,082
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belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ reduces the effectiveness of the detection system. Most of the metric 
combinations generate higher number of ܨܲ alarms than the distance-mode results, 
when the sliding window length is ݊ ൒ 60. For this ݊ value, the required processing 
time per frame ranges between 52µsec and 63µsec. 
7.3.2 Airpwn Attack Experiments 
Airpwn is another attack that has been implemented to evaluate the proposed 
methodology. Two different versions of the same attack have been implemented. 
Similar to the deauthentication attack analysis, the experiment results have been 
evaluated using all possible combination of metrics. Six different metrics have been 
selected. Therefore, the same wireless network dataset has been evaluated 63 times. 
Additionally, for each combination of metrics, the results are plot using a sequentially 
increasing length value of the sliding window. The length value ݊ varies from one 
single slot to 200 slots. In addition, the four possible methodology configurations have 
been evaluated for each of the metrics combinations. 
All these configurations have been evaluated using the four different Airpwn 
datasets. The first dataset only contains non-malicious traffic instances. The second, 
ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01, and third dataset, ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02, contain both normal and malicious network 
traffic instances. Finally, the fourth dataset, ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇  contains normal traffic 
instances, as well as malicious network traffic instances generated by both Airpwn 
attack versions. The testbed for the detection of the deauthentication attack is the 
generic testbed described in Chapter 6. All the devices are located in a stationary 
geographical location, being the attacker is placed 1.5 metres away from the victim. 
7.3.2.1 Airpwn Attack Experiments Results 
The multi-layer results for the Airpwn attack experiments, using the six considered 
metrics, are presented in the Figures 7.32 – 7.37. Figure 7.32 represents intrusion 
detection results for the multi-layer approach on the completely non-malicious dataset. 
This figure represents the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ for the four methodology configurations, modifying 
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the length value of the sliding window. As can be seen, none of the intrusion detection 
results overpasses 0.45% 𝐹𝑃!"#$ . The two methodology configurations that make use 
of the distance generate 0% 𝐹𝑃!"#$ for sliding window length 31 ≤ 𝑛, whilst the two 
methodology configurations that make use of the angle generate 0% 𝐹𝑃!"#$ for the 
sliding window length 54 ≤ 𝑛. 
 
Figure 7.32 Airpwn Attack - Normal Traffic Dataset - 6 metrics                                
- 𝐹𝑃!"#$ Results Comparison. 
 
 
Figure 7.33 Airpwn Attack - 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘01 Dataset - 6 metrics                                        
- 𝐹𝑃!"#$ Results Comparison. 
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Figure 7.33 represents the detection results for the multi-layer approach, using the 
six considered metrics, when the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 dataset is used. The ܦܴ results are not 
shown in this graph, but these are constantly 100% for any of the four methodology 
configurations when 4 ൑ ݊ . In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘,  the detection system using the 
distance-mean configuration generates the best results overall. Nonetheless, the 
difference with the other three methodology configuration variations is very small. 
Perfect detection is generated after the sliding window length reaches 9 slots long for 
the two methodology configurations that make use of the distance. All the metric 
configurations generate 0% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ for the sliding window length 31 ൑ ݊. None of the 
detection results overpass 0.45% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ for any sliding window length. 
Figures 7.34 and 7.35 represent the ܦܴ  and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results for the multi-layer 
approach when the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 dataset is used, respectively. In terms of ܦܴ results, the 
four methodology configurations produce 100% ܦܴ  for 17 ൑ ݊ . For this particular 
dataset, the angle-mean configuration produces the best ܦܴ results overall. Especially 
when the sliding window length is relatively small. While the other three 
configurations drop the effectiveness of the detection system for ሾ6 ൑ ݊ ൑ 7ሿ, the ܦܴ 
results of the angle-mean configuration remain above 85%. In addition, this 
configuration outperforms the other three for ሾ7 ൑ ݊ ൑ 17ሿ. In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘, none 
of the four methodology configurations achieve 0% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. The two configurations 
that make use of the Euclidean distance to assign the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ generate 0.01% 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  after the sliding window length reaches 89 slots long. The other two 
configurations using the angle generate 0.03% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ for 89 ൑ ݊. 
Figures 7.36 and 7.37 represent the ܦܴ  and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results when the ܯ݅ݔ݁݀ 
ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ dataset is used. The ܦܴ results generated by all the configurations are very 
similar to each other. All the methodology configurations produce 100% of DR for 
8 ൑ ݊. In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘, none of the four methodology configurations achieve 0% of 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ for 158 ൒ ݊. The distance-mean configuration, which produces the best results 
overall, generate 0.01% of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  after the sliding window length reaches 91 slots 
long. None of the two configurations that use the Euclidean distance overpasses 0.05% 
of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  for 31 ൑ ݊. The other two configurations generate slightly higher ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
  
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS EVALUATION 
212
results than the two configurations using the distance. Nonetheless, none of the 
configurations can be considered a good option for sliding window length ݊ ൒ 10. 
From the presented multi-layer results for the Airpwn attack experiments, the 
difference between the ܦܴ and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results generated with each of the methodology 
configurations is very small. None of the configurations substantially outperforms any 
of the other three. 
 
Figure 7.34 Airpwn Attack - ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Dataset - 6 metrics                                        
- ܦܴ Results Comparison. 
 
Figure 7.35 Airpwn Attack - ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Dataset - 6 metrics                                        
- ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ Results Comparison. 
  
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS EVALUATION 
213
 
Figure 7.36 Airpwn Attack - ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Dataset - 6 metrics                                        
- ܦܴ Results Comparison. 
 
Figure 7.37 Airpwn Attack - ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Dataset - 6 metrics                                        
- ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ Results Comparison. 
Figure 7.38 shows the average processing time required by the detection system to 
provide a final decision about the nature of each analysed frame, for the Normal 
experiment dataset. The sliding window length ݊ ൌ 31  has been selected as the 
smallest value that produces the best results overall for any of the methodology 
configurations that use the Euclidean distance. On the other hand, the length value of 
the sliding window ݊ ൌ 54 is the smallest length value that produces the best results 
overall for the methodology configurations that use the angle. For ݊ ൌ 31, the average 
processing time for the normal dataset is between 22µsec and 30µsec. Similarly, if 
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𝑛 = 54 was selected, the average processing time is between 52µsec and 72µsec. 
Since the average interarrival time between two consecutive frames is 6.11msec, the 
intrusion detection process can fairly be implemented in real time. Figure 7.39 shows 
the average processing time required by the detection system to provide a final 
decision about the nature of each analysed frame, for the 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘01 dataset. For 𝑛 = 31, the average processing time for the normal dataset is between 20µsec and 
39µsec. Similarly, for 𝑛 = 54 the average processing time is between 48µsec and 
59µsec. The average interarrival time between two consecutive frames is 10.1msec. 
 
Figure 7.38 Airpwn 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 - Per Frame Detection Analysis Processing Time. 
 
Figure 7.39 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘01 - Per Frame Detection Analysis Processing Time. 
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Figure 7.40 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘02 - Per Frame Detection Analysis Processing Time. 
 
Figure 7.41 Airpwn 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 - Per Frame Detection Processing Time. 
Figure 7.40 shows the average processing time for the 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘02 dataset. For 𝑛 = 31, the average processing time for the normal dataset is between 23µsec and 
32µsec. Similarly, for 𝑛 = 54 the average processing time is between 54µsec and 
68µsec. The average interarrival time between two consecutive frames for this dataset 
is 2.37msec. Figure 7.41 shows the average processing time for the 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 
dataset. For 𝑛 = 31, the average processing time for the normal dataset is between 
22µsec and 28µsec. Similarly, for 𝑛 = 54 the average processing time is between 
53µsec and 68µsec. The average interarrival time between two consecutive frames for 
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this dataset is 2.18msec. The processing time results show that the intrusion detection 
process can be implemented in real time for all the Airpwn experiment datasets for the 
selected sliding window lengths. 
As a method to compare the four different assessed configurations, the following 
tables show all evaluation parameters described in Section 7.1, for each of the four 
configurations when the length value of the sliding window is ݊ ൌ 31 and ݊ ൌ 54. 
Table VII.VI corresponds to the Normal dataset; Tables VII.VII and VII.VIII 
correspond to the datasets ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 and ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02, respectively; and Table VII.IX 
corresponds to the ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ dataset. 
In order to verify whether the combination six metrics outperforms the 
combination of fewer numbers of metrics, Figures 7.42 - 7.57 represent the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
results of any possible combination of five metrics for the different datasets when the 
system uses the methodology configurations distance-mean, distance-mode, angle-
mean and angle-mode, respectively. The detection results in terms of ܦܴ  are not 
shown but these are always 100% for any case when 16 ൑ ݊, with the only exception 
of ܶܶܮ െ ߂ܶ݅݉݁ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܰܣܸ െ ܵܧܳ஽௜௙, which generate worse ܦܴ  than the 6 
metrics combinations. In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ , the four metric combinations ܴܵܵܫ െ
߂ܶ݅݉݁ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܰܣܸ െ ܵܧܳ஽௜௙,  ܴܵܵܫ െ ܶܶܮ െ ߂ܶ݅݉݁ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܰܣܸ, 
ܴܵܵܫ െ ܶܶܮ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܰܣܸ െ ܵܧܳ஽௜௙  and ܶܶܮ െ ߂ܶ݅݉݁ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܰܣܸ െ
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ outperform the intrusion detection results of the 6 metrics combinations, for 
53 ൒ ݊. For 54 ൑ ݊, the combination of 6 metrics produce the best results overall for 
all the datasets. From all these results, the methodology configuration distance-mean is 
the one that produces the best results. 
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TABLE VII.VI.  RESULTS - 6 METRICS NORMAL TRAFFIC - 31 // 54 SLOTS. 
Configuration ܦܴ ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ ܨ ோܰ௔௧௘ ܱܴܵ ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ܨܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ܶ݅݉݁ ሺμݏ݁ܿ
Distance//Mean ݊/ܽ 0 ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ 22 
Distance//Mode ݊/ܽ 0 ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ 30 
Angle//Mean ݊/ܽ 0.03 ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ 23 
Angle//Mode ݊/ܽ 0.06 ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ 26 
Distance//Mean ݊/ܽ 0 ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ 53 
Distance//Mode ݊/ܽ 0 ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ 71 
Angle /Mean ݊/ܽ 0 ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ 52 
Angle//Mode ݊/ܽ 0 ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ ݊/ܽ 72 
 
 
TABLE VII.VII.  RESULTS - 6 METRICS ATTACK01 TRAFFIC - 31 // 54 SLOTS. 
Configuration ܦܴ ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ ܨ ோܰ௔௧௘ ܱܴܵ ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ܨܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ܶ݅݉݁ ሺμݏ݁ܿ
Distance//Mean 100 0 0 1 1 1 20 
Distance//Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 30 
Angle//Mean 100 0 0 1 1 1 26 
Angle//Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 39 
Distance//Mean 100 0 0 1 1 1 58 
Distance//Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 59 
Angle /Mean 100 0 0 1 1 1 48 
Angle//Mode 100 0 0 1 1 1 57 
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TABLE VII.VIII.  RESULTS - 6 METRICS ATTACK02 TRAFFIC - 31 // 54 SLOTS. 
Configuration ܦܴ ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ ܨ ோܰ௔௧௘ ܱܴܵ ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ܨܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ܶ݅݉݁ ሺμݏ݁ܿ
Distance//Mean 100 0.06 0 1 0.992 1 21 
Distance//Mode 100 0.06 0 1 0.992 1 32 
Angle//Mean 100 0.17 0 1 0.975 0.99 24 
Angle//Mode 100 0.14 0 1 0.98 0.99 31 
Distance//Mean 100 0.05 0 1 0.993 1 54 
Distance//Mode 100 0.03 0 1 0.995 1 68 
Angle /Mean 100 0.08 0 1 0.988 0.99 58 
Angle//Mode 100 0.09 0 1 0.987 0.99 62 
 
 
TABLE VII.IX.  RESULTS - 6 METRICS MIXED ATTACK TRAFFIC - 31 // 54 SLOTS. 
Configuration ܦܴ ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ ܨ ோܰ௔௧௘ ܱܴܵ ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ܨܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ܶ݅݉݁ ሺμݏ݁ܿ
Distance//Mean 100 0.05 0 1 0.95 0.97 22 
Distance//Mode 100 0.05 0 1 0.95 0.97 27 
Angle//Mean 100 0.1 0 1 0.904 0.95 27 
Angle//Mode 100 0.11 0 1 0.897 0.95 28 
Distance//Mean 100 0.04 0 1 0.957 0.98 53 
Distance//Mode 100 0.04 0 1 0.957 0.98 62 
Angle /Mean 100 0.13 0 1 0.876 0.93 68 
Angle//Mode 100 0.12 0 1 0.883 0.94 64 
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Figure 7.42 Airpwn 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 - 5 Metrics - Distance & Mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.43 Airpwn 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 - 5 Metrics - Angle & Mean. 
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Figure 7.44 Airpwn 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 - 5 Metrics - Distance & Mode. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.45 Airpwn 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 - 5 Metrics - Angle & Mode. 
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Figure 7.46 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘01 - 5 Metrics - Distance & Mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.47 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘01 - 5 Metrics - Angle & Mean. 
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Figure 7.48 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘01 - 5 Metrics - Distance & Mode. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.49 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘01 - 5 Metrics - Angle & Mode. 
 
0"
0,5"
1"
1,5"
2"
2,5"
3"
3,5"
4"
4,5"
5"
1" 4" 7" 10" 13" 16" 19" 22" 25" 28" 31" 34" 37" 40" 43" 46" 49" 52" 55" 58" 61" 64" 67" 70" 73" 76" 79" 82" 85" 88" 91" 94" 97" 100"
Fa
ls
e&
Po
si
*v
e&
(%
)&
Sliding&Window&Size&
Man7in7the7Middle&A;ack&Results&7&False&Posi*ve&Rate&Comparison&7&Single&Client&7&A;ack&01&Traffic&7&Distance&Mode&
RSSI_DEL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_TTL_DEL_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_TTL_DEL_RATE_NAV"
RSSI_TTL_DEL_RATE_SEQ"
RSSI_TTL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
TTL_DEL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_TTL_DEL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
0"
0,5"
1"
1,5"
2"
2,5"
3"
3,5"
4"
4,5"
5"
1" 4" 7" 10" 13" 16" 19" 22" 25" 28" 31" 34" 37" 40" 43" 46" 49" 52" 55" 58" 61" 64" 67" 70" 73" 76" 79" 82" 85" 88" 91" 94" 97" 100"
Fa
ls
e&
Po
si
*v
e&
(%
)&
Sliding&Window&Size&
Man7in7the7Middle&A;ack&Results&7&False&Posi*ve&Rate&Comparison&7&Single&Client&7&A;ack&01&Traffic&7&Angle&Mode&
RSSI_DEL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_TTL_DEL_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_TTL_DEL_RATE_NAV"
RSSI_TTL_DEL_RATE_SEQ"
RSSI_TTL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
TTL_DEL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
RSSI_TTL_DEL_RATE_NAV_SEQ"
  
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS EVALUATION 
223 
 
 
 
Figure 7.50 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘02 - 5 Metrics - Distance & Mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.51 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘02 - 5 Metrics - Angle & Mean. 
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Figure 7.52 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘02 - 5 Metrics - Distance & Mode. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.53 Airpwn 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘02 - 5 Metrics - Angle & Mode. 
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Figure 7.54 Airpwn 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 - 5 Metrics - Distance & Mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.55 Airpwn 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 - 5 Metrics - Angle & Mean. 
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Figure 7.56 Airpwn 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 - 5 Metrics - Distance & Mode. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.57 Airpwn 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 - 5 Metrics - Angle & Mode. 
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Since the best intrusion detection results from the Airpwn attack datasets are 
generated using the configuration distance-mean, Figures 7.58 – 7.61 present the ܦܴ 
and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results for the Airpwn attack experiments using only this particular 
configuration, when the sliding window length is ݊ ൌ 54 . The different metrics 
combinations have been categorised in the indexes represented in the Table VII.X. The 
index M1 referrers to the set that combines all the considered metrics, and the index 
M63 referrers to a single metric set. Therefore, the best results are to be expected from 
the test index M1. These figures help to understand the effect that increasing the 
number of metrics used to implement the intrusion detection. The Y-axis of the graphs 
represents the percentage of ܦܴ and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. The X-axis of the graphs represents the 
metric combination indexes shown in Table VII.X. 
 
TABLE VII.X.  INDEXES OF THE USED METRICS IN AIRPWN ATTACK. 
Index-Metrics Index-Metrics Index-Metrics Index-Metrics 
M1 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M17 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M33 - ܶܶܮ - 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
M49 - ܶܶܮ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
M2 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
M18 - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
M34 - ܶܶܮ - 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ - ܰܣܸ 
M50 - ܶܶܮ - 
ܰܣܸ 
M3 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M19 - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M35 - ܶܶܮ - 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M51 - ܶܶܮ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M4 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M20 - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M36 - ܶܶܮ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
M52 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
M5 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M21 - ܶܶܮ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M37 - ܶܶܮ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M53 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ 
M6 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M22 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
- ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M38 - ܶܶܮ - 
ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M54 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M7 - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M23 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
M39 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
M55 - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
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M8 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
M24 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
M40 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M56 - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M9 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ 
M25 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - 
ܰܣܸ 
M41 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M57 - ܰܣܸ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M10 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
- ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M26 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M42 - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ M58 - ܴܵܵܫ 
M11 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
- ܰܣܸ 
M27 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
M43 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
ܶܶܮ M59 - ܶܶܮ 
M12 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
- ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M28 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܰܣܸ 
M44 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
߂ܶ݅݉݁ M60 - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ 
M13 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܶܶܮ - ܰܣܸ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M29 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M45 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ M61 - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ 
M14 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
M30 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܰܣܸ 
M46 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
ܰܣܸ M62 - ܰܣܸ 
M15 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - 
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M31 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M47 - ܴܵܵܫ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ M63 - ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M16 - ܴܵܵܫ - ߂ܶ݅݉݁ - ܰܣܸ 
- ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M32 - ܴܵܵܫ - ܰܣܸ - 
ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ 
M48 - ܶܶܮ - 
߂ܶ݅݉݁  
 
Figures 7.58.a and 7.58.b present the ܦܴ and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results for the configuration 
distance-mean for the Normal traffic dataset. Since this dataset only contains non-
malicious information, the ܦܴ  for all the metric combinations is 0%. In terms of 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘, there are 13 metric combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 5%, 
in the case of ݊ ൌ 54. Seven out of these 13 metric combinations (M23, M43, M44, 
M48, M58, M59, and M60) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 10%. The test index 
M1, six metrics, produces the best results that could be achieved, 0% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. Single 
metric (M58) ܴܵܵܫ and (M59) ܶܶܮ, are the two metrics that produce the worst ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
results. Apart from (M60) ߂ܶ݅݉݁ , all the metric combinations that overpass 10% 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ contain either ܴܵܵܫ or ܶܶܮ. It is also appreciable that the number of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
results is increased when fewer metrics are combined. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 7.58 Airpwn Normal Traffic - 54 Slots - Distance & Mean. 
The ܦܴ and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results for the distance-mean configuration and the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 
dataset, when the sliding window length is ݊ ൌ 54, are presented in Figures 7.59.a and 
7.59.b, respectively. In terms of ܦܴ, all of the metric combinations using four, five 
and six metric generate 100% 	ܦܴ . The particular single metric that substantially 
reduces the ܦܴ results is ߂ܶ݅݉݁. Single metric (M60) ߂ܶ݅݉݁ is the only metric that 
produces 0% ܦܴ  results. Additionally, the only metric that is in all the metric 
combinations that do not produce 100% ܦܴ results is ߂ܶ݅݉݁. These are M23, M35, 
M44, M47, M52, M53, M54, and M60. In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ , there are 15 metric 
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combinations that produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results higher than 5%, in the case of ݊ ൌ 54 . 
Seven out of these 15 metric combinations (M23, M43, M44, M48, M58, M59, and 
M60) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 25%, reaching single metric (M59) ܶܶܮ up 
to 36.13% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ . Using this dataset, the test index M1, six metrics, once more 
produces the best results that could be achieved, 0% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. Similar to the previous 
results using the Normal traffic dataset, at least one of the metrics ߂ܶ݅݉݁, ܴܵܵܫ or 
ܶܶܮ, is in the metric combinations that generate that overpass 25% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 7.59 Airpwn ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 Traffic - 54 Slots - Distance & Mean. 
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Figures 7.60.a and 7.60.b present the ܦܴ and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results for the configuration 
distance-mean for the Airpwn ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 traffic dataset and ݊ ൌ 54. In terms of ܦܴ, a 
lower number of metric combinations produce 100% 	ܦܴ  than using the Airpwn 
ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 traffic dataset. However, only four metric combinations generate ܦܴ results 
lower than 90%. These are M35, M54, M60, and M63. Either ߂ܶ݅݉݁ or ܵܧܳ஽௜௙  is 
included in these four metric combinations. The test index M1, six metrics, produces 
100% ܦܴ, the best achievable results. Additionally, none of the metric combinations 
using four, five and six metric generate ܦܴ  lower than 99%. In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ , 
eleven metric combinations produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results higher than 5%. Three of these 
metric combinations (M58, M59, and M60) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 25%, 
reaching single metric (M58) ܴܵܵܫ up to 51.68% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ and (M59) ܶܶܮ up to 85.11% 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. In this case, the test index M1, six metrics, produces 0.05% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. Among 
the metric combinations using 5 metrics, only M2 and M5 generate completely perfect 
detection. Once more, it is clear that the combined use of four and above metrics 
generates better detection results overall than the combining lower number of metrics. 
Finally, Figures 7.61.a and 7.61.b present the ܦܴ  and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results for the 
configuration distance-mean for the Airpwn ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ traffic dataset and ݊ ൌ 54. 
In terms of ܦܴ, five metric combinations generate ܦܴ results lower than 90%. These 
are M48, M51, M54, M60, and M63. Again, either ߂ܶ݅݉݁ or ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ is included in 
these five metric combinations. The combination of six metrics (M1) produces 100% 
ܦܴ, the best achievable results. Additionally, none of the metric combinations using 
four, five and six metric generate ܦܴ lower than 90%. In terms of ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘, 13 metric 
combinations produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  results higher than 5%. Five of these metric 
combinations (M43, M44, M58, M59, and M60) produce ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ results higher than 
25%, reaching single metric (M58) ܴܵܵܫ up to 37.26% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ and (M59) ܶܶܮ up to 
94.69% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. Using the ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ dataset M1 produces 0.04% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. Once 
more, it is clear that the combined use of four and above metrics generates better 
detection results overall than the combining lower number of metrics. 
The presented results using all the network traffic dataset while implementing 
Airpwn attack indicate that the configuration of the methodology that produces the 
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best results overall is the utilisation of the Euclidean distance along with the mean to 
establish the reference of normality, when the length value of the sliding window is 
݊ ൒ 54 . For this ݊  value, the required processing time per frame ranges between 
53µsec and 68µsec. The use of the angle methodology to define the belief in ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ 
generally increases the number of ܨܲ  alarms. The only benefit of using the angle 
methodology appears in Airpwn ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 dataset, for ሾ7 ൑ ݊ ൑ 17ሿ, in which the ܦܴ 
results of the rest of configurations drops. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 7.60 Airpwn ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Traffic - 54 Slots - Distance & Mean. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 7.61 Airpwn ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Traffic - 54 Slots - Distance & Mean. 
7.3.3 Malicious Frames Within Initial Sliding Window 
The first time the proposed detection methodology starts the process of filling the 
initial sliding window, an attacker could alter the reference of normality injecting 
malicious frames into the initial sliding window. Nonetheless, even if there exist high 
proportion of malicious frames within the initial sliding window, the proposed 
methodology produces good detection results. 
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In order to calculate the maximum number of malicious frames that could be 
included into the initial sliding window before the detection performance drops, the 
detection process has been repeated several times introducing one additional malicious 
frame for each of the iterations. The results of these experiments are based on the 
percentage of ܦܴ results, the percentage of malicious frames within the initial sliding 
window, and the sliding window length. The results for these experiments were 
initially presented in [129]. The deauthentication Short Distance dataset and all the 
Airpwn attack datasets are used in these experiments. For the deauthentication attack, 
only the four metrics ܴܵܵܫ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ߂ܶ݅݉݁ െ ܰܣܸ  were used with the angle-
mean configuration, whilst the four metrics	ܴܵܵܫ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܶܶܮ െ ܰܣܸ were used 
for Airpwn attack. 
Figures 7.62 – 7.64 show the multi-layer results using the Airpwn datasets 
ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 , ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02  and ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ , respectively. There exists an evident 
consistency in the detection results of all these experiments. For any sliding window 
length larger than 12 frames, ݊ ൒ 12, the detection system produces perfect detection 
with up to 43% of malicious frames within the initial sliding window. A higher 
percentage of malicious frames causes the detection accuracy to drastically drop. This 
behaviour is constantly repeated for all the Airpwn attack datasets. 
Figure 7.65 shows the multi-layer results using the deauthentication Short 
Distance dataset. The detection system produces perfect detection with up to 20% of 
malicious frames within the initial sliding window, if the length of the sliding window 
is between 31 and 90 frames, ሾ31 ൑ ݊ ൑ 90]. If the sliding window length is ݊ ൑ 90, 
the system produces 100% ܦܴ including up to 13% of malicious frames within the 
initial sliding window. If the sliding window length is ݊ ൒ 31, the system is unable to 
produce higher than 95% ܦܴ including any amount of malicious frames within the 
initial sliding window. In contrast to the Airpwn attacks results, the DR results 
gradually drop along with the percentage of malicious frames within the initial sliding 
window. 
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Figure 7.62 Percentage of Malicious Frames in The Initial Sliding Window – 
Airpwn ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 Dataset. 
 
Figure 7.63 Percentage of Malicious Frames in The Initial Sliding Window – 
Airpwn ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 Dataset. 
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Figure 7.64 Percentage of Malicious Frames in The Initial Sliding Window – 
Airpwn ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ Dataset. 
 
Figure 7.65 Percentage of Malicious Frames in The Initial Sliding Window –
Deauthentication Attack – Short Distance Dataset 
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7.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented a thorough description of the results that prove 
effectiveness of the unsupervised anomaly based IDS presented in this thesis. The 
results have been generated by analysing all the considered datasets using the four 
proposed IDS configurations. The approach followed to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the detection system is to compare the detection results generated using the multi-
layer approach against the same methodology utilising different sets of metrics. 
A fundamental part of the evaluation experiments has been to assess the 
performance of the detection methodology using each of the system configurations. It 
is important to find the methodology that generates the best results. For the Long 
Distance experiments, the combination of metrics that produces the best detection 
results is ܴܵܵܫ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܰܣܸ െ ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ . Not including ߂ܶ݅݉݁  in the detection 
process improves the final detection results. For ݊ ൌ 29, the combined use of all the 
considered metrics produces ܦܴ  100% and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  0.87%, whereas the ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  is 
constantly reduced to 0.43% after the sliding window reaches 68 ൑ ݊. For ݊ ൌ 29, the 
use of the 4 metrics produces 100% ܦܴ and 0.43% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘. However, for 54 ൑ ݊, the 
4 metrics produces ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  0%. For this particular sliding window length, the 
combined use of the five metrics still produces ܦܴ 100% and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 0.87%. These 
results have been achieved using the distance-mode configuration, which has proven 
to outperform the detection results of the other three system configurations for this 
dataset. These results also show that increasing the length value of the sliding window 
reduces the number of ܨܲ alarms. For both set of metrics and these sliding window 
lengths, the system produces the detection results in an average time of 20µsec, when 
݊ ൌ 29, and 76µsec when ݊ ൌ 68. Since the average interarrival time between two 
consecutive frames is 55msec, the intrusion detection can be implemented in real time. 
Similar to the Long Distance experiments, the metric combination ܴܵܵܫ െ
ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܰܣܸ െ ܵܧܳ஽௜௙ outperforms the overall results of the combined use of the 
metrics five for the Short Distance dataset. Again, the distance-mode configuration 
outperforms the detection results of the other three system configurations for this 
dataset. For this dataset and this system configuration, the combined use of all the 
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considered metrics produces ܦܴ 100% and ܨܲ 0% when ݊ ൌ 60. However, the metric 
combination ܴܵܵܫ െ ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ െ ܰܣܸ െ ܵܧܳ஽௜௙  generates ܦܴ  100% and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  0% 
when ݊ ൌ 42. For ݊ ൌ 42, the use of all the considered metrics produces ܦܴ 100% 
and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 2%. For both set of metrics, 5 metrics and 4 metrics, the system produces 
the detection results in an average time of 77µsec and 63µsec, respectively, when 
݊ ൌ 60 . Since the average interarrival time between two consecutive frames is 
49msec, the intrusion detection can be implemented in real time. 
For the ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ dataset, the combination of all the available metrics produces the 
best detection results. For ݊ ൌ 31, the combined use of the six considered metrics 
produces ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  0%, using the system configurations distance-mode and distance-
mean. For this set of metrics and this sliding window length, the average processing 
time for the normal dataset is between 22µsec and 30µsec. Since the average 
interarrival time between two consecutive frames is 6.11msec, the intrusion detection 
process can fairly be implemented in real time. 
For the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01  dataset, the combined use of the six considered metrics 
produces ܦܴ 100% and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 0%, using the system configuration distance-mean and 
݊ ൌ 9. This configuration has proven to outperform the detection results of the other 
three system configurations for this dataset. Nonetheless, the difference with the other 
three methodology configuration variations is very small. Only after the sliding 
window length reaches 31 slots long, all the metric configurations generate ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
0%. Once more, the combined use of all the considered metrics produces the best 
detection results. The average time to process the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇01 dataset, using all the 
considered metrics ranges between 20µsec and 39µsec, when ݊ ൌ 31 . Since the 
average interarrival time between two consecutive frames is 10.1msec, the intrusion 
detection process can also be implemented in real time. 
For the ܣݐݐܽܿ݇02 dataset, all the system configurations produce	ܦܴ  100% for 
17 ൑ ݊ , but none of the four system configurations achieve 0% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ . The two 
configurations that make use of the distance generate 0.01% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ after the sliding 
window length reaches 89 slots long. The other two configurations using the angle 
generate 0.03% ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ for 89 ൑ ݊. The different between the results for this dataset 
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and the rest is that the angle-mean configuration produces the best ܦܴ results overall 
when the sliding window length is ሾ7 ൑ ݊ ൑ 17ሿ . For 17 ൐ ݊ , the system 
configuration that generates the best results is distance-mean. Similar to all the Airpwn 
datasets, the combined use of all the considered metrics produces the best detection 
results. The average interarrival time between two consecutive frames for this dataset 
is 2.37msec, whereas the average time required to process the dataset ranges between 
23µsec and 32µsec. 
For the ܯ݅ݔ݁݀	ܣݐݐܽܿ݇ dataset, all the methodology configurations produce ܦܴ 
100% when 8 ൑ ݊, but none of the four methodology configurations achieve ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 
0% for 158 ൒ ݊. The distance-mean is the configuration that produces the best results 
overall, generating ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  0.01% after the sliding window length reaches 91 slots 
long. For 31 ൑ ݊, none of the two configurations that use the distance overpasses 
ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 0.05%. The average time to process the dataset ranges between 22µsec and 
28µsec, whereas the average interarrival time between two consecutive frames is 
2.18msec. Hence, the intrusion detection process can also be implemented in real time. 
To summary up, the presented results have proven the effectiveness of the 
unsupervised anomaly based IDS presented in this thesis. Also, among all the system 
configurations, the use of the Euclidean distance makes the system to generate the best 
results. In the case of the deauthentication attack datasets, the mode is the best 
reference of normality. Whereas, the mean is the best reference of normality, in the 
case of the ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ  and the Airpwn attack datasets. In addition, the results 
demonstrate that using the multi-layer approach generates the best detection results 
overall. This is the case when analysing the ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ and the Airpwn attack datasets. 
For this datasets, the multi-layer approach generates better results than the same 
methodology utilising different sets of metrics. For the deauthentication attack 
datasets, there is one particular set of metrics that outperform the multi-layer approach. 
Nonetheless, the detection results generated by the multi-layer approach are still 
highly accurate. Similarly, for the ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܽ and the Airpwn attack datasets, there are 
cases in which the attack can be detected by using the information only from the single 
metric ܫܰܬோ௔௧௘ . However, using solely this single metric to detect deauthentication 
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attack would be highly ineffective. Therefore, for all the considered datasets, the 
combination of information from all the metrics produces the best results overall. 
The sliding window length that generates the best detection results has also been 
evaluated. All the datasets have been analysed multiple times varying the length of the 
sliding window, and the results have been compared. In the case of the 
deauthentication experiments, the minimum sliding window length that generates the 
best results is ݊ ൌ 60. For the Normal and all the Airpwn datasets, the minimum 
sliding window length that generates the best results is ݊ ൌ 31. From all the results, 
there is not a particular sliding window length that is appropriate for all the evaluated 
datasets. However, based on the results presented in this chapter, it is estimated that a 
sliding window length approximate to 60 slots long may generate good detection 
results, regardless of the attacks been analysed. The results presented have also proved 
that the proposed methodology is capable of being implemented in real time. Whilst 
the average time to process the datasets is of a few tens of µsec, the average 
interarrival time between two consecutive frames is a few msec. Therefore, the 
intrusion detection process can be fairly implemented in real time. 
In addition, the presented results have been used also to evaluate the maximum 
number of malicious frames that could be included within the initial sliding window 
before the accuracy of the detection results were affected. The results have shown that, 
for the Airpwn attack datasets and sliding window length larger than 12 frames, 
12 ൒ ݊, the detection system produces ܦܴ 100% and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  0%, comprising up to 
43% of malicious frames within the initial sliding window. A higher percentage of 
malicious frames makes the detection accuracy to drop drastically. On the other hand, 
for the deauthentication attack dataset and sliding window length is between 31 and 90 
frames, ሾ31 ൑ ݊ ൑ 90 ], the detection system produces ܦܴ  100% and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘  0%, 
comprising up to 20% of malicious frames within the initial sliding window. When the 
sliding window is 90 ൐ ݊, the initial sliding window can comprise 13% of malicious 
frames to generate ܦܴ 100% and ܨ ோܲ௔௧௘ 0%. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusions 
Wireless Networks based on the IEEE 802.11 standard have experienced a tremendous 
growth in popularity over the last decade. Unfortunately, these networks present 
vulnerabilities exploitable by cyber-attackers [51]. The IEEE 802.11 standard has 
proposed different security protocols, establishing traffic encryption and integrity 
protection to the network infrastructure, as well as avoiding unauthorised access to the 
wireless networks. However, all these security protocols are vulnerable to decryption 
analysis processes [49] [118]. Wireless networks cannot rely on these security 
protocols to protect the content of the communications. Therefore, the design of secure 
and reliable wireless networks presents a major challenge to security system designers. 
Any effort to provide an extra level of protection to a network has become an issue of 
critical importance. This thesis has tackled the insecurity of wireless networks and has 
proposed a novel security system able to detect wireless-specific attacks. 
There exist different types of wireless-specific attack that can compromise 
wireless networks. Initially, this thesis has presented an overview of the wireless-
specific attacks that more commonly compromise wireless networks. The purpose of 
this overview was to find, if possible, a common implementation pattern, which could 
help to identify a common detection or countermeasure mechanism against these 
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attacks. One of the countermeasures most commonly proposed in the literature is 
access control filters or MAC address filtering [50] [67]. However, it is easy to realise 
that the success of these mechanisms relies on the unequivocally identification of the 
attacker. Unfortunately, the MAC address in the frames is not a reliable approach to 
assess the real identity of the wireless device. An attacker can easily implement 
techniques of MAC address spoofing, and masquerade itself behind a fake MAC 
address. The efforts to provide reliable security should focus on the identification of 
the device that transmits the frames. The solution proposed in this thesis is to use, not 
only the MAC address, but also multiple other metrics from the wireless device or the 
wireless communication to infer the real identity of these devices. The higher the 
number of parameters or metrics used to identify the real identity of the wireless 
devices, the higher the probability to identify any attempt of an attacker to masquerade 
itself behind the spoofed identity of a legitimate wireless device. 
This thesis presents a security system that makes use of metrics from multiple 
layers of observation to produce a collective decision on whether an attack is taking 
place. Although there are cases in which IDSs that utilise the information from a 
single metric give positive detection results, the combined use of multiple metrics 
from the same or different protocol layers commonly outperform the detection of the 
single-layer IDSs. Among different methods, the D-S theory has been chosen in this 
thesis as the data fusion technique to combine the evidences from the different layers. 
Despite been proven as a powerful and efficient technique, the major challenge for 
applying D-S theory in IDS is to automatically determine the BPA values, based on 
the information extracted from the network measurements. 
The most important contribution of this thesis is a novel BPA methodology able 
to automatically adapt its probabilities assignment to the current characteristics of the 
wireless network, without requiring manual intervention from an IDS administrator. 
The current methods that perform the BPA process do not dynamically adapt to the 
measured characteristics of the monitored environment. The proposed approach is 
computationally simple, scalable and could easily applicable to other wireless 
technologies. The novel automatic, unsupervised and self-adaptive BPA methodology 
developed for this thesis is composed of three different and independent statistical 
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techniques, able of generating predictions regarding the presence of attacks, based on 
historical parameters. Only two of these techniques work independently in order to 
meet the requirement of the independency of the beliefs. The third technique is based 
on the outcome beliefs of the other two. Despite being rather simplistic, and dissimilar 
to well-known information management techniques, the combined utilisation of the 
three techniques applied to the different wireless network metrics produce a highly 
accurate detection system. The detection system is able to generate ??  100% and 
?????? 0% using the considered combination of metrics. The security system has been 
written in the C language, which provides great flexibility to be easily adapted or 
integrated to other security implementations. 
The proposed security system has been evaluated with a reduced number of 
datasets and attacks. The effectiveness of the IDS proposed in this thesis will be 
evaluated using five different wireless network datasets, generated with two particular 
wireless-specific attacks (i.e. Airpwn and deauthentication attacks), as well as a 
dataset with non-malicious information. There might be a concern about whether the 
number of experiments is large enough to prove the efficiency of this security 
mechanism. Whilst evaluating all the existing wireless-specific attacks would be the 
most appropriate decision to assure that the IDSs can identify all these attacks, 
research wise, evaluating all these attacks would be impractical. Nonetheless, the 
attacks implemented in this thesis are an adequate sample to showcase the efficiency 
of the IDSs. 
The proposed approach only requires a lightweight process for generating a 
baseline profile of normal utilisation, in order to generate high intrusion detection 
accuracy and low number of false alarms. A sliding window scheme is used to manage 
the information, implement the training process and construct an accurate statistical 
reference of normal behaviour. Only a reduced number of frames are required to 
generate a reference of normal wireless network behaviour. The best intrusion 
detection results for the evaluated datasets are achieved collecting as little as 60 
frames. Four different configurations of the proposed BPA methodology have been 
described. Although there are differences in the final detection results, all the 
configurations provide very precise detection results. The sliding window length also 
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influences the final detection results, as well as the time required to implement the 
intrusion detection analysis. The results have proven that the system is able to 
implement the intrusion detection in real time. For all the evaluated datasets, the 
processing time required to analyse each frame ranges between 45µsec and 71µsec. 
The presented results have proven the effectiveness of the detection system 
presented in this thesis, generating ?? 100% and ?????? 0% for most of the results. 
This performance is produced even if there exist a high proportion of malicious frames 
within the initial sliding window. These are, up to 43% of malicious frames within the 
initial sliding window using all the Airpwn datasets, and up to 20% of malicious 
frames within the initial sliding window using the deauthentication dataset. The used 
wireless-specific attacks have demonstrated the robustness of the detection approach 
irrespectively of the nature of the launched attack. To the best of the author 
knowledge, this is the first methodology able to efficiently identify Airpwn attack. 
8.2 Future Work 
Multiple research avenues still remain open in the field of wireless network intrusion 
detection. In the future, we would like to continue exploring some of these research 
avenues and enhancing the capabilities of the proposed IDS framework. 
One of these future researches is to implement the proposed framework in 
additional type of wireless communications. In Chapter 1 an early attempt to evaluate 
the proposed framework on a WiMAX network was discussed. This approach was not 
feasible for a number of reasons previously explained. However, the interest for 
security of this type of wireless communication technology is still very high. The need 
for further security methods is not restricted only to WiFi or WiMAX. Other wireless 
communication technologies such as LTE, WSNs, Personal Area Networks (PANs) or 
Bluetooth would also require additional level of protection against attacks. Therefore, 
evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed framework in all these wireless 
communication technologies would be desirable. 
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Another future research area is to provide strong resilience capabilities to the 
wireless networks against attacks, and make transparent to the user the presence of 
these attacks. In Chapter 4 were briefly introduced the concepts of IPSs and ITSs, 
which allow the system administrator to specify a set of reactions to be implemented 
in case of detecting an attack. In an early attempt to provide resilience capabilities to 
the proposed IDS framework, this was configured to shut the web browser of the user 
down in case an Airpwn attack was detected. Although this might seem a very crude 
defence action, malicious and spurious information is then never displayed in the web 
browser to the user. This action is a proof of concept, and an early attempt to respond 
to the attack. Other actions, such as alerting the user, changing the security 
configuration or disconnecting the wireless communication may not be effective. One 
of the defence actions for future research is to discard the frames considered 
malicious. This is a defence approach totally transparent to the users, which would 
keep the network correctly working, despite the presence of attack. In [70], researchers 
have started investigating this type of prevention approach. 
Providing active security mechanisms to IDSs is another future research that 
needs to be explored. The research presented in this thesis has obviated the fact that 
the IDS could also be compromised. However, similar to the wireless networks, IDSs 
are also targeted by attackers. This is a concern that has been previously arisen in [55] 
[139]. According to [36], these systems perform poorly defending themselves when 
they are targeted by attackers. 
Other future research includes the automatic generation of labelled datasets and 
the automatic selection of metrics. Whereas these are two different research avenues, 
both are dependent on one another. In Chapter 5, the concept of feature selection was 
introduced, along with the multiple drawbacks of current feature selection techniques. 
These techniques work as supervised implementations. These techniques work only if 
the records in the analysed datasets have been previously labelled. One possible 
research avenue to tackle this issue is to propose a feature selection technique that 
could be implemented when unsupervised. These techniques would not require 
previously labelled datasets in order to operate. Another possible research avenue to 
tackle this issue is to propose a technique that could correctly label the instances in the 
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analysed dataset automatically. This automatically labelled dataset could then be sent 
to a supervised feature selection technique for further analysis. 
Another further research avenue would be adding the proposed framework in a 
suite of tools with additional security mechanisms, or integrating it in a more complete 
and robust security system. There always exists the option of collaborating with other 
researching groups to extend the security capabilities of the proposed system, or 
working with any company who wanted to include the proposed framework in any 
commercial tool. 
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